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Introduction  
In September 2000, the world’s leaders adopted the UN Millennium Declaration, thereby 
committing all nations to exert stronger efforts to improve human welfare across the globe. 
This ambitious declaration defined a precise set of goals, known as the “Millennium 
Development Goals” (MDGs). Many international organizations in pursuit of progress 
towards completion of the MDGs are gathering data and making it comparable across 
countries. Most of the data produced in order to assess progress are, however, national 
averages; it is thus crucial to take into account that progress often differs widely across 
regions or groups in the same country. The emphasis in this study is placed on ethnicity. In 
particular, we analyze the situation of indigenous and afro-descendent groups vis-à-vis euro-
descendent and mestizo groups using micro-data from household surveys from fifteen LAC 
countries. This paper mainly focuses on the analysis of the first three MDGs: (1) Halving 
extreme poverty and hunger; (2) Achieving universal primary education; and (3) Promoting 
gender equality.   
Our sample includes fifteen LAC countries: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and 
Suriname. The sample represents almost 90% of the indigenous and afro-Latin population in 
LAC- making this paper, at least to the extent of our knowledge, the most representative 
analysis of poverty, educational outcomes and gender with respect to ethnicity for Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. We produce a large number of statistics by ethnicity that 
are included in this report, and can also be accessed and downloaded in a convenient format 
through www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/cedlas/ethnicity.
We have two main objectives. First, we explore the situation of indigenous and afro-
descendent individuals in terms of poverty, educational achievement and gender equality. In 
particular, we investigate the “distance” of these groups to the national average in some of the 
MDGs, and their performance during the last decade toward those goals. Comparisons with 
other groups (e.g. euro-descendents and mestizos) of both the present situation and past 
performance in relation to the MDGs are highlighted. Second, we perform a set of micro-
simulations to increase the understanding of the factors behind the income and educational 
disadvantages of indigenous and afro-descendent peoples, and to portray different scenarios 
(in terms of growth and redistribution) in which poverty within these groups can be 
significantly reduced.  
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 Chapter 1: Ethnicity in LAC 
In this chapter we propose an operational definition that allows us to identify ethnic groups in 
LAC household surveys. According to some estimates, there are over 50 million indigenous 
peoples and over 120 million individuals of afro-descent in LAC, representing almost 33% of 
the total population in the region. Despite this relevance, many censuses and household 
surveys in LAC have not nearly identified ethnicity; only until very recently have some 
surveys included such types of questions.  
We follow three general methods to identify ethnicity in household surveys. Depending on the 
country, we consider that a person is indigenous or of afro-descent if he or she: (i) identifies 
himself or herself as belonging to a certain ethnic group, (ii) identifies his or her native 
language or speaks an indigenous language, or (iii) lives in a territory that is mostly populated 
by persons from certain ethnic groups. We use self-perception as a method of identification in 
Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Suriname. We use language as an 
identification criterion in the cases of Chile, Ecuador, Haiti, and Paraguay, and regions in 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Honduras.  
In chapter 1 of the study we present a description of important socio-economic characteristics 
(location, household type and labor market variables) among individuals of indigenous and 
afro-descent. We find that average non-white families in LAC countries live in rural areas and 
are slightly larger (usually having more children) than white families. Also, we show evidence 
that a typical indigenous or afro-descendent male has the same participation rate in the labor 
market and experiences lower rates of unemployment than his white counterpart. 
Additionally, he has a higher probability of working in the primary sector of the economy, is 
usually self-employed and works in a small firm. The average indigenous or afro-descendent 
female, on the other hand, tends to have lower participation and employment rates than her 
white counterpart. 
Chapter 2: Poverty Reduction (MDG 1) 
In this chapter we provide descriptive evidence regarding the relationship between ethnicity 
and poverty. We analyze the situation of indigenous and afro-descendent people in terms of 
poverty and living conditions in fifteen LAC countries. We measure poverty with different 
indicators (headcount ratio, poverty gap and severity index) using international poverty lines 
(USD 1 a day a USD 2 a day at PPP), official poverty lines (extreme and moderate) and 50% 
of median income.  
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In almost every country and according to all poverty lines, non-white groups have higher 
poverty rates than white groups. For instance, the median ratio of non-white poverty to white 
poverty is 2.2 when using one dollar a day, and 1.8 when using two dollars a day.  
Differences in other indicators of living conditions are also significant. In urban areas, non-
whites have lower probabilities of access to safe water than do whites. Differences are more 
important regarding access to hygienic restrooms: on average, whites in urban LAC have 20% 
more access than do non-whites. In rural areas, these differences are smaller.  
To provide preliminary evidence on potential ethnic discrimination, we estimate wage 
equations, where we regress the log of wage on a model that defines ethnicity and several 
control variables. The coefficient associated with ethnicity essentially tells us how much more 
an individual expects to earn if he or she is non-white, holding constant the other 
characteristics. We find that these estimated coefficients are in general negative, meaning that 
the expected wage is reduced because of being non-white. We find that lower coefficients (i.e. 
more discrimination) are associated with higher poverty among non-whites.   
Chapter 3: Improving Educational Outcomes (MDG 2) 
In this chapter we first analyze educational outcomes from several perspectives, always 
highlighting the analysis of differences by ethnicity. We compute literacy rates, enrollment 
rates for different age groups, educational levels, and what is known as “school gaps”. We 
come to two important conclusions. First, we find that for children of primary school age, 
differences by ethnicity in all of these outcomes are not quantitatively important. That being 
said, however, it is also true that in some countries, differences do exist and should be 
addressed.  Second, we find that differences by ethnicity in educational outcomes do exist for 
individuals of secondary school and college age.  
Literacy rates are always higher for whites, for both the 10-65 and 15-24 age groups.  
Comparing estimates for the 10-65 and 15-24 age groups shows that differences between 
ethnic groups are narrower in the last case. In countries where we have information that has 
been collected for two years, we see that literacy rates for non-whites have been converging to 
those of whites. For instance, the literacy rates for whites and indigenous people aged 15-24 
in Mexico were 97% and 80% in 1992, and 98% and 93% in 2002, respectively. 
The gap in the primary school attendance rate for whites and non-whites is relatively 
important only in Panama and Guatemala, with 13 and 11 percentage points, respectively. 
Primary school enrollment rates have been increasing during the last decade in LAC countries 
for which we have information. At the same time, the gap between whites and non-whites has 
narrowed. Most LAC countries are performing well with respect to the accomplishment of the 
MDG 2 both for whites and non-whites. Only Haiti, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua 
show primary school enrollment rates below 90%.  
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In contrast, differences in secondary school attendance between whites and non-whites are 
considerably high in some cases. In nine out of thirteen countries, the enrollment rates for 
non-whites is more that 10 percentage points lower than for whites. Also, differences by 
ethnicity in the enrollment rates for tertiary education are strikingly high in some countries, 
including Panama, Mexico, and Honduras.  
The schooling gap measures the number of years of missed education. The school gap of non-
whites for the 13-19 age group varies across countries, from 2.1 in Bolivia to 5.2 in 
Nicaragua. The school gap is higher for non-whites than for whites in all countries for the 13-
19 age group and in eleven out of thirteen for the 20-25 age group. This means, for example, 
that a young indigenous Guatemalan is missing, on average, 5.1 years education, while his 
white counterpart has missed only 2.9 years of education. 
Differences in ethnicity are explicitly considered to be unacceptable sources for differences in 
access to education in the United Nations Millennium Declaration. In this chapter, we use 
econometric tools to assess how being indigenous or of afro-descent affects the probability of 
school attendance. We estimate the conditional probabilities of attending school in order to 
capture differences between groups. The coefficients associated with ethnicity are interpreted 
as the difference in the enrollment rates when we compare two individuals that have the same 
(average) characteristics, with ethnicity as the only exception. The results indicate that, for 
primary education, ethnic discrimination exists only in Brazil, Guatemala and Panama; it is 
important to note that ethnic discrimination has decreased in Brazil (from 1995 to 2002), and 
disappeared in Mexico (from 1992 to 2002) and Costa Rica (from 1992 to 2001). The results 
also suggest statistically significant differences in secondary enrollment rates due to ethnicity 
in Paraguay and Honduras. We find ethnic discrimination in college for all countries, 
excluding Bolivia, Chile and Peru. 
If family background explains children’s opportunities, then social mobility is low. We 
compute educational mobility indices based on Andersen (2001) for teenagers (aged 13-19) 
and young adults (aged 20-25) by ethnicity for all LAC countries in the sample. The SMI is 
lower for non-whites than for whites, in only three out of thirteen countries. The fact that the 
SMI is higher for non-whites than for whites may indicate that younger generations of non-
whites might not be entrapped by their family background (at least compared to whites).  
Also, in this chapter we try to assess whether whites are more educated than non-whites 
because they have higher returns to education. We follow the methodology of Di Gresia 
(2004) to estimate the determinants of the university attendance decision, taking into account 
the expected return to education. We find that the returns to education have a positive effect 
over the probability of college attendance both for whites and non-whites. The coefficients 
associated with the returns to education suggest that whites have greater incentives to receive 
education than do non-whites because when facing the decision of entering college, they 
perceive a higher return to education. 
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Chapter 4: Increasing Gender Equity (MDG 3) 
The Millennium Development Goal 3 refers to the elimination of gender disparity in all levels 
of education by the year 2015. Latin America and the Caribbean is one of the regions in the 
world where the usual indicators of education show a relatively high gender equity- this holds 
when analyzing the sample by ethnicity. However, there are some exceptions worth noting. 
Whereas some countries do not exhibit this equality (e.g. Guatemala), in others, gender 
equality holds only in primary education, which is typically mandatory; in these countries, 
males tend to have higher secondary education enrollment rates.  
As a measure for gender discrimination in educational scenarios, the MDGs propose the ratio 
of literate women to men aged 15–24 years old. This Literacy Gender Parity Index is 
considerably lower than 1 only for those indigenous and afro-descendants living in Peru 
(0.77), Panama (0.78) and Guatemala (0.85). The corresponding figures for whites are 0.92, 
1.00 and 0.94, respectively. The other countries show no major differences by ethnicity in the 
ratio of literate women and men aged 15-24. Thus, most LAC countries in our sample seem to 
be performing well with respect to the MDG Literacy Gender Parity Index. 
The ratio of girls to boys attending school is used as an indicator to monitor progress towards 
Goal 3, which regards gender equality in school enrollment.  For children between 6-12 years 
old, we find gender equality in enrollment rates for both whites and non-whites in all 
countries, with the exception of Honduras and Panama for non-whites only, and Guatemala 
both for whites and non-whites. The 13-15 age cohort shows the smallest differences in 
school enrollment rates, by gender. Only non-white girls living in Ecuador, Guatemala and 
Mexico lag behind boys in the same age groups. We have found an increase in enrollment 
rates for non-white women and men in every country during the past few years. 
There is evidence of statistical gender discrimination in access to primary education only for 
non-whites living in Guatemala and Panama. Bolivia and Peru show gender discrimination at 
the secondary school level for non-whites. Only among non-whites in Guatemala do we find 
gender discrimination in access to tertiary education. In summary, our results suggest that in 
most Latin American countries there is no evidence for gender discrimination with respect to 
access of education for both whites and non-whites.  
The share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector is also part of the 
MDG 3. We show that the proportion of women living in rural areas who work in agriculture 
is higher for non-whites than for whites. Finally, we find evidence on the existence of gender 
wage discrimination both for whites (in all countries) and non-whites (in all countries, 
excluding Honduras and Paraguay).  
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Chapter 5: Achieving MDG Number One for Non-Whites 
In this chapter we use a simple micro-simulation technique to estimate the effect at the 
national level of achieving the MDGs for the indigenous and afro-descendant populations in 
the Latin American and Caribbean countries in our sample. To this end, we simulate the 
implementation of a transfer program that allows indigenous and afro-descendent individuals 
to be relieved of poverty. The reduction in the poverty incidence at the national level varies 
widely between countries, ranging from 27 percentage points in the case of Haiti (from 51% 
to 24%) to 0.07 percentage points for Chile (from 3.53% to 3.46%). As expected, national 
poverty reduction is higher for those countries with a larger non-white population (i.e. Haiti, 
Bolivia, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Brazil).  
It is useful to examine two basic ways in which the extent of poverty can be reduced: growth 
in the mean and/or reduction in inequality. Following ECLAC/IPEA/UNDP (2003), we 
present isopoverty curves that allow us to have an idea of the effort, in terms of income 
redistribution as well as economic growth, which would allow indigenous and afro-
descendent individuals to halve their poverty incidence. The estimated isopoverty curves are 
relatively “flat”, implying that the poverty reduction impact of even a small transfer program 
is equivalent to that of many percentage points in accumulated economic growth. For 
example, in the case of Ecuador, an annual growth rate of 6% between 1998 and 2015 is 
equal, in terms of poverty reduction, to an income transfer 0.48% from income of the wealthy 
to poor non-whites. In the case of Bolivia, for instance, the MDG 1 poverty reduction target 
for the indigenous would be achieved, with no economic growth, and with a redistribution of 
3.6% from total income of the wealthy to indigenous people in poverty.  
Summarizing, the isopoverty curves show that the impact of even a small income 
redistribution from wealthy individuals to non-whites is equivalent to that of a relatively large 
annual growth rate until 2015. However, the simulation of a counterfactual income 
distribution through the mechanisms described above is a simple arithmetic exercise: there is 
no guarantee that it would be consistent either with (i) household behavior, and (ii) a general 
equilibrium of the markets in the economy (Ferreira and Leite, 2003). 
Chapter 6: Explaining Differences Between Whites and Non-Whites: 
Microeconometric Decompositions 
A countless number of factors may explain the differences in poverty rates between whites 
and non-whites in the Latin American and Caribbean countries. In this chapter, we 
concentrate on six of these factors: i) returns to education; ii) the gender wage gap; iii) returns 
to experience; iv) the dispersion in the endowment of unobservable factors; v) hours of work; 
and vi) the education of the active population. This chapter is aimed at estimating the size and 
the relative magnitude of the effects of these factors for explaining differences in poverty 
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incidence between whites and non-whites. To achieve this, we adapt the microeconometric 
decomposition methodology of Bourguignon et al. (2004) and Gasparini et al.  (2004).  
The basic idea of the decompositions is to simulate the income distribution of group g (non-
whites) if some of its determinants were those of group g’ (whites), and compare that 
counterfactual income distribution to the real one of group g. The difference between the two 
distributions can be attributed to differences between g and g’ in the selected determinants. 
The observed and simulated income distributions can be compared in terms of a poverty 
index.  
We find that the two most compelling poverty-increasing factors for non-whites are related to 
education: the returns-to-education effect, and the education effect. In eight out of twelve 
countries, the returns-to-education effect is poverty-decreasing. In countries such as Bolivia, 
Mexico, and Ecuador, if the returns to education of  indigenous people were equal to those of 
white people, the poverty incidence for the first group would be more than 10 percentage 
points lower. In Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Guatemala, and Honduras, the difference in the 
returns to education also has a negative impact of about 5 percentage points in the indigenous 
and afro-descendent poverty incidence.  
The differences in the education structure of the active population are important factors to the 
twelve countries in our sample. The indigenous and afro-descendant active populations tend 
to be less educated than their white counterparts. These differences have a negative effect in 
non-whites’ poverty incidence for eleven countries. The largest effects are observed in 
Mexico and Panama, where the education effect accounts for 15 and 13 percentage points of 
the difference in poverty incidence between whites and non-whites. In Honduras, Paraguay 
and Ecuador, the education effect accounts for more than 5 percentage points of the difference 
in poverty incidence by ethnicity. 
In the second part of the chapter we implement the methodology proposed in Gasparini 
(2000) for the microeconometric decomposition of differences in the rates of school 
attendance by ethnicity for three education levels: primary; secondary; and tertiary. The 
method quantifies the fraction of the school attendance differential that can be attributed to a 
difference in characteristics between two groups (“characteristic effect”), and the proportion 
that is due to differences in the way those characteristics are linked to the schooling decision 
(“parameter effect”). The characteristic effect would be larger if the difference in school 
enrollment between white and non-white children were mainly driven by differences in some 
of the characteristics of these groups, such as household income, parental education, 
household size, and location. Instead, differences might be mainly driven by other factors 
(e.g. preferences) that imply different schooling decisions by ethnicity, even in the case of 
similar characteristics. In this case, the parameter effect would be larger in our decomposition.    
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We find that differences in individual characteristics among children of primary school 
attending age explain a large portion of the difference between rates of school attendance for 
whites and non-whites, in all countries. This conclusion applies to the three educational 
levels. The characteristic effects are always negative and, in most cases, they are larger than 
the parameter effects. This implies that differences in household per capita income, parental 
education, household size, and location are the most important factors behind the differences 
in enrollment rates between whites and non-whites. Differences in the way individuals make 
schooling decisions based on their characteristics (driven, for instance, by preferences) appear 
less important sources for differences in enrollment rates between ethnicity groups. 
Chapter 7: Policies to Meet the MDGs  
The underlying causes of poverty among the indigenous and individuals of afro-descent are 
largely structural. In addition, inequity manifests itself in terms of discrimination and 
inequality of opportunities for the indigenous and afro-descendant population with respect to 
access of basic services. Language, cultural differences and physical isolation can be 
important determinants of their situation, yet “social exclusion”, due to racial, ethnic and 
religious prejudice, tends to worsen their situation. Moreover, these groups have traditionally 
been excluded from the political process, thereby limiting their abilities to lobby for 
resources. Only until recently has this begun to change, especially since the transitions to 
democracy most Latin American countries experienced.  
In this chapter we revise different policies to address the specific problems from which 
indigenous and afro-descendent populations suffer. The basic discussion regarding this issue 
is divided in two tendencies. Some people consider that both indigenous and afro-descendent 
individuals have to be treated as any other impoverished group of society and included in 
programs targeted to the poor population as a whole. Other individuals argue that indigenous 
and afro-descendant populations have cultural specificities that can only be addressed by 
special programs tailored to them.  
To understand the profile of poor households and assess how government policies affect their 
welfare, it is necessary to have extensive, detailed and precise knowledge of the 
characteristics and behavior of the households in terms of income generation, consumption, 
location and access to social services. It has become clearer that it is necessary to improve the 
data-collecting tools in order to more accurately reflect the situation of the ethnic minorities in 
Latin America. If countries wish to address the challenges faced by the indigenous and afro-
descendant population, the need to develop a set of standardized questions for surveys is 
urgent.  
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the role of indigenous peoples and 
language heterogeneity, which was reflected in the creation of intercultural bilingual 
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education programs. Various studies suggest that the implementation of this educational 
model can improve the performance of indigenous peoples through increasing enrollment 
rates, educational results and the level of attendance at school among girls, also reducing 
gender gaps in education, furthering comprehension of Spanish and increasing the 
participation of parents at school. 
The experience of affirmative action policies in Latin America is still novel. The main 
challenge related to this type of policy is to identify the targeted population in a society that 
has more inter-racial marriages than in the US. The questions that remain to be answered 
before initiating this type of program are ‘who is black?’ and ‘who is indigenous?’ The use of 
a self-identification method can be a problem if the result of identifying oneself as black gives 
benefits with certainty. 
A large problem related especially to some infrastructure projects undertaken in many 
countries is involuntary resettlement. Involuntary resettlement can have a dramatic impact on 
the lives of people living in areas that are undergoing large-scale development projects. 
Resettlement should be planned by trying to improve the living standards, physical security, 
productive capacity and income levels of the people affected or to restore these conditions to 
former levels within a reasonable time frame. Indigenous peoples represent a special case for 
resettlement because of their deep attachment to land and location. To date, there are only a 
handful of accounts of successful resettlements involving indigenous peoples. Nevertheless, 
indigenous social organization, cultural values and attachment to the land reflect centuries of 
practice, adaptation and survival strategies and hence, as a general rule, resettlement should 
be avoided. 
Neither micro-enterprise nor social investment funds were originally designed to address rural 
poverty- a few countries have established specific funds for indigenous people. Social funds 
targeted to indigenous populations are distinguished by their approach and methodology. 
Typically, they have to address the features that differentiate the indigenous population from 
other sectors amongst the poor. There are four factors that are particularly important to this: 
(i) geographic isolation; (ii) social exclusion, based on ethnic or racial prejudice; (iii) social 
and cultural differences, covering areas such as language, structures of authority and 
economic values; and (iv) need to strengthen the capacity of indigenous organizations. 
In the past few years, demands for land originating from NGOs representing indigenous 
peoples have begun to increase. There is a widespread consciousness among the indigenous 
that land is the main resource in order avoid poverty. Policies geared toward improving land 
productivity and distribution might have important effects on poverty reduction. Accessible 
credit and proper titling, too, have become priorities.  
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Chapter 1 
Ethnicity and the Millennium 
Development Goals in Latin America and the Caribbean*
In September 2000, the world’s leaders adopted the UN Millennium Declaration, committing 
all nations to exert stronger efforts to improve human welfare across the globe. This ambitious 
declaration adopted by the General Assembly and ratified by other International 
Organizations defined a precise set of goals, numerical targets and quantifiable indicators to 
assess progress in several areas related to development. These objectives are now known as 
the “Millennium Development Goals” (MDGs), encompassing eight goals, eighteen targets 
and over fifty indicators (see Table 1.1). Taking the year 1990as a baseline, the MDGs to be 
achieved by 2015 include: (1) Halving extreme poverty and hunger; (2) Achieving universal 
primary education; (3) Promoting gender equality; (4) Reducing under-five mortality by two-
thirds; (5) Reducing maternal mortality by three-quarters; (6) Reversing the spread of 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis; (7) Ensuring environmental sustainability; and (8) 
Developing a global partnership for development. 
The progress towards the completion of the MDGs is being followed by many International 
Organizations, which are gathering data and making it comparable across countries. Most of 
the data produced to assess progress are, however, national averages. It is crucial to take into 
account that, while national performance indicators help to convey what is happening to a 
given country’s population, progress often differs widely across regions or groups within the 
same country. Countries with good average performance indicators might contain groups in 
the population that are being left behind- consequently, indicators used to assess national 
progress towards the MDGs may not adequately reflect the living conditions of many 
individuals. Some countries might, for instance, be involuntarily advancing via a top-down 
approach, investing resources in groups that are easier to reach, such as the middle class or 
urban population. For this reason, sub-national trends deserve attention even among countries 
that appear to be performing well in the aggregate. In an attempt to fill this informational gap, 
the aim of this paper is to determine if within LAC countries, there are differences between 
target groups as proposed by the Millennium Declaration.  
The emphasis in this study is placed on ethnicity. In particular, we analyze the situation of 
indigenous and afro-descendent groups vis-à-vis euro-descendent and mestizo groups, using 
household surveys from fifteen LAC countries and using, when possible, comparable 
methodologies. 
                                                 
* All the tables included in this chapter can be downloaded from 
www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/cedlas/ethnicity.
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1. MDGs in Latin America1
Many human development indicators in LAC are converging to the levels of wealthy 
countries. Some goals proposed in the Millennium Declaration were chosen taking into 
account the situation of countries that are less developed than the average country in the LAC 
region. For example, when comparing gender differences in education, in the case of LAC, 
women are equally and sometimes more educated than men. A similar situation occurs with 
populations living on less than one-dollar a day. Although this is not a good measure to define 
poverty in most LAC countries, it is still relevant in, for instance, for Sub-Saharan African 
countries.2 Here, we briefly introduce each goal and give a perspective of the relative situation 
of Latin America with respect to the rest of the world. 
Goal 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. As seen in Graph 1.1, this target has already 
been met in East Asia and the Pacific (mainly due to the extraordinary performance of China), 
while in the rest of the developing countries, more effort remains needed. Extreme poverty 
(i.e. 1 U$S PPP) declined everywhere during the last ten years, except in the poorest region of 
the world, Sub-Saharan Africa. A similar pattern is observed when measuring poverty 
according to 2 U$S PPP. In this case, it is clear that the situation in LAC countries is 
disappointing. 
- Insert Graph 1.1 - 
We can think of changes in income poverty as the result of changes in average income and 
changes in income inequality. During the 70s, the LAC region experienced a significant fall in 
poverty, mainly due to growing economies with stable income distributions. The 80s, 
however, experienced an opposite turn of events, with falling incomes and more unequal 
distributions combining to generate an important increase in poverty statistics. During the 90s, 
again a different combination of events was observed: despite some un-equalizing changes in 
the income distribution, the recovery of several LAC economies generated a reduction in the 
poverty indicators for the region as a whole as well as in most countries.3 Overall, in the last 
three decades the region has experienced a substantial fall in poverty. Still, the region requires 
an aggregate reduction of several points in poverty to accomplish the MDGs. Even if this is 
accomplished, it should be clear that this would not imply achieving the goals in every 
country; moreover, this would not imply the fulfillment of goals for every group within each 
country. 
                                                 
1 This section was based on data from http://www.developmentgoals.org/ (that belongs to the World Bank) and 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/povmonitor/. 
2 See Besley and Burguess (2003). 
3 See Wodon (2000), Wodon (2001), Székely (2001), Sala-i-Martin (2002), CEDLAS (2004). 
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Goal 2. Achieve universal primary education. In the case of education, the situation is 
different (see Graph 1.2). Many regions including LAC are on track to reach the target by 
2015. Moreover, LAC countries have experienced the greatest increase in the primary 
completion rate. Nevertheless, the evidence presented in this paper suggests large differences 
across and within countries, which should be considered in order to target educational policies 
towards reaching the poorest. 
- Insert Graph 1.2 - 
Goal 3. Promote gender equality and empower women. In most developing countries, gender 
gaps still exist in enrollment at all levels of education. In the case of LAC, as seen in Graph 
1.2, girls have reached boys in the enrollment rate of primary and secondary education. 
However, even though regional averages show a great advancement among women as a 
whole, there are still persistent problems between certain groups of women; the greatest 
differences are between the rich and poor, urban and rural regions, and ethnic origins. In this 
study, we show that in almost every country the levels of education of indigenous women are 
significantly lower than those of non-indigenous women.  
Goal 4. Reduce child mortality. In 2001, the average under-five mortality rate was 121 deaths 
per 1,000 live births in low-income countries, 41 in lower-middle-income countries, and 27 in 
upper-middle-income countries. In high-income countries, the rate was less than 7.4 Usually, 
the cause of child death is a disease or a combination of diseases and malnutrition that could 
be preventable.5  
In LAC, children’s health has been improving steadily over the past decades and it appears as 
though the region will achieve this MDG. As with the previous goals, the situation varies 
considerably from country to country as well as within countries. For instance, child mortality 
rates range from 80 per 1,000 live births in Haiti is to 7 per 1,000 in Cuba.. If we look at intra-
country differences, in most of the countries, the situation is more severe in rural zones than it 
is in the urban areas, especially in Peru (28/60), Brazil (42/65) and Bolivia (53/100).6  
Goal 5. Improve maternal health. Even though maternal mortality is higher in all developing 
regions than in developed countries, within developing countries we can identify two groups; 
whereas Eastern Europe, Central and Eastern Asia, Middle East, North Africa and LAC 
countries have maternal mortality rates lower than 200 per 100,000 live birth,  South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa have maternal mortality rates much higher (600 and 900 per 100,000 live 
birth, respectively). Still, some authors have pointed out that maternal mortality rates in LAC 
                                                 
4 See World Bank (2004). 
5 The most common causes being acute respiratory infections, diarrhea, measles, and malaria. 
6 OPS/WHO (2003). 
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did not improve during the last decade7 and that, again, country differences are important, 
ranging from 27 in Uruguay to 680 in Haiti per 100,000 live births. 
Goal 6. Fight HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. HIV prevalence rates are still increasing 
for men and women in the developing world. The rate is seven times higher in developing 
countries than developed countries for women and almost three times higher for men. If we 
look at LAC, the situation has recently been deteriorating; even if the prevalence index of 
HIV is low (relative to other regions), there are signs that the disease is propagating more 
rapidly, especially in the Caribbean and Central America. Also, in this case, certain groups 
within the population are more susceptible to the disease than others (e.g. individuals with 
little or no education). The condition with respect to tuberculosis is also grave. According to 
the World Health Organization, the world’s rate of death as a consequence of tuberculosis is 
28 per 100,000 inhabitants. In LAC the average rate is 41, four times the rate of developed 
countries. 
Goal 7. Ensure environmental sustainability. In this paper, when analyzing Goal 7 we focus 
on living conditions of the population (access to water, sanitation and secure dwelling) and  
for expository simplicity, we associate that to poverty in place of environmental 
sustainability.  
An estimated 75 million people do not have access to clean water in their regions8; these 
individuals represent 7% of urban and 39% of rural populations. Approximately 116 million 
people (13% of urban and 52% of rural populations) do not have access to sanitary services. 
Deficient sewage and water services are proven to directly cause the deterioration of health 
conditions and the increase of gastrointestinal diseases, premature death and diminution of life 
expectancy. This means that deterioration of water conditions may have an impact on other 
goals, especially those related to health, thus highlighting the urgency to improve this 
situation.  
Goal 8. Develop a global partnership for development. According to the World Bank, this 
calls for an open, rule-based trading and financial system, more generous aid to countries 
committed to poverty reduction, and relief of debt problems in developing countries. It also 
calls for cooperation with the private sector to address youth unemployment, ensure access to 
affordable, essential drugs, and make available the benefits of new technologies.  
In this paper, we shall focus on the analysis of goals 1, 2, 3 and part of goal 7 for three 
reasons. First, some goals are more relevant than others for LAC as a region, in the sense that 
there are goals in which significant improvements remain to be seen (such as the case of goal 
                                                 
7 AbouZahr and Wardlaw (2001). 
8 IDB (2003). 
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1 and part of goal 7). Second, some goals are almost achieved in the aggregate- it is thus 
important to check if some groups are left behind (as in the cases of goals 2 and 3). Finally, in 
the event that it would be desirable to analyze goals 4, 5, and 6, it is impossible to do so with 
household survey data that does not include information on health. 
2. Ethnicity and the MDGs 
In addition to achieving the MDGs, countries should aim to achieve them in a context of 
equal opportunities for every citizen, regardless of ethnicity, gender, age-group or location. 
More specifically, we will analyze the MDGs through the lens of ethnicity and, in some cases, 
gender. In many cases, however, we will be implicitly analyzing differences associated with 
location as in several countries indigenous and afro-descendent groups live in some specific 
areas- or with age-groups, as many of the MDGs are targeted to individuals belonging to 
specific age-groups. 
At this point one might wonder why ethnicity will be analyzed versus other characteristics: 
Latin America and the Caribbean is a racially and ethnically diverse region and, at the same 
time, it has a highly unequal distribution of income, suggesting that the level of well-being 
might not be equitably distributed between races. Furthermore, the fact that indigenous people 
are poorer, less educated and experience worse living conditions than the non-indigenous 
population in Latin America is a well-known fact. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (1994) 
analyzed in great detail the situation of indigenous peoples in the four Latin American 
countries having the largest indigenous populations: Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru. 
They found a higher incidence of poverty, worse living conditions and lower levels of 
educational attainment among indigenous peoples. Is that still the case? What is happening 
with indigenous people in other LAC countries? And what is the situation of afro-descendent 
people? 
Our sample includes fifteen LAC countries: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and 
Suriname.9 It is estimated that the actual population of LAC is approximately 510 million 
people, of which approximately 172 million are non-white (i.e. indigenous or afro-descendent 
individuals). Our sample represents almost 90% of those indigenous and afro-Latin persons- 
making this paper, at least to the extent of our knowledge, the most representative analysis of 
                                                 
9 From Latin America, only Argentina, Uruguay, El Salvador and Venezuela were excluded from our sample. In 
the first two countries less than 1% of the population is indigenous or of afro-descent, making it impossible to 
analyze ethnicity using household surveys (i.e. specially designed surveys would be required to analyze ethnicity 
in these countries). In El Salvador the number of indigenous people is higher (almost 7%) but the survey did not 
allow us to identify ethnic groups. In Venezuela approximately 10% of the population is afro-descendent and 
0.9% is indigenous, however it was not possible to identify them using the survey. 
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poverty, educational outcomes and gender with respect to ethnicity for Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. 
We have two main objectives. First, we explore the situation of indigenous and afro-
descendent people in terms of poverty, educational achievement and gender equality. In 
particular, we investigate the “distance” of these groups to the national average in some of the 
MDGs, and their performance during the last decade toward those goals. Comparisons with 
other groups (e.g. euro-descendents and mestizos10) of both the present situation and past 
performance in relation to the MDGs will be highlighted.  
Second, we will perform a set of micro-simulations to increase the understanding of the 
factors behind the income and educational disadvantages of indigenous and afro-descendent 
peoples, and to portray different scenarios (in terms of growth and redistribution) in which 
poverty in these groups can be significantly reduced. 
3. How Many Indigenous and Black People Live in LAC Countries? 
In this section we make an attempt to define ethnicity and to determine an operational 
definition that allows us to identify ethnic groups in LAC household surveys. We also try to 
determine, using several different sources, the number of indigenous and afro-descendent 
people who live in Latin America and the Caribbean today.  
The concept of “ethnic group” refers to people who share a common language, territory, 
cultural background and/or physical characteristics and are somehow embedded in the rest of 
the society.11 This means that within what we usually call indigenous and afro-descendent 
people, there exist potentially many ethnic groups.12 Indeed, Latin American’s ethnic 
spectrum is very diverse. It comprises communities of people who speak very different 
languages, and share different cultures and traditions. There are approximately 400 different 
indigenous languages spoken throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.13 Moreover, 
among what we usually call indigenous peoples, there are descendent from very diverse pre-
Columbian tribes. Afro-descendent people also have heterogeneous backgrounds: among 
them there include individuals whose ancestors were brought (or came) to Latin America in 
different times, from different countries and with a diverse cultural background. Some of 
these groups have remained isolated while others have mixed with the rest of the society, 
leading to further ethnic diversity. 
                                                 
10 The word mestizos refers to people who have both European and indigenous heritage. 
11 Urban and Sherzer (1992). 
12 See Gonzales (1994) for an interesting discussion about the culture heterogeneity among indigenous people in 
Latin America. 
13 See SIL (1988) and Homberger (1992) for details.  
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As we shall see later, despite this cultural diversity, indigenous peoples and afro-descendents 
share a common characteristic: they are usually among the poorest and least educated people 
in all LAC countries. Because the goal of this paper is precisely to analyze those kinds of 
characteristics (included among the MDGs), we will ignore any cultural heterogeneity and 
focus on the situation of two aggregated groups: indigenous and afro-descendent people vis-à-
vis euro-descendent people.14  
Unfortunately, the definition of ethnicity is too broad for it to allow a precise identification of 
who and who is not of indigenous or afro-descent. Therefore, the number of people belonging 
to these groups in each country is not clearly determined (from a conceptual point of view). 
Moreover, estimations vary (in many cases widely) depending on the operative definition of 
ethnicity and on the source of the data, that is, whether it is a census or a survey. 
According to some estimates there are more than 50 million indigenous people and more than 
120 million afro-descendents in LAC (see Table 1.2). This represents almost 33% of the total 
population of the region. The heterogeneity in ethnic structure between countries, however, is 
great. In Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru and Ecuador more that 25% of the total population is 
indigenous whereas in Panama, Brazil, Nicaragua and almost every Caribbean country more 
than 25% of the population is black. On the other hand, in some other countries such as 
Argentina and Uruguay, only a small percentage of the population is indigenous or afro-
descendent. 
Despite the size of indigenous and afro-descendent populations, many censuses and 
household surveys in LAC have not identified ethnicity, at all. Only until very recently have 
some surveys included such types of questions. Furthermore, in the majority of cases the 
questions used to identify ethnicity vary between countries (and in many cases within 
countries, over time), thus impeding comparisons.  
We follow three general methods to identify ethnicity in household surveys. Depending on the 
country, we consider that a person is indigenous or afro-descendent if he or she: (i) identifies 
himself or herself as belonging to a certain ethnic group, (ii) identifies his or her native 
language or speaks an indigenous language, or (iii) lives in a territory that is mostly populated 
by persons from a given ethnic group. Each method has some advantages and some 
drawbacks. 
Many household surveys ask the individual if he or she considers himself or herself as 
belonging to certain ethnic group. This self-identification question can be used directly to 
                                                 
14 Further research should tackle the task of analyzing the situation of each ethnic group within indigenous and 
within afro-descendent peoples. Household surveys, however, will not be very useful for such a purpose because 
they are not designed to be representative of small specific groups. As a matter of fact, to the extent of our 
knowledge, such data does not currently exist in LAC countries. 
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identify ethnicity. In fact, an ethnic group is defined by some authors as “a self-reproducing 
social collectivity identified by myths of a common provenance and by identifying 
markers”.15 The advantage of relying on self-identification is that it avoids language 
proficiency issues and it allows individuals to choose whether or not they consider themselves 
as indigenous/blacks. This method’s drawback, however, is that classification as belonging to 
a certain ethnic group depends on how the survey’s question is asked, in what situation and by 
whom.16 This is particularly important where discrimination and social prejudice can induce 
the individual to deny affiliation to a certain ethnic group. We will use self-perception as a 
method of identification in Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and 
Suriname.  
Alternatively, even if the household survey lacks information on self-identification, it may ask 
the individual whether he or she speaks an indigenous language. The underlying assumption 
(and main advantage) when using language as an identification variable is that language 
differences will exist until the ethnic group is completely integrated into the rest of the 
society. It can be claimed, however, that this might not be the case in those situations where 
primary education is predominantly given in the “official” language (i.e. Spanish, Portuguese, 
English or French, depending on the country). More importantly, if that “language policy” 
persists for a long period of time, it is likely that the native language would tend to disappear. 
For many years that was the case in almost every LAC country, and it is for this reason that 
we decided to use language only as a second resource to identify ethnicity; to partially 
overcome this drawback, we will consider as indigenous all those individuals who speak an 
indigenous language (even if they also speak the “official” language).  There are typically 
three types of questions regarding language: one asks about the individual native tongue, the 
other about the ability of speaking an indigenous language and a final question asks the 
household head whether at least one individual in the household can speak an indigenous 
language. We will use language as an identification criterion in the cases of Chile, Ecuador, 
Haiti, and Paraguay. 
Finally, a more imperfect way of identifying ethnicity is by the region in which the individual 
lives. This method essentially relies on the fact that some ethnic groups are geographically 
concentrated. The main advantage of this method is that it avoids any subjectivity. The 
disadvantage is, of course, that some individuals might be wrongly classified if segregation is 
                                                 
15 Smith (1990). 
16 Gonzales (1994) claims that it is believed that the self-identification method may lead to underestimation 
especially when asked in the form “Are you indigenous?”. On the other hand, there might exist some 
overestimation if some individuals believe that they may receive some social benefits by declaring themselves as 
indigenous. Consequently, the sign of the bias is ultimately unknown. Fortunately, as we will see later, except 
for the case of Panama, the self-identification questions asked in LAC countries’ household surveys are better 
posed (than that of Gonzales’ example) and usually household surveys are not used to assign benefits, so it can 
be argued that neither of those problems are very serious.  
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not complete. For each country where this criterion was used, we defined indigenous regions 
using census data. Indeed, the smaller the definition of region, the more efficient the criterion. 
Thus, whenever possible we used counties (municipalities) as the reference region.17 Also, if 
information of counties was not available in the household survey, we used 
states/provinces/departments. The first method was used in the cases of Colombia, Mexico 
and Honduras, whereas the second method was used only in Costa Rica. 
In summary, we will be able to analyze the situation of indigenous and afro-descendent 
groups in terms of the MDGs in 15 countries covering almost 85% of the total population, and 
90% of the indigenous and black populations in LAC countries. 
4. Definitions of Ethnicity by Country 
This section gives a detailed description of our operational definitions of ethnicity in each 
country: it discusses some assumptions we made, in addition to decisions we made,  regarding 
those definitions and assesses the precision of those definitions. 
As we mentioned earlier, we consider a person as indigenous or afro-descendent if: (i) he or 
she perceives herself as indigenous, (ii) he or she speaks an indigenous language, or (iii) he or 
she lives in a region highly populated by indigenous/black individuals. Table 1.3 summarizes 
information on data source, coverage of household survey, sample size, and the percentage of 
non-white populations in each country. Four points are worth mentioning. First, all household 
surveys used in this paper cover both rural and urban areas: this is an extremely important fact 
given that many indigenous/black individuals live in rural areas. Second, it should be noted 
that the sample size varies widely between countries; Guatemala, Nicaragua and Suriname in 
particular have small samples.18  Finally, the percentage of indigenous/black people obtained 
in our samples approximately matches those obtained from census by other sources in 
Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Peru. However, we do 
underestimate the number of indigenous/afro-descendant people in Colombia, Ecuador, and 
Nicaragua, and we overestimate the number in Costa Rica and Paraguay. Finally, it should be 
noted that the percentage of the non-white population captured by household surveys tends to 
be relatively constant over time, except in the case of Bolivia.19  
                                                 
17 This criterion was used by Panagides (1994) to identify indigenous people in Mexico.  
18 In Guatemala this is not a problem since the number of indigenous people is large- therefore, when splitting 
the sample between indigenous and non-indigenous each group has a relatively large number of observations. 
Unfortunately, Nicaragua and Suriname have a small sample size and a small percentage of indigenous/afro 
people in the sample. Consequently, some descriptive statistics will not be as reliable and some exercises will not 
be feasible.  
19 This difference might be explained by a change in the definition of the sample. It is not explained by the fact 
that we changed the method of identifying ethnicity. Note that we used language in 1997 and self-identification 
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In Table 1.4 we summarize how we identified ethnicity in household surveys- it is worth 
discussing in greater detail some decisions we made in that process. 
Decision 1 (Treatment of missing values). It is important to address the issue of how we treat 
missing values in our samples. The interviewer always answers the question regarding 
“region”, so there are no missing values in that case. However, there is a prior expectation that 
some people do not answer questions on self-identification or on language. In those cases, we 
follow this procedure: (i) if he or she is not a child, we consider him or her as not 
indigenous/afro-descendent and (ii) if the individual is a child we assign him or her the 
answer of his or her mother (that is, if the mother is present in that household) or of the 
household head otherwise. This procedure was followed so as to minimize the loss of 
observations and  important in countries with small samples and with small indigenous/black 
populations. Note, however, that the number of missing values was relatively small and thus 
our results are strong. There is only one exception: those cases where children who were 5 
years old or less were not asked the questions (Bolivia and Peru). We claim that this exception 
is unique to those cases because ultimately, the child was assigned his or her mother’s (or 
household head’s) answer.  
Decision 2 (Definition of “non-white” group). In general, every LAC country has in its 
population euro-descendent, afro-descendent, indigenous peoples and people from other races 
(other races in LAC countries are typically a small fraction of the total population). Ideally, 
we would like to identify each of these groups in every country since that would allow for 
more accurate statistics. Unfortunately, LAC household surveys usually do not allow this kind 
of desegregation.  
Since we are interested in determining how indigenous and afro-descendent individuals have 
faired (in terms of the MDGs) with respect to the euro-descendent population, we proceed in 
the following manner. We split our sample into two: a white group and a non-white group. 
The definition of white and non-white will differ between countries (Table 1.4). There are 
three cases: 
• In those countries where we could identify both groups, we include in the non-white 
group both indigenous and afro-Latin individuals. In Nicaragua and Peru the number of 
black people in the sample was too small to make any separate inference on their 
situation. In these two countries, we decided to analyze indigenous and afro-descendents 
as if they were one group. To obtain an idea of what data refers to in these countries it is 
important to highlight that in Nicaragua 5% of the population is indigenous and 13% is 
black while in Peru 47% is indigenous and almost 10% is black. 
                                                                                                                                                        
in 2002. Actually, using language in 2002 gives a percentage of indigenous people in total population of 35% 
(below 45% found in 1997).  
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• In general, in countries where the indigenous population is small relative to the afro-
descendent population, household surveys tend to capture only a small number of 
indigenous people (if any) and therefore we have to define the non-white group to be 
composed only of afro-descendent people (e.g. Haiti, Colombia, Costa Rica). The case of 
Brazil deserves special attention. Although there we were able to identify both indigenous 
and afro-descendent people, we decided to focus only on the afro-descendent population 
because studies of race and ethnicity in Brazil tend to work with this group that represents 
a high proportion of the total population.  
• Finally, in those countries where the indigenous population is larger, household surveys 
tend to be designed in a way that allows for the identification of indigenous people and 
not afro-descendent individuals (i.e. household surveys use either self-identification or 
language that usually does not include an option for afro-descendent in its answers). We 
therefore define the non-white group in such a way that it only includes indigenous people 
(e.g. Bolivia).  
Decision 3 (Analyzed years). We choose to analyze information from the latest available year 
to have a perspective as updated as possible, and from one year during the 90s (in order to 
make comparisons). However, in several cases it was not possible to have information for the 
90s because, as we have mentioned earlier, only until recently have many countries included 
questions on ethnicity. 
Decision 4. (Self-Identification was chosen over Language –whenever possible-). In Peru 
2001, Nicaragua 2001 and Bolivia 2002, we have information on self-perception and 
language to identify ethnicity. In the case of Nicaragua and Peru, the decision to use self-
perception (even when we used language to identify ethnicity in Bolivia 1997 and Nicaragua 
1998) was due to the fact that it allowed us to capture the situation of the afro-descendent and 
indigenous population –even if we were not able to analyze separately the situation of both 
groups- whereas having used language would have forced us to analyze only the situation of 
indigenous people. Having said that, it is important to note that the correlation between 
language and self-perception was highly positive and statistically significant in both cases20, 
and that all of our results are robust with this decision (i.e. results do not change when we use 
language instead of self-perception). 
In order to make results comparable, in Bolivia we also used self-perception as an ethnic 
identifier. Again, we found a significantly positive correlation of 0.46 between language and 
self-perception, unfortunately some results from this paper were not robust with this decision 
(from a quantitative point of view). This was basically explained because many individuals 
who considered themselves as indigenous did not speak any indigenous languages. Wood and 
                                                 
20 The partial correlation coefficient was 0.65 in Peru and 0.86 in Nicaragua. 
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Patrinos (1994) used language as an ethnic identifier in Bolivia (self-perception was not 
available in the survey they used). We decided to use self-perception because, as we mention 
above, language can be more influenced by the educational system. 
Decision 5 (“Exceptions” to definitions of ethnicity). In every country where we used self-
perception to identify ethnicity, we decided to classify people who declare themselves to be 
“mestizos” as white (basically because they have some white heritage). The only exception 
was in Brazil, where we classified “pardos” (i.e. individuals that descend from white and 
black people) as afro-descendent. This choice was done to make our results comparable with 
the rest of the literature on ethnicity and race in Brazil.21  
In addition, when we used language to identify ethnicity we treat as indigenous all those 
individuals who declare to speak at least one indigenous language. The only exception was 
Paraguay, where Guaraní is the official language; many people speak this language, 
regardless of whether or not they are indigenous. This essentially explains the great 
overestimation of the percentage of indigenous people in the total population (with respect to 
alternative sources). To partially fix this problem we decided to classify as indigenous those 
individuals who only speak Guaraní.  
Decision 6. (Indigenous/Afro-Descendent Regions).  As we mention earlier, in Colombia, 
Honduras and Mexico we were able to use counties to identify regions, making our results 
more precise. In Costa Rica, this was not possible because of data unavailability. 
For Colombia, we defined non-whites to be people of afro-descent. In fact, the percentage of 
indigenous persons in the total population is approximately 2% while the percentage of black 
individuals is 25%. Afro-descendent populations are mostly concentrated around the coastal 
areas of the Pacific Ocean (which include the departments of Cauca, Chocó, Nariño y Valle22) 
and around the coastal areas of the Atlantic regions (which include the departments of 
Atlántico, Bolívar, Cesar, Córdoba, La Guajira, Magdalena y Sucre). In these last regions, 
however, white and non-white populations tend to be more mixed. In light of this, we decided 
to use counties to make our identification more precise.23
For Honduras, we defined non-whites as indigenous people since the percentage of 
indigenous people represents 15% of the total population while the percentage of black 
individuals is 5%. According to the 2001 census of data currently available, the indigenous 
                                                 
21 See for instance, World Bank 2003. 
22 Although it should be noted that Cauca and Nariño have sizeable indigenous population. 
23 We used information produced by Departamento Nacional de Planeación de Colombia that identifies black 
counties characterized for having high percentage of afro-descendent persons in their population. For further 
details refer to the web page:  
http://www.dnp.gov.co/ArchivosWeb/Direccion_Desarrollo_Territorial/divers_etnica/afros_raizales/estad_indica
d/sociales_afro.xls. 
 23
populations are clustered mainly in the states (departments) of Gracias a Dios, Intibuca, Islas 
de la Bahía, La Paz, Lempira, Ocotepeque. Within those states we identified “indigenous 
counties” as those with more than 21% of indigenous population (three times the average of 
the indigenous population in the country). In practice, this means that we end up considering 
indigenous all those individuals who live in counties with more than 50% of indigenous 
populations. 
For Mexico, we also defined non-white as the indigenous population (14% of Mexican 
population is indigenous and 0.4% is afro-Latin). The majority of the indigenous population is 
located in the south of the country. In particular, we considered to be indigenous all those 
individuals who live in counties that have, according to data from census, more than 50% of 
indigenous in their total population. Indigenous counties are located in the departments of 
Campeche, Chiapas, Chihuahua, Durango, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Nayarit, Oaxaca, Puebla, 
Quintana Roo, San Luis Potosí, Veracruz, and Yucatán. 
For Costa Rica we made two decisions. First, we decided to analyze the afro-descendent 
population instead of the indigenous population because the first group is larger and is 
geographically more concentrated. Second, following World Bank (2002) we consider the 
region (state) Huetar Atlántica (located on the Caribbean Sea coast) to be “predominantly 
black” and the rest of the country to be “predominantly white”.  
5. Socio-Demographic Characterization of Non-White People in LAC 
Before starting the analysis of each MDG, this section presents a description of some 
important socio-economic characteristics of indigenous and afro-descendent people. The goal 
is to understand three characteristics of these groups: location, types of families and labor 
market variables (including, unemployment rates, type of jobs and economic sectors in which 
indigenous and afro-descendent individuals tend to participate more). 
In particular, we found that average non-white families in LAC countries live in rural areas 
and are slightly larger (usually with more children) than white families. Also, we show 
evidence that a typical indigenous or afro-descendent male has the same participation rate in 
the labor market and experiences lower rates of unemployment than his white counterpart. He 
also has a higher probability of working in the primary sector of the economy, is usually self-
employed and works in a small firm. The average indigenous or afro-descendent female, on 
the other hand, tends to have lower participation and employment rates than her white 
counterpart. 
Location. In every LAC country, over 45% of the indigenous or afro-descendent population 
in each country lives in rural areas (Brazil being the only exception). In countries such as 
Honduras, Ecuador and Panama this number is much higher, reaching over 80%. The 
importance of this fact cannot be overstressed. Rural areas in LAC tend to be more 
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underdeveloped than urban areas. Usually, schools or hospitals are difficult to access, and 
infrastructures like sewage and safe water are not available. These characteristics tend to 
make poverty among people living in those areas more persistent; children with less access to 
health and education services will have more obstacles to leave poverty when they are adults. 
- Insert Graph 1.3. - 
Rural areas, however, are not homogeneous regions across LAC countries. It is estimated that 
over ninety percent of indigenous people are sedentary subsistence farmers that cultivate 
small plots (minifundios) and supplement their resources with seasonal wage labor, mining 
activities, and artisan production. The other ten percent of indigenous people live in tropical 
or dry forest areas. Although they usually live in remote environments, they have become 
increasingly vulnerable because of the pressures on their lands and natural resources caused 
by mining ventures and the expansion of the agricultural frontier.24  
Afro-descendent people, on the other hand, live predominately along the continent coastal 
areas in the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans or along the Caribbean Sea25, and are not as rural 
as indigenous people. In Brazil –the country with the largest afro-descendent population in 
South America- afro-descendent communities living in rural areas is only 19%. Moreover, we 
found that the difference in location patterns between white and black people in Brazil, and 
Colombia26 are smaller than the difference between white and indigenous people in other 
LAC countries.  
This difference in location between afro and indigenous people is an important fact to 
acknowledge when targeting developing plans in black and indigenous communities. In the 
latter case, location can be used as a targeting factor whereas it seems that in the first case it 
cannot.  
Family Characteristics. Gender structures between white and non-white individuals are, as 
expected, very similar (see Table 1.5). The structure of each population, however, differs in 
terms of age. Excluding Chile, the percentage of individuals who are younger than 14 years 
old is higher in non-white groups (see Table 1.6). Another way of considering this fact is that 
non-white families tend to have more children than their white counterparts; this difference, in 
some cases, is similar to cases in Ecuador, Honduras, Panama and Nicaragua. In the latter 
country, for instance, the average number of children in a euro-descendent or mestizo family 
is 1.3 while in its indigenous counterpart the number is 2.6 (see Table 1.7). 
- Insert Graph 1.4 - 
                                                 
24 IDB, 1997. 
25 World Bank, 2003. 
26 Remember that in Brazil, Costa Rica, and Colombia we defined non-white as afro-descendent. 
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This translates, in many cases, to differences in family size. A typical non-white family has in 
general a larger number of members than a white family, yet this difference is smaller than 
expected. One possible explanation is that non-white people get married before or that they 
leave their parents home at an earlier age than do white people- this explanation is consistent 
with the result that there exists a higher proportion of married people among the group of 25-
45 years old in the non-white group. Finally, we also found a lower proportion of single-
headed families among the non-white population (see Tables 1.8 and 1.9). 
Labor Market Characteristics.27 The analysis of labor market characteristics by ethnicity 
can also help us to later understand some of the causes of differences in poverty and 
educational outcomes between white and non-white people.  
Let us first focus on men who are in their prime age (i.e. who are between 25 and 50 years 
old).28 Both white and non-white men participate actively in the labor market; this means that 
a high percentage of individuals in this group are either employed or unemployed (but are not 
inactive). There is, however, one difference between groups, which concerns the way in 
which individuals actually participate in the labor market: white individuals present higher 
rates of unemployment than do non-white individuals (see Graph 1.5).  
- Insert Graph 1.5 - 
Part of this difference in unemployment rates comes from a fact already mentioned: non-white 
people are more concentrated in rural areas, where unemployment tends to be much lower 
than in urban areas. Differences in unemployment rates are also driven by differences in 
financing capacities during the unemployment period. In countries that lack unemployment 
insurance (or similar mechanisms that finance job searches), unemployed workers have to 
finance the unemployment period by themselves.29 If the worker cannot finance the period 
during which he or she is searching for a job, the worker  will end up being forced to accept 
any job. If markets are integrated, in the sense that both white and non-white individuals have 
access to the same jobs, a higher unemployment rate in white individuals might suggest that 
white people have better means to finance job searches than do non-white people (either 
because white men are wealthier or they used to work in a formal job that provided them with 
severance payment).  
Indeed, descriptive data tend to support this view: the proportion of white men working in 
informal jobs is much lower than the proportion of non-white men working in informal jobs. 
                                                 
27 For detailed data please refer to Tables 1.10 – 1.13. 
28 The reason for focusing on people in their prime age is that it avoids questions related to preferences or 
intertemporal decisions. Essentially, younger people have higher chances of being (or considering being) in 
school and older individuals are more likely to be retired. In other words, they have a lower attachment to the 
labor market. 
29 Typically using savings or severance payments if they used to have a formal job. 
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As it can be observed from Graph 1.6, a pattern observed almost in every LAC country is that 
non-white individuals tend to work in the agricultural sector, usually self-employed and in 
small firms. 
- Insert Graph 1.6 - 
The case of women is more complex to analyze and actually very little can be said from 
descriptive statistics. Latin American women have been changing their behavior with respect 
to labor market participation in the last thirty years. The process began many years ago in 
some countries (e.g. Brazil) and is a relatively new phenomenon in other countries, such as 
Ecuador or Paraguay. Graph 1.7 shows that, nowadays, labor market participation and 
employment rates are higher among non-white women only in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. 
However, the trend in female participation can change these facts rapidly within the next 
years.30  
- Insert Graph 1.7 - 
 
                                                 
30 In this sense, note the rapid increment of participation of white female in the cases of Costa Rica and Mexico 
vis-à-vis the much smaller increment of non-white females’ participation in those countries. 
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Chapter 2 
Poverty Reduction* 
(MDG 1) 
The discussion and approval of the Millennium Development Goals introduced the 
international development community to new forces that led the community to express a 
strong determination to tackle the high levels of poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
About ten years ago Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (1994) drew attention to the issue of 
indigenous peoples and poverty reduction by showing the strong association between 
ethnicity and poverty in LAC, with indigenous peoples being over-represented among the 
poorest groups of the countries under study.  
Here we provide more descriptive evidence about the relation between ethnicity and poverty, 
which complements and expands the findings of Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (1994). We 
analyze the situation of indigenous and afro-descendent people in terms of poverty and living 
conditions in fifteen countries that cover more than 90% of the indigenous/black population 
of LAC countries. Moreover, in some cases we are able to study the evolution of poverty by 
groups during the last decade. 
In the first section of the chapter we provide a methodological discussion on poverty indexes, 
poverty lines and income concepts used in this chapter. We then describe the situation of 
white and non-white (i.e. indigenous and/or afro-descendent individuals31) groups regarding 
poverty and living conditions (Section 2). Finally, in Section 3 we characterize this situation 
in terms of differences in mean income and inequality, and ethnic discrimination.  
1. Measuring Poverty in Household Surveys 
The concept of poverty refers to the inability of an individual or household to ensure access to 
enough resources to satisfy basic needs. Therefore, in practice, measuring poverty requires 
two elements. First, we need to find what goods compose a basket of basic needs and how 
much they cost. Second, we need to assess if each individual has the sufficient amount of 
money to purchase that basket.  
Poverty Lines. The first problem boils down to defining the so-called poverty line. There are 
two types of these lines. The “extreme poverty line” that includes basically food in the basic-
                                                 
* All the tables included in this chapter can be downloaded from 
www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/cedlas/ethnicity.
31 The definition of “non-white” varies from one country to another. In some countries non-white refers to 
indigenous people, in others to black people and in some others to both groups at the same time. Please refer to 
Chapter 1 for further details with respect to which definition applies to each country.  
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needs-basket and the “poverty line” that includes some other goods besides food (clothing, 
housing, basic health, education, transportation, etc.). Moreover, there are three 
(complementary) informational sources of these poverty lines: official poverty lines, 
international poverty lines and a third type called 50%-of-the-median-income line.  
In many countries, each national statistical agency computes an “official” poverty line by 
defining which goods will be classified as basic-needs-goods and by gathering information 
about prices for that set of goods. Sometimes, this information on prices contemplates 
regional differences (either by state/department or using a rural/urban classification). These 
“official” lines are important to the MDGs. In fact, United Nations suggests using official 
lines in order to monitor country poverty trends. Unfortunately, some agencies do not publish 
an official poverty line, although they do publish an official poverty rate. In those cases, we 
estimate the poverty line that replicates that rate (again, we made use of  regional information 
when it was available). Finally, some statistical agencies compute neither poverty lines nor 
poverty rates. In those cases, we used the poverty line published by the World Bank in its last 
Poverty Assessment Report as an “official” poverty line.  
One drawback of “official poverty lines” is that they are not comparable among countries. 
Comparison of poverty among countries is important because, among other things, it might 
help international organizations to allocate resources in different countries. To solve this 
problem, the World Bank has established a threshold of one dollar per day per person, based 
on purchasing power parity. This poverty line will be important in our study because the 
MDGs’ targets are defined using this specific line. At the same time, it is usually recognized 
that this one dollar a day poverty line is, in the case of many countries, (including many in 
LAC) a conservative line32, as people who are considered poor by national standards are not 
considered so when using this poverty line. Therefore, in addition we use a two dollar a day as 
the poverty line. Whether this latter line reflects extreme poverty or moderate poverty will 
depend on the country under analysis. 
Finally, we also use a third type of line that is calculated as 50% of the median income. This 
line is usually located somewhere between the “official poverty line” and the “extreme 
poverty line” (and also between one and two dollar PPP lines). In some cases, however, it is 
lower than the official extreme poverty line (Haiti) and in others is greater than the official 
poverty line (Chile). 
Income Definition. Once the relevant poverty lines are selected, we need to define which 
definition of income is going to be used to determine whether or not the individual is poor. It 
is worth noting that the MDGs’ targets do not specify any income definition and that, as it is 
expected, poverty rates do vary with the income definition that is used.  
                                                 
32 For instance, Besley and Burguess (2003). 
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It can be argued that among the variables usually included in a household survey, 
consumption is probably the one that best approximates living standards.33 Its main 
advantages over its usual competitor, household income, include: (i) underreporting is usually 
less severe for consumption data than for income and (ii) it reflects more accurately the 
current well-being of individuals than income because people can borrow and lend money. 
Unfortunately, in LAC countries consumption surveys are very rare. Therefore, the 
measurement of poverty in LAC has mainly been done using household income- here, we will 
follow the same approach.  
Note, however, that by using income we are implicitly assuming that household current 
income is highly correlated with individual living standards. We really do not know how 
distorted the picture we draw with income data from household surveys is from the reality we 
would like to assess. If we accept that there exists a high positive correlation between current 
income and consumption, then using income is an acceptable proxy. 
Individuals usually live in households and share a common budget. This implies that an 
individual’s well being depends on the resources available in the household and also on the 
size and structure of that household. Typically, there are two concepts of income that can be 
used in poverty analysis. The most common one is the household per capita income that is 
constructed as the sum of income earned by each member of a family (i.e. the total family 
income) divided by the number of members in the family. That per capita household income 
is then assigned to each member of the family. This definition implicitly assumes that there is 
an egalitarian distribution of resources and needs within each family. It can be argued, 
however, that some members of the family actually need more resources than others basically 
as a function of age and gender. To control for these differences, we also construct an income 
variable adjusted for adult equivalents.  
Poverty measures. We use a class of poverty measures generalized by Foster, Greer and 
Thorbecke (1984) of the following form: 
∑
=
⎟⎠⎜⎝= i znP 1α
⎞⎛ −q yz1 α  
where n is the total population, q is the number of individuals i whose income yi is lower than 
the poverty line z. In symbols, if we sort incomes from minimum to maximum we will have  
n1qq1 yyzyy <<<<<< + ...... . Finally, α is a non-negative number.  
When [α = 0] this general measure becomes the headcount index, which counts the number of 
people who are below the poverty line and divides it by the total population. This is the 
measure used to set the MDGs on poverty, and its two main advantages are that it is easy to 
                                                 
33 See Deaton (1997).  
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construct and straightforward to understand. Its main drawback, however, is that it ignores 
differences in the well being between different poor households. In other words, it assumes 
that all poor households are in the same situation. In addition, over time the index does not 
change if individuals below the poverty line become poorer or wealthier. 
This problem is solved when we set [α = 1], which transforms the general index into what is 
called the poverty gap index (also included among the MDGs’ targets). It is defined as the 
average, over all individuals, of the relative gaps between poor people’s living standards and 
the poverty line. This index can be interpreted as the average shortfall of poor people. It 
shows how much would have to be transferred (in terms of the poverty line) to the poor in 
order to bring their expenditure up to the poverty line. In other words, the index measures the 
minimum cost of eliminating poverty. Although this index solves the problems present in the 
headcount ratio, it still has some drawbacks: it does not capture differences in the severity of 
poverty amongst the poor, it ignores inequality among the poor, and it is insensitive to 
transfers among the poor. 
Setting [α = 2] solves this latter problem and transforms the general index into what is called 
the severity of poverty index, which is a weighted sum of poverty gaps (as a proportion of the 
poverty line), where the weights are the proportionate poverty gaps themselves. This index 
takes inequality among the poor into account: note that a transfer from a poor household to an 
even poorer family would reduce the index whereas a transfer from a very poor family to a 
less poor family would increase the index. Unfortunately, the index is usually difficult to 
interpret (especially when used to make comparisons among groups or countries). 
Population Weights. All measures and simulation exercises included in this study will make 
use of population weights. That is, each observation in the household surveys represents a 
certain number of individuals in the total population.  
In conclusion, the next table sums up the poverty indexes we shall compute in this chapter. 
Each index is computed for two income definitions: household per capita and adult 
equivalent. In addition, the table shows which of these indexes are parts of the MDGs’ targets. 
Poverty Indexes and MDGs 
α = 0 α = 1 α = 2
Headcount Ratio Poverty Gap Severity of Poverty
1 U$S PPP MDG 1 MDG 1 X
2 U$S PPP X X X
Official Poverty Line MDG 1 X X
Official Extreme Poverty Line X X X
50% of median income X X X
Poverty Line
Foster, Greer ad Thorbecke (1984) Index
 
Results are shown in Tables 2.1 to 2.6. In particular, in Tables 2.1-2.3 we use household per 
capita income whereas in Tables 2.4-2.6 we use adult equivalents income to construct our 
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indexes. For each concept of income we compute the headcount ratio, the poverty gap, and 
the severity of poverty index. In each of these tables indexes are calculated with five different 
poverty lines: one dollar a day PPP, two dollars a day PPP, 50% of the median income, 
official moderate poverty line and the official extreme poverty line. Finally, each of these 
indexes is computed for the white population (first column), the non-white population (second 
column) and the complete population (third column). 
2. MDG 1: Poverty in Latin America by Ethnicity 
In this section we highlight three types of comparisons: (i) we compare poverty indexes 
across countries; (ii) we assess differences in poverty by groups analyzing “approximate” 
distance from the MDGs and (iii) for those countries for which we have data on two points in 
time, we analyze the evolution of poverty.  
We focus mainly on indexes calculated using the household per capita income. It is important 
to note that although the values of these indexes change when calculated using the adult 
equivalents income, the main stylized facts remain unchanged. 
Poverty Rankings (by country). Poverty varies widely among LAC countries.34 At one end 
of the spectrum, Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico have a relatively low proportion of poor 
people in their populations. According to the one dollar a day PPP poverty line, poverty in 
these countries is 3.5%, 5% and 13.9%, respectively. On the other side of the spectrum, the 
poorest countries are Haiti, Ecuador and Bolivia. Their one dollar a day PPP headcount ratios 
are 50.9%, 30.3%, and 27.7%, respectively (Table 2.7). Note that although the ranking is 
basically maintained across indexes, the variation of headcount ratios with respect to poverty 
lines is large. Each poverty line captures, in a sense, different types of poverty (from a very 
extreme poverty to a ”milder” poverty).  These rankings also hold when computing the 
poverty gap index (Table 2.8) and the severity of poverty (Table 2.9). 
Poverty by Ethnicity. According to the MDGs, countries should halve poverty by 2015 
taking 1990 as baseline year. Therefore, to assess this goal we need to define accurately what 
the poverty rate was  in 1990. Unfortunately, for some countries household surveys are not 
available for that year (e.g. Haiti), and even in many countries where those types of surveys 
are in fact available, they are not comparable with more recent surveys (due to change in the 
sample definition, changes in the way the relevant questions were asked, or changes in the 
survey coverage).  
                                                 
34 Note that because we do not have information on ethnicity, we are excluding from the analysis some countries 
that are typically included in cross-country studies in LAC: Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela and El Salvador. 
Therefore rankings should be interpreted just as rankings within sample.  
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An alternative strategy is to rely on poverty indexes computed by other studies. The World 
Bank has already computed many poverty rates for almost all LAC countries for 1990.35 
However, the same limitations mentioned in the previous paragraph apply to these indexes, 
too. We therefore proceed in the following way: (i) for those countries in which our poverty 
rates (for any given year) matches the World Bank’s poverty rates (for the same year), we 
used the World Bank’s 1990 poverty rates to define the MDG; (ii) in every other case, we set 
the MDG to be half of the poverty rate computed in 2000.36 It should be noted that since we 
cannot be sure that the methodology applied in the World Bank’s study is exactly the same as 
ours, we cannot ensure that both sets of results are strictly comparable.37 Therefore, a word of 
caution is needed: comparisons between headcount ratios / poverty gaps with the MDGs 
should be seen as informative of a trend but the actual difference between these two numbers 
will not be accurate of the true situation and evolution of poverty in each country. Because of 
this, at the end of this section we abandon the use of these MDGs, and work as if the MDGs 
were to halve by 2015 the poverty rates observed in 2000 (instead of halving the poverty rates 
observed in 1990). On the other hand, note that the comparison of poverty indexes by 
ethnicity is valid (because it uses the same household survey and the exact same method to 
compute poverty). 
If we accept the MDGs based in 1990 data, then only Chile and Costa Rica, the only two 
countries that have consistently ranked lower in poverty rates within the region, have 
achieved the MDG related to poverty (Graph 2.1). In the same Graph we can observe the 
difference in poverty between white and non-white populations. According to all poverty 
lines, in almost every country white groups have lower poverty rates than do non-white 
groups. For instance, the median ratio of non-white poverty to white poverty, when using one 
dollar a day is 2.2- when using two dollars a day, it is 1.8. - (Table 2.10). The only exceptions 
are Costa Rica and Haiti. These stylized facts are also observed when using the two dollars a 
day poverty line (Graph 2.2). With this poverty line, poverty rates among non-whites exceed 
45% in ten out of fifteen countries, whereas in only two countries do white populations have 
poverty rates above that number. Graphs 2.3 and 2.4 show that poverty gaps are also higher 
among non-white individuals when we use either one or two dollar a day poverty rates (the 
only exception is Haiti).   
                                                 
35 These indexes can be found in http://www.worldbank.org/research/povmonitor/. 
36 Strictly speaking we define the MDG to be half of the poverty computed in the last available year in our study, 
which varies by country. 
37 Székely et al. (2000) found that poverty indexes are highly sensitive to the assumptions made in its 
computation. They checked the sensitivity of poverty indexes in LAC household surveys with respect to: (i) 
several assumptions made while computing these indexes (choice of adult equivalence scales, use of economies 
of scale in consumption, methods for treating missing and zero incomes, adjustments to handle income 
misreporting); and (ii) use of different poverty lines and poverty indexes. They basically change these 
parameters within somewhat reasonable boundaries, and find that the proportion of poor varies between 12.7 
percent and 65.8 percent of the total population. The ranking of countries with respect to poverty is also highly 
sensitive. 
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- Insert Graphs 2.1-2.4 – 
In conclusion, in almost every country included in our sample, poverty among non-white 
individuals is greater than poverty among white individuals. This conclusion is robust to the 
poverty line or the poverty index we choose to measure poverty.  
Evolution of Poverty (by ethnicity). An important question then is whether or not the 
situation of non-white individuals is improving over time. Unfortunately, we have two points 
in time for only six countries. In Graph 2.5 we observe that official extreme and moderate 
poverty have gone decreased for non-white groups in every country (except in Nicaragua) 
over the past few years. Essentially, the decline happened with an overall decline in poverty 
that affected the whole population.  
- Insert Graph 2.5 - 
Standard Errors. Most of the analysis focuses on comparisons of poverty outcomes between 
white and non-white groups, within groups across periods of time and between countries. 
Therefore, we will need a measure of how precise the estimation of poverty outcomes is. To 
assess this, we compute standard errors of poverty measures using bootstrapping; we do this 
for a selected number of measures and we find that the standard errors are small for all 
measures. In Tables 2.11 and 2.12, we present standard errors for headcount ratios and 
poverty gaps calculated using both two dollars a day and 50% of the median poverty lines. 
Note that the difference between the lower and upper limits of the confidence intervals is in 
general less than 2 % (except in the cases of white people in Haiti non-white people in 
Nicaragua and Ecuador, and white and non-white people in Suriname). Also note that the 
confidence intervals of poverty rates of whites and non-whites only overlap in the cases of 
Costa Rica, Haiti and Suriname, which means that, excluding these three cases, whenever we 
claim that poverty among white and non-white differs, it will be true with a 95% level of 
confidence. 
Living Conditions. Although access to sewage, to safe water and to hygienic restrooms is 
included as part of MDG 738, it is also another facet of poverty- we thus find it appropriate to 
include an analysis of these in this chapter.39  
We compute the proportion of the population that has access to these services desegregating 
in rural and urban areas. Graph 2.6 shows our results and Table 2.13 provides more details. 
First, it should be noted that living conditions are, as expected, much better in urban than in 
rural areas both for white and for non-white individuals. Take for instance the case of Bolivia: 
                                                 
38 Ensure Environmental Sustainability. 
39 In fact, there are some definitions of poverty that are not related to income but instead to access of some 
services and to certain type of infrastructures. 
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in urban areas, 93% of white individuals have access to safe water, 48% have access to 
sewage and 91% have access to hygienic restrooms, whereas in rural areas these numbers are 
reduced to 56%, 4% and 50%, respectively. These differences are typical in the region (even 
in more developed countries such as Mexico). On average, people living in urban areas have 
30% more access to sewage, 40% more access to safe water and 50% more access to hygienic 
restrooms.  
- Insert Graph 2.6- 
Similarly to what was observed when poverty was measured by income, there are also 
differences in living conditions by ethnicity. Our results show that in urban areas, white 
people in general are more likely to have access to safe water than are non-white individuals. 
Note, however, that differences are sometimes small (as in Brazil, Chile and Honduras) and in 
Ecuador, the opposite was found to be true. Differences are much more important regarding 
access to hygienic restrooms: On average, white individuals in LAC have 20% more access 
than do non-white individuals. In some countries, this difference is extremely high (e.g. 
Mexico, Honduras and Paraguay), whereas in others, this difference is small (Chile, Peru or 
Ecuador). A similar pattern is observed with respect to access to sewage. 
In rural areas, differences are smaller. Although in Chile white individuals seem to have more 
chances of having access to water (30% more), the difference in the rest of the countries is 
rather small and in some cases, is reversed. It is worth noting though, that the definition of 
“safe water” can affect the response. Essentially, in rural areas, people can provide for their 
own water without using public infrastructure, still having access to safe water yet being 
classified as if they do not. A similar problem occurs with sewage service, which is a rare case 
in rural areas of Latin America. A more reliable indicator, therefore, is the proportion of 
people with access to hygienic restrooms. In this case, we do observe differences between 
white and non-white people who average 15% in the region, with some countries having a 
difference of above 20% (Chile, Paraguay and Ecuador), and others having a difference that is 
almost irrelevant (Guatemala, Peru, Nicaragua). 
3. Some Explanations for Differences in Poverty among Ethnic Groups 
In conclusion, indigenous and afro-descendent people tend to be poorer and have worse living 
conditions than white individuals. These facts are robust in the sense that they do not depend 
on which index, poverty line or definition of income we use to compute poverty. Also, 
differences are, in general, statistically significant. Indeed, there exist several, most likely 
complementary explanations. In this chapter we will focus on two of them: first we will 
analyze how income distribution (its inequality and mean) can affect poverty and then we will 
analyze if the existence of discrimination can explain the difference in poverty.  
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Mean Income and Inequality. There is a somewhat straightforward relation between the 
poverty, inequality and mean income of an economy. In general, a lower mean income and 
more unequal distributions will be associated with higher poverty (holding the income 
distribution or mean income constant, respectively). In Graph 2.7 we explore this relation in 
our cross section of countries. We plot the mean household per capita income against the 
observed headcount ratio. As expected, for both groups we find a negative relation between 
mean income and poverty.  
- Insert Graph 2.7 - 
We can also expect differences in poverty rates between whites and non-whites to be 
associated with differences in mean income between these two groups. Indeed, in every LAC 
country, white individuals tend to have, on average, a higher mean household per capita 
income and higher hourly wages than non-white people (Graph 2.8). This graph also shows 
the important difference in mean income across countries. Note that countries with high mean 
incomes are ranked lower in terms of poverty.  
- Insert Graphs 2.8 - 
Graph 2.9 shows the relation between mean incomes of whites and non-whites. On average, 
white individuals in LAC countries tend to earn twice as much as non-white individuals. This 
might be explained because white individuals have more human capital that allows them to 
obtain more productive jobs and therefore earn higher salaries. Alternatively, this can be the 
result of some type of discrimination, in the sense that although both whites and non-whites 
have the same stock of human capital yet the market pays a higher wage to white individuals. 
Of course, both explanations can be operating at the same time.   
More unequal distributions are also associated with higher levels of poverty. Graph 2.10 plots 
headcount ratios (for several poverty lines) against different standard measures of income 
inequality: Gini’s index, Theil’s index, and components of Theil’s index that measure 
inequality within and between white and non-white groups. Although our sample is small, we 
find that more unequal distributions are associated with higher levels of poverty (and the 
relation seems to hold independently of which measure of inequality or of poverty we 
choose).  
In conclusion, higher levels of income and lower levels of inequality seem to be associated (in 
our cross-section of countries) with lower levels of poverty. These findings are consistent 
with evidence for the rest of the world. Besley and Burguess (2003) find using a large sample 
of countries two similar results that: (i) increments in mean income (i.e. growth) can reduce 
poverty (on average, it would require a 3.8% rate of growth over 25 years to halve global 
poverty); and (ii) lowering the level of income inequality in each region of the world by one 
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standard deviation would reduce poverty by about 67%.  In Chapter 5 we will implement 
some simulations to further explore these relations.  
 
- Insert Graphs 2.9-2.10 - 
 
Ethnic Discrimination in the Labor Market. Differences in poverty between indigenous/ 
afro-descendent and white individuals can also be explained by other factors. Essentially, it 
can be thought that the wage earned by each worker is a function of his or her stock of human 
capital and how much the market values those resources. Since in competitive markets labor 
is paid according to its marginal productivity, differences in wages earned by individuals that 
are equally productive can be regarded as a form of discrimination. Oaxaca (1973) establishes 
the basic methodology to measure this type of discrimination by deriving a decomposition 
technique that simulates a counterfactual distribution by combining data on individual 
characteristics from one group (e.g. non-white people), with estimated parameters from a 
wage (i.e. Mincer) equation from another (e.g. white people). We use a generalization of this 
methodology, known as microeconometric decompositions, in Chapter 6.  
In this section, we implement a more simple strategy to assess the existence of ethnic 
discrimination. We essentially estimate wage equations, where we regress the log of wage on: 
(i) a dummy that defines ethnicity that takes the value of one if the individual is non-white 
and zero otherwise and (ii) several control variables: age, education, gender, and place where 
the individual lives (i.e. urban dummy). The coefficient associated with ethnicity tells us how 
much more an individual expects to earn if she is non-white holding constant the other 
characteristics (e.g. for a given level of human capital). A negative coefficient means that the 
expected wage is reduced because of being non-white.  
Table 2.14 shows our results. The first three columns report the coefficient associated with 
ethnicity for different samples and the other columns report the robust t-statistic of those 
coefficients. In Graph 2.11, we plot them against the headcount ratio. We find that lower 
coefficients (i.e. more discrimination) are associated with higher poverty among non-white 
individuals and are also associated with lower poverty among white individuals (although this 
latter relation is small). This evidence suggests the existence of discrimination. In Chapter 6 
we explore it in a more rigorous fashion.   
In the next chapter we explore a third explanation for differences in poverty between white 
and non-white individuals: differences in education achievement. 
- Insert Figure 2.11- 
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Chapter 3 
Improving Educational Outcomes* 
(MDG 2) 
Poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean countries is high. Moreover, almost in all cases 
poverty is higher among indigenous and afro-descendent people than among white 
individuals. Indeed, poverty is related to the ability to generate income and this, in turn, is 
determined by the human capital of each individual; more educated people will be able to 
generate more income and thus escape poverty.  
The Millennium Development Goals focus explicitly on educational outcomes of current 
students, especially of those children that are (or should be) in primary school. Here, we will 
not focus on differences between gender (MDG 3); we shall postpone that discussion for the 
next chapter. 
In this chapter, we first analyze educational outcomes from several perspectives- always 
stressing the analysis of differences by ethnicity. We compute literacy rates, enrollment rates 
for different age-groups and educational levels and what is known as “school gaps”. We come 
to two important conclusions. First, we find that for children of primary school age, 
differences by ethnicity in all these outcomes are not quantitatively important. That being 
said, however, it is also true that in some countries differences do exist and should be 
addressed.  Secondly, we find that differences by ethnicity in educational outcomes do exist 
for individuals of secondary school and college age.  
We then try to assess possible causes for these differences. First, by estimating binary choice 
models, we compute a set of coefficients associated with discrimination regarding the access 
to education. We then implement a methodology to study educational mobility that helps us 
determine whether or not the current educational system allows individuals without monetary 
resources to access to education. Finally, studying the cases of Brazil and Bolivia we try to 
answer if whites have more incentives to receive education than non-whites because when 
facing the decision of entering school, white individuals perceive a higher return to education. 
1. Education in LAC 
In this section, we compute educational statistics stressing differences between white and non-
white groups, we calculate literacy rates, enrollment rates, and school gaps, where only the 
first two are explicitly considered as indicators in MDG 2. 
                                                 
* All the tables included in this chapter can be downloaded from 
www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/cedlas/ethnicity.
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Literacy Rates 
The literacy rate of 15–24 year-olds, or the youth literacy rate, is defined as the percentage of 
the population aged 15–24 years, which can both read and write and understand a short simple 
statement on everyday life. This indicator corresponds to the millennium target 3 necessary to 
reach Goal 2 (achieve universal primary education). The rationale for including the literacy 
rate of 15-24 years-olds is that the youth literacy rate reflects the outcomes of primary 
education over the previous 10 years or so. As a measure of the effectiveness of the primary 
education system, it is often seen as a proxy measure of social progress and economic 
achievement. 
We compute literacy rates as the proportion of people who read and write to the total 
population. We calculate this indicator for two age-groups: 15-24 and 10-65. Only the former 
is considered as an indicator towards achieving MDG 2. The last is broader and, when 
compared to the former, allows a raw assessment of the temporal evolution of literacy rates. 
Literacy rates do differ between Latin American and the Caribbean countries. We find that 
Haiti, Peru, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala have relatively lower youth literacy rates (see 
Table 3.1). The highest youth literacy rates in the region are those of Chile, Mexico and Costa 
Rica. 
Inside each country, literacy rates are always higher for white people, both for the 10-65 and 
15-24 age-groups (Graph 3.1).40 Comparing estimates for the 10-65 and 15-24 age-groups 
shows that differences between ethnic groups are narrower in the last case. In Panama, for 
example, this difference is 30 percentage points for the former age-group and 20 percentage 
points for the last age-group. 
 
- Insert Graph 3.1 - 
 
In countries where we have information for two years, we see that literacy rates for non-
whites have been converging to those of whites. For instance, literacy rates for whites and 
indigenous people aged 15-24 in Mexico were 97 and 80 percent in 1992, and 98 and 93 
percent in 2002, respectively. 
Although literacy rates are important indicators of people’s human capital, they might not 
accurately reflect it. In what follows, we compute enrollment rates. 
                                                 
40 For the 15-24 age-group, the only exception is Ecuador. 
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Enrollment Rates 
The Millennium Development Goal 2 only refers to primary education, focusing attention on 
the net enrollment ratio in primary education. This indicator is defined as the ratio of the 
number of children of school age who are enrolled in primary school to the total population of 
children of school age. Primary education provides children with basic reading, writing, and 
mathematics skills along with an elementary understanding of such subjects as history, 
geography, natural science, social science, art, and music.  
We computed enrollment rates not only for the primary educational level but also for 
secondary school and college. In Table 3.2 we compute enrollment rates simply as the number 
of enrolled students within an age cohort divided by the number of individuals of the same 
age. In Table 3.3, on the other hand, we present net enrollment rates calculated using the 
MDG 2 definition. We consider the following age cohorts for each educational level: 6-12 for 
primary, 13-17 for secondary, and 18-30 for tertiary. In columns (iv)-(vi) and (x)-(xii) we 
consider only those young people who have finished the previous educational level.41 Graph 
3.2 shows the net enrollment rates by ethnicity for the last available years that correspond to 
those in Table 3.3. 
 
- Insert Graph 3.2 - 
 
Primary. The MDG 2 refers to this school level. The graph indicates, for example, that 
among whites and indigenous children in Guatemala aged 6-12, 88 and 77 percent attended 
school in 2002, respectively. The gap in primary school attendance rate for whites and non-
whites is relatively important only in Panama and Guatemala with 13 and 11 percentage 
points, respectively. 
Table 3.3 shows that primary school enrollment rates have been increasing during the past 
decade in LAC countries for which we have information. At the same time, the gap between 
whites and non-whites has narrowed.42 The figures show that most LAC countries are doing 
well to accomplish the MDG 2. In fact, some of them (e.g. Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico) 
have nearly achieved full enrollment.  
Secondary. The current situation for this educational level is quite different from that of the 
previous level. Secondary school attendance rates vary widely among LAC countries. 
                                                 
41 Column (vi) indicates, for example, that 87% of the Peruvian teenagers with complete primary education are 
enrolled in the secondary educational level. 
42 The only exception is Nicaragua. 
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Whereas Haiti, Brazil, Guatemala and Nicaragua show relatively low net enrollment rates, we 
found Panama, Mexico, Peru, Colombia and Costa Rica to have relatively high (national) net 
enrollment rates. 
Differences in secondary school attendance between whites and non-whites are considerably 
high in some cases. In nine out of thirteen countries the enrollment rates for non-whites is 
more that 10 percentage points lower than that for whites. For Panama, Ecuador, Paraguay, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras, the difference is more than 20 percentage points against 
the non-white youth. 
Tertiary. The (national) enrollment rates for college ranges from a relatively low 1% in Haiti 
to a relatively high 19% in Bolivia. We see that 69% of the Mexican young adults with 
complete secondary school are enrolled in college.43
Differences by ethnicity in the enrollment rates for tertiary education are strikingly high in 
some countries including Panama, Mexico, and Honduras. In this countries, the tertiary 
enrollment rates for non-whites are only 6, 13 and 14 percent of that of the whites, 
respectively. 
The MDG 2 indicator of universal primary education in 2015 seems to be attainable, both for 
whites and non-whites, in most countries in our sample. Only Haiti, Guatemala, Honduras, 
and Nicaragua show primary school enrollment rates below 90%.44 On the other hand, 
significant differences in enrollment rates between whites and non-whites do exist for 
secondary and tertiary educational levels. 
In Graph 3.3, we plot non-whites’ enrollment rates against their headcount ratio for the one-
dollar a day poverty line. We find, for all educational levels, a negative relation between 
them. 
 
- Insert Graph 3.3 - 
 
School Gaps 
The schooling gap is defined as the difference between: (1) the years of education that a child 
would have completed had he entered school at normal school and advanced one grade each 
year and (2) the actual years of education. In other words, the schooling gap measures years 
                                                 
43 See column (xii) of Table 3.3. 
44 A similar result is presented in UNESCO (2004). 
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of missing education. Note, however, that this is not part of the MDGs’ targets. Graph 3.4 
shows the school gaps by ethnicity for teenagers (13-19) and young adults (20-25).45
 
- Insert Graph 3.4 - 
 
The school gap for 13-19 for white people varies across countries from 1.52 in Chile to 4.44 
in Nicaragua. The corresponding figures for non-whites are 2.10 in Bolivia and 5.15 in 
Nicaragua. 
The school gap is higher for non-whites than for whites in all countries for the 13-19 age-
group and in 11 out of 13 countries for the 20-25 age-group. This means, for example, that a 
young Guatemalan indigenous person has, in average, 5.05 years of missing education, while 
his white counterpart has only 2.97. 
2. Measuring Statistical Discrimination in the Access to Education 
Differences in ethnicity are explicitly considered to be unacceptable sources of differences in 
access to education in the United Nations Millennium Declaration. In this section, we use 
econometric tools to assess how being indigenous/afro-descendant affects the probability of 
school attendance. 
Methodology 
We estimate the conditional probabilities of attending school in order to capture differences 
between groups. We estimate these conditional probabilities from binary choice models of the 
attendance decision using household per capita income, age, gender, location (urban/rural), 
parental education, and a dummy indicating if the individual is indigenous or afro-descendant 
as an independent variable. The coefficients associated with ethnicity are interpreted as the 
difference in the enrollment rates when we compare two people who have the same (average) 
characteristics with the only exception of ethnicity. A negative value is a first signal of ethnic 
discrimination. If, after controlling for individual and family characteristics, we still find 
differences in school enrollment rates between whites and non-whites, they could be 
attributed to ethnic discrimination. 
                                                 
45 See Table 3.4 for details. 
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Results 
Table 3.5 in the appendix reports our results. Columns (i), (iii) and (v) show the coefficients 
associated with ethnicity for each educational level. The other columns report the z-statistics 
associated with those coefficients. In Graph 3.5 we plot the regression coefficients against the 
headcount ratio for non-whites. We find that lower coefficients for secondary and tertiary 
educational levels (i.e. more discrimination) are associated with higher poverty rates for 
indigenous and afro-descendants. 
 
- Insert Graph 3.5 - 
 
The results reported in Table 3.5 indicate that, for primary education, only in Brazil, 
Guatemala and Panama there is ethnic discrimination. It is interesting to note that ethnic 
discrimination has decreased in Brazil (from 1995 to 2002), and disappeared in Mexico (from 
1992 to 2002) and Costa Rica (from 1992 to 2001). The results also suggest statistically 
significant differences in secondary enrollment rates due to ethnicity also in Paraguay and 
Honduras. We find ethnic discrimination in college for all countries except for Bolivia, Chile 
and Peru. 
The regression results, not reported here, show that a higher household per capita income, 
living in a city, and a higher educational level of the household head have a positive effect on 
the probability of school attendance. Thus, if non-white people are poorer that white people, 
they will have a lower conditional probability of school attendance even if the coefficients in 
Table 3.5 show no ethnic discrimination. 
3. Educational Mobility 
It is a well-known fact that Latin American countries have very unequal income distributions 
compared to most other countries in the world (World Bank, 2004). This, combined with low 
mean income, is undesirable as it implies that many people live in poverty. However, high 
inequality in a context of high social mobility is not as bad as high inequality combined with 
low social mobility. Poverty differences may be seen as less worrisome when they are 
combined with high social mobility. Social mobility basically measures the importance of 
family background in determining the education of teenagers. If family background is very 
important, we will say that social mobility is low. 
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Methodology 
The main idea behind the proposed methodology can be summarized as follows: if family 
background explains children’s opportunities, then social mobility is low- if it does not, then 
social mobility is high. The methodology, firstly developed by Andersen (2001), is very 
simple and can be explained in two steps.46
In the first step we identify all teenagers who live with at least one parent, and regress their 
schooling gaps on two sets of regressors: (i) “family background variables” that include 
household income per capita and the maximum of father’s and mother’s education and (ii) 
other “explanatory variables” such as age, age of head parent at birth of the child, dummies 
for the presence of older sisters, older brothers, younger sisters, or younger brothers, a dummy 
for female-headed households, a dummy for single parent households, a self-employment 
dummy for the family head, average regional income, and average regional education. 
In the second step we apply the Fields Decomposition (Fields, 1996) on the regression results. 
This tells us what percentage of the schooling gap’s total variance can be explained by the 
“family background variables”. The Social Mobility Index (SMI) is defined as 1 minus the 
variance of the school gap that is explained by family background. In an economy with very 
low mobility, family background would be important and thus SMI would be near zero. If 
family background does not matter, the SMI would be equal to one. The two basic 
assumptions underlying this methodology are that a smaller schooling gap should imply better 
future opportunities for young people and that equality of opportunity is a good indicator of 
social mobility.  
Results 
Graph 3.6 shows the SMI for teenagers (aged 13-19) and young adults (aged 20-25) by 
ethnicity for all LAC countries in the sample.47 In only three out of thirteen countries the SMI 
is lower for non-whites than for whites. The fact that the SMI is higher for non-whites than 
for whites may indicate that the younger generations of non-whites may not be trapped by 
their family background. The SMI for non-whites teenagers ranges from 0.75 in Colombia to 
0.95 in Chile. The corresponding figures for young adults are 0.61 in Ecuador and 0.96 in 
Honduras. The temporal evolution of SMI shows higher social mobility for non-whites in 
Brazil both for teenagers and young adults.  
 
- Insert Graph 3.6 - 
                                                 
46 For technical details see Andersen (2001). 
47 Detailed results are reported in Table 3.6. 
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 4. Returns and Incentives to get Education 
In this section we try to assess if whites are more educated than non-whites because they have 
higher returns to education. We follow the methodology of Di Gresia (2004) to estimate the 
determinants of the university attendance decision taking into account the expected return to 
education. 
Methodology 
We conduct estimations only for Bolivia and Brazil because we need regional variability in 
order to estimate the effect that the expected return to education has on the college attendance 
decision. 
As a first step, we estimate two standard Mincerian wage equations for each region in Bolivia 
and Brazil to get regional returns to education both for whites and non-whites. The 
specification of this equation is similar to that described in the last section of Chapter 2. As a 
second step, we estimate a binary choice model for the college enrollment decision similar to 
that described in Section 2 above adding (regional) returns to education and some other 
regional controls as explanatory variables.48 The estimations were conducted separately for 
whites and non-whites. 
Results 
Table 3.7 reports the estimation results of the last step. We find that the returns to education 
have a positive effect over the probability of college attendance both for whites and non-
whites. The coefficients associated with the returns to education suggest that white 
individuals have more incentives to get education than non-white individuals because when 
facing the decision of entering college they perceive a higher return to education. 
 
 
                                                 
48 See Di Gresia (2004) for technical details. 
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Chapter 4 
Increasing Gender Equity* 
(MDG 3) 
The Millennium Development Goal 3 refers to the elimination of gender disparity in all levels 
of education no later than the year 2015. Latin America and the Caribbean is one of the 
regions in the world where the usual indicators of education show a relatively high gender 
equity, which holds when analyzing the sample by ethnicity. However, there are some 
exceptions worth noticing. Some countries do not exhibit this equality (e.g. Guatemala) and in 
some others gender equality holds only in the primary education that is typically mandatory, 
whereas in secondary education males tend to have higher enrollment rates.  
In this chapter we focus our attention on gender equity by ethnicity. We first analyze literacy 
rates, enrollment rates and skill composition by gender both for whites and non-whites. Then, 
in Section 2, we estimate binary choice models in order to compute a set of coefficients 
associated with gender discrimination in the access to education. In the last two sections we 
tackle the question of gender discrimination in the labor market both in terms of work type 
(Section 3) and wage gap (Section 4). 
1. Assessing Gender Differences in Educational Outcomes  
In this section, we report some educational statistics related to MDG 3 (promote gender 
equality and empower women) stressing differences by gender and ethnicity. All the indices 
used here were defined in the previous chapter. The reader is referred there for their 
definitions. 
Literacy Rates 
As one measure for gender discrimination in educational outcomes, the MDGs propose the 
ratio of literate women to men 15–24 years old (Literacy Gender Parity Index).49 This 
indicator measures progress towards gender equity in literacy and learning opportunities for 
women in relation to those for men. It also measures a presumed outcome of attending school 
and a key indicator of empowerment of women in society. Graph 4.1 reports our estimates for 
this indicator and Table 4.1 provides more details. The graph indicates that the literacy gender 
parity index is considerably lower than 1 (less than 0.9) only for indigenous and afro-
descendants living in Peru (0.77), Panama (0.78) and Guatemala (0.85). The corresponding 
figures for whites are 0.92, 1.00 and 0.94, respectively. The other countries show no major 
                                                 
* All the tables included in this chapter can be downloaded from www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/cedlas/ethnicity
49 See www.developmentgoals.org. 
 51
differences by ethnicity in the ratio of literate women to men aged 15-24. Thus, most LAC 
countries in our sample seem to be doing well with regards to the MDG literacy gender parity 
index. 
 
- Insert Graph 4.1 - 
 
Enrollment Rates 
The indicator used to monitor progress towards Goal 3 regarding gender equity in school 
enrollment is the ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education. This 
indicator is defined as the ratio of the number of female students enrolled at primary, 
secondary and tertiary levels in public and private schools to the number of male students. 
The indicator of equality of educational opportunity, measured in terms of school enrolment, 
is a measure of both fairness and efficiency. Education is one of the most important aspects of 
human development. Eliminating gender disparity at all levels of education would help to 
increase the status and capabilities of women.50 This indicator is computed in Graph 4.2 as the 
ratio of the number of enrolled girls to enrolled boys in five different age-groups.51  
 
- Insert Graph 4.2 - 
 
Men and women show increasingly similar levels of education in Latin America particularly 
in urban areas (World Bank, 2004). However, when examining our country sample by 
ethnicity, gender equality in school access is not the same across countries. For 6-12 years old 
we find gender equality in enrollment rates both for whites and non-whites in all countries 
with the exception of Honduras and Panama for non-whites only, and Guatemala both for 
whites and non-whites. The 13-15 age cohort shows the smallest differences by gender in 
school enrollment rates. Only non-white girls living in Ecuador, Guatemala and Mexico lag 
behind boys in the same group. Table 4.2 allows a comparison of school enrollment rates both 
by ethnicity and by gender. The single most ignored group is that of non-white women aged 
13-24 in Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama. This group lags behind white women due 
                                                 
50 See MDGs definitions. 
51 Please see Table 4.2 in the appendix. 
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to ethnic gaps and behind non-white men due to a gender factor that does not appear to be as 
strong among white people.52
We have information for two points in time only for a few countries. We can observe an 
increase in enrollment rates for non-white women and men in every country during the last 
years. 
Skill 
Here, we compute the skill composition of individuals aged 25-65 both by gender and 
ethnicity. An individual is considered skilled if he has some tertiary studies (complete or 
incomplete). We find that the proportion of skilled women among non-white individuals is 
lower than that for whites for all countries in our sample (see Table 4.3). Gender equality is 
lower for non-whites than for whites in seven countries (Guatemala, Ecuador, Mexico, Chile, 
Bolivia, Peru, and Nicaragua).  
 
- Insert Graph 4.3 - 
 
2. Statistical Gender Discrimination in Education 
In this section, we make a conditional analysis of differences in educational outcomes by 
gender. We want to know if, after controlling for a standard set of variables (age, place where 
the individual lives -city or rural areas-, household income, maximum education of the head 
of household or of her spouse, household head’s age, and number of persons that live in the 
household) women have lower probabilities of going to school than do men. These 
differences in probabilities can be interpreted as a measure of discrimination. The 
methodology is similar to the one applied in the previous chapter to asses the existence of 
ethnic discrimination. The only difference is that here we run separate regressions for whites 
and non-whites in order to measure gender discrimination by ethnicity. In Table 4.4 we report 
the coefficients associated with the male dummy for each educational level. A positive value 
indicates gender discrimination. 
We find statistical gender discrimination in access to primary education only for non-whites 
living in Guatemala and Panama. Bolivia and Peru show gender discrimination at the 
secondary school level for non-whites. Only among non-whites in Guatemala we find gender 
discrimination in the access to tertiary education. If we combine these results with those of 
                                                 
52 A similar result for Bolivia is obtained by World Bank (2004). 
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Chapter 3, we can conclude that in Guatemala and Panama non-white women are the most 
disadvantaged group in that they have the lowest (conditional) probability of going to school.  
Summarizing, our results suggest that in most Latin American countries there is no evidence 
of gender discrimination in the access to education both for whites and non-whites. On the 
other hand, in Chapter 3 we found ethnic discrimination in the access to education in some 
countries. 
3. Gender Gross Gaps in the Labor Market 
Absence of differences in educational outcomes might exist in the presence of differences in 
wages earned and in the types of jobs women do. In this section we investigate both of these 
issues stressing differences by ethnicity.  
Work Type 
The share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector is also part of MDG 
3. This indicator, computed as the share of female workers in the non-agricultural sector 
expressed as a percentage of total employment in the sector, measures the degree to which 
labor markets are open to women in industry and service sectors. In Graph 4.4 it is shown that 
the proportion of women living in rural areas who work in agriculture is higher for non-whites 
than for whites (except in Colombia).53 This proportion for indigenous and afro-descendant 
women ranges from 0.21 in Colombia to 0.86 in Bolivia. The corresponding figures for white 
women are 0.23 and 0.77, respectively. The comparison by gender shows a higher 
participation of agricultural employment for women than for men only for non-whites living 
in rural Ecuador and Nicaragua. 
 
- Insert Graph 4.4 - 
 
Wage Gaps 
The MDGs do not refer to gender wage gaps although they can be a signal of gender 
discrimination in the labor market. Here we compute gross gender wage gaps by ethnicity 
simply as the ratio of average hourly wages for men and for women both for rural and urban 
workers. Graph 4.5 shows our results. The average gross wage gap across countries is higher 
in rural than in urban areas. We also see that the difference in the gender wage gap by 
                                                 
53 See Table 4.5 for detailed results. 
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ethnicity is lower for urban workers than for their rural counterparts. However, six countries 
(Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Paraguay, Guatemala, and Honduras) show somewhat higher 
average wages for non-white women living in rural areas than for men in the same group. For 
white individuals, this happens in Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, and Nicaragua. In urban 
areas we find a negative wage gap for non-whites only in Honduras.  
- Insert Graph 4.5 - 
 
4. Gender Wage Discrimination 
The seminal work by Becker “The Economics of Discrimination” was the first  literature that 
tries to detect, explain, and quantify the existence of “unjustifiable” differences in the 
treatment received by male and female workers in the labor market. Oaxaca (1973) and 
Blinder (1973) made important contributions to the measurement of discrimination. Many 
authors have found the existence of wage discrimination in Latin American countries. 
Contreras and Galván (2003) find gender and ethnic discrimination during the nineties in the 
case of Bolivia. They also find that this discrimination is lower amongst younger workers. 
Loureiro (2001) finds race discrimination in Brazil. 
In this section we use the same methodology described in the last section of Chapter 2 to 
measure the conditional gender wage gap both for whites and non-whites. Instead of applying 
the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, in Table 4.6 we report gender coefficients of 
standard Mincer equations estimated by ethnicity. The coefficient associated with gender tells 
us how much more a male worker expects to earn holding constant the other characteristics. 
We find evidence of the existence of gender wage discrimination both for whites (in all 
countries) and non-whites (in all countries except Honduras and Paraguay).  
Summarizing, we found that gender equality does not hold when analyzing gross gender wage 
gaps, especially in rural areas of some countries (e.g. Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru). We also 
found evidence that the gender wage gap persists when doing the analysis conditioning on 
human capital. 
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Chapter 5 
Achieving MDG Number One for Non-Whites*
The first target associated with the MDG number one is that countries should halve, between 
1990 and 2015, the proportion of poor people. In the first section of this chapter, we use a 
simple microsimulation technique to estimate the effect, at the national level, of achieving the 
MDGs for the indigenous and afro-descendant populations in the Latin American and  
Caribbean countries in our sample. In Section 2, we use isopoverty curves to explore the 
implications of achieving the MDG number one for indigenous and afro-descendent people by 
means of different combinations of economic growth and income redistribution. 
1. A Simple Exercise 
In this section we calculate the effect at the national level of achieving the first MDG for 
indigenous and afro-descendant people. To that end, we simulate the implementation of a 
transfer program that allows the indigenous and afro-descendent people to leave poverty 
behind. In this and the following sections, we set the millennium target for non-whites to be 
half of the poverty computed in the last available year.54 We present results for three poverty 
indicators –poverty incidence, poverty gap, and severity of poverty- and two poverty lines –
one dollar a day at purchasing power parity and half the median income- using the household 
per capita income as our income measure. Graphs 5.1 to 5.3 show the results for the one-
dollar a day poverty line.55
 
- Insert Graphs 5.1-5.3 - 
 
The reduction in the poverty incidence at the national level varies widely between countries, 
ranging from 27 percentage points in the case of Haiti (from 51% to 24%) to 0.07 percentage 
points for Chile (from 3.53% to 3.46%). These figures reflect that, trivially, (national) poverty 
reduction is higher for those countries with a larger non-white population (i.e. Haiti, Bolivia, 
Guatemala, Paraguay, and Brazil). Table 5.1 indicates that, for example, Bolivian poverty 
incidence decreases from 28 to 18 when the indigenous population is taken out of poverty 
                                                 
* All the tables included in this chapter can be downloaded from 
www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/cedlas/ethnicity.
54 For a discussion of the available alternatives see Chapter 2. 
55 For the complete set of results, please refer to Tables 5.1 to 5.3 in the appendix. 
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using one dollar a day at PPP as the poverty line. The corresponding figures for the poverty 
gap and the severity of poverty are 17 to 10 and 13 to 8, respectively. 
2. Isopoverty Curves 
Since the first target associated with the MDG number one is a poverty reduction target, it is 
useful to think about it in terms of two basic ways in which the extent of poverty for any 
given income distribution can be reduced: growth in the mean and/or reduction in inequality 
(Ferreira and Leite, 2003). In this section we present isopoverty curves that allow us to have 
an idea of the effort, in terms of income redistribution as well as economic growth that would 
allow the indigenous and afro-descendent people to halve their poverty incidence. We first 
discuss the methodology and then show the results. 
Methodology 
The isopoverty curves are used in ECLAC/IPEA/UNDP (2003) to show the combinations of 
inequality reduction (as measured by changes in the Gini coefficient) and growth in the mean 
income that would allow each of the LAC countries to halve their (national) poverty 
incidence. These isopoverty curves have negative slope and are convex to the origin showing 
that, when the mean income is higher, the reduction in inequality that is needed to meet a 
certain poverty incidence objective is relatively less. 
In this paper, on the other hand, we estimate isopoverty curves that show the combinations of 
income transfer from non-poor people to poor indigenous and afro-descendents and growth in 
the mean income that would allow non-whites to halve their poverty incidence. Starting from 
the observed income distribution we simulate a counterfactual in which the mean income for 
the whole population is β% higher and there is an income redistribution of α% of non-poor 
individuals’ total income to indigenous and afro-descendants.  
We analyze two types of income transfers: (i) targeted, in which some non-white poor 
individuals receive a transfer equal to the difference between their income and the poverty 
line; and (ii) egalitarian, in which all non-white individuals receive the same amount of 
money independent of their income. In both cases, we choose the indigenous and afro-
descendent people who receive the income transfer in a way that minimizes the amount of 
money that is redistributed.  
Targeted transfer. In the case of the targeted transfer, the first step is to identify the poor 
indigenous/afro-descendent individuals that should leave poverty to meet the millennium 
target for this group. We assume that the non-whites who receive the transfer are those with 
higher incomes among the poor. If *P  is the millennium target in terms of poverty incidence 
for indigenous/afro-descendent people, the income transfer is received only by the ( )%100 P− *  richer among non-whites. The individual transfer is calculated as the difference 
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between the poverty line and the observed income. In this way, we minimize the amount of 
money to be transferred from rich people to non-whites in poverty.  
Egalitarian transfer. The transfer that receives each indigenous/afro-descendant is calculated 
as the difference between the poverty line and the income of the poorest person in this group 
that should reach the poverty line to meet the millennium target for non-whites. In this case, 
the whole non-white poor population receives the same amount of money as a transfer from 
the rich population.56  
It should be clear that only the election of the transfer beneficiaries is based on ethnicity. On 
the other hand, all the rich persons pay the tax to finance the income transfer. The exercises 
that we present in this section should be interpreted in a broad sense, meaning that the transfer 
from non-poor individuals to indigenous and afro-descendants may not necessarily be a cash 
transfer. 
Results 
We present four isopoverty curves for each country corresponding to a combination of a 
transfer type and a poverty line. We consider two alternative poverty lines: (i) one dollar a day 
at PPP; and (ii) half the median income. For the simulations we use the household per capita 
income as the income measure. As the initial poverty incidence (P0) for non-whites, we take 
the one observed in the latest available household survey so that the millennium target for this 
group is 20PP =*
                                                
.  
As an example, the estimated isopoverty curves for Guatemala and Panama are shown in 
Graph 5.4 below.57 The vertical axis measures the income tax rate that is paid by the non-poor 
individuals (α). Although the previous discussion was made in terms of growth in the mean 
income, to ease the presentation, the horizontal axis measures the rate of annual growth 
between the year in which the household survey was conducted and 2015 (g).  
 
- Insert Graph 5.4 - 
 
Each point in the isopoverty curve corresponds to a (national) income distribution in which 
the poverty incidence for indigenous and afro-descendants is exactly equal to half the 
observed value in the base year with respect to the relevant poverty line. Clearly, given such 
 
56 The mathematical formulas for calculating the simulated income for each group are presented in the technical 
appendix to this chapter that is available from the authors upon request. 
57 The isopoverty curves for the other countries in our sample are shown in Graph 5.1 in the Appendix. 
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disparate “initial” conditions, the various countries under study will require different 
combinations of economic growth and income transfer to meet their respective millennium 
poverty reduction target for their non-white population. 
The position of an isopoverty curve shows how easy or difficult it is for a given country to 
meet the millennium target for its non-white population: the closer to the origin an isopoverty 
curve lies, the less growth and income transfer are required to reach it. In all cases, the slope 
of the isopoverty curves is negative (indicating that it is possible to substitute economic 
growth by income redistribution) and convex (indicating that the marginal rate of substitution 
between economic growth and income redistribution is decreasing). Their horizontal 
intercepts tell us how much economic growth each country would need in order to meet its 
own millennium poverty reduction target for non-whites if there where no income 
redistribution. Their vertical  intercepts tell us how much income redistribution (as a share of 
the rich individuals’ total income) each country would need in order to meet its own 
millennium poverty reduction target for non-whites if its mean income remained constant (i.e. 
with zero growth). 
Isopoverty curves for all countries are shown in Graph 5.5. The isopoverty curves shown are 
relatively “flat” implying that the poverty reduction impact of even a small transfer program 
is equivalent to that of many percentage points in accumulated economic growth. For 
example, in the case of Ecuador, an annual growth rate of 6% between 1998 and 2015 is 
equal, in terms of poverty reduction, to an income transfer 0.48% of the wealthy individuals’ 
income to non-whites in poverty. 
 
- Insert Graph 5.5 - 
 
Table 5.4 (egalitarian transfer) and 5.5 (targeted transfer) show in columns (i) and (ii) the 
intercepts of the isopoverty curves with the X-axis and Y-axis, respectively. Column (iii) 
shows the amount of income transferred from non-poor individuals to non-whites as a 
percentage of the country’s total income58 when there is no economic growth (g=0) (see also 
Graph 5.6). Columns (iv) and (v) present the Gini coefficient of the distribution of household 
per capita income before and after the transfer scheme, also computed assuming no economic 
growth (see also Graph 5.7). 
- Insert Graph 5.6 - 
                                                 
58 Calculated as the sum of the household per capita income across the whole population. 
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- Insert Graph 5.7 - 
The figure in column (ii) of Table 5.4 for Peru means that for this country to meet its 
millennium target by means of the targeted transfer scheme described above if the poverty 
line is one dollar a day at PPP, it would be necessary to transfer 0.29% of non-poor 
individuals’ total income to the indigenous population if the economy were not to grow 
between 2002 and 2015. The similarity between columns (ii) and (iii) reflects that the share in 
total national income of non-whites in poverty is small. 
In the case of Bolivia, for instance, the MDG one poverty reduction target for indigenous 
people would be reached, with no economic growth, with a redistribution of 3.6% of the non-
poor individuals’ total income in favor of indigenous people in poverty. This income transfer 
would reduce the Gini coefficient from 0.624 to 0.578. Alternatively, the same poverty 
incidence would be reached, with no income redistribution, by an average annual growth rate 
of 11% over the 2002-2015 period. 
The most costly transfer is, by assumption, the egalitarian one where all non-whites in poverty 
receive the same amount of money. In this case, the income tax rate that should pay the non-
poor population if the average income remains constant and the poverty line is one dollar a 
day at PPP, goes from 0.01% in the case of Chile to 3.6% for Bolivia. This tax rate is higher, 
ceteris paribus, for those countries with a larger indigenous and afro-descendant population. 
The isopoverty curves for the two different poverty lines in the same country often cross (e.g. 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia), indicating that more growth is required to halve a lower poverty rate 
(with respect to a lower poverty line) than to halve a higher poverty rate (with respect to a 
higher poverty line). This is explained by the bell shape of the density functions for the 
distributions of (log) income.59 The closer a poverty line is to the mean of a distribution, the 
more mass (from below) lies close to it; hence, the larger the return of economic growth in 
terms of poverty reduction of “sliding” the density function to the right. When the poverty 
incidence that remains is very small (e.g. Chile), one needs a great deal of rightward 
movement in the mean (growth) to slide half the mass below the very flat tail, past the poverty 
line. This same argument explains why Chile needs a higher income growth rate (without 
income redistribution) than Paraguay to halve a poverty incidence for non-whites that is much 
lower (11.9% and 3.3%, respectively). 
Summarizing, the isopoverty curves show that the impact of an even small income 
redistribution from non-poor individuals to non-whites is equivalent to that of a relatively 
large annual growth rate until 2015. However, the simulation of a counterfactual income 
distribution through the mechanisms described above is a simple arithmetic exercise. There is 
                                                 
59 See ECLAC/IPEA/UNDP (2003). 
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no guarantee that it would be consistent either with (i) household behavior, and (ii) a general 
equilibrium of the markets in the economy (Ferreira and Leite, 2003). 
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Chapter 6 
Explaining Differences Between Whites and Non-Whites: 
Microeconometric Decompositions*
In this chapter, we try to explain why indigenous and afro-descendants in Latin American and 
the Caribbean countries tend to be poorer and less educated than whites.60 To this aim, we use 
the microeconometric decomposition technique. This technique allows us to answer several 
questions such as, what would the poverty incidence be if the educational levels of indigenous 
and afro-descendants were those of the whites? In the first section, we apply the 
microeconometric decomposition technique to explain differences in poverty, while in Section 
2 we use this methodology to explain differences in school enrollment rates. Our results 
suggest that a large portion of the differences in poverty incidence between whites and non-
whites is explained by education-related factors.  
1. Explaining Differences in Poverty 
A countless number of factors may explain the differences in poverty rates between whites 
and non-whites in Latin American and the Caribbean countries. In what follows we will 
concentrate on six of them: i) returns to education; ii) the gender wage gap; iii) returns to 
experience; iv) the dispersion in the endowment of unobservable factors; v) hours of work; 
and vi) the education of the active population. The objective of this section is to estimate the 
sign and the relative magnitude of the effects of these factors for explaining differences in 
poverty incidence between whites and non-whites. To that aim we adapt the 
microeconometric decomposition methodology first proposed by Bourguignon, Ferreira and 
Lustig (1998) to our case. 
Methodology 
Decompositions provide counterfactual income distributions that can be helpful to 
characterize differences in poverty incidence by ethnicity.61 Microeconometric decomposition 
techniques have been initially applied to the study of discrimination (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 
1973; Oaxaca and Ramson, 1994), and more recently in the inequality literature (Juhn et al., 
1993; Bourguignon et al., 2001). In the last few years, this methodology has become a usual 
tool for the analysis of distributional changes (Bourguignon et al., 2004). We first provide a 
                                                 
* All the tables included in this chapter can be downloaded from 
www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/cedlas/ethnicity.
60 For the definition of white and non-white in each country please refer to Chapter 1. 
61 The same methodology can also be used to make predictions on the poverty impact of future changes in 
economic factors and public policies.  
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brief explanation of this methodology and then show the results for LAC countries concerning 
the differences in poverty incidence between whites and non-whites. 
The basic idea of the decompositions is to simulate the income distribution of group g (non-
whites) if some of its determinants were those of group g’ (whites), and compare that 
counterfactual income distribution to the real one for group g. The difference between the two 
distributions can be attributed to differences between g and g’ in the selected determinants. 
The observed and simulated income distributions can be compared in terms of some poverty 
index. The methodological Appendix A to this chapter provides more details on this 
approach.  
Results 
In the empirical implementation of the microeconometric decomposition, we use the 
household per capita income and the two dollars a day at purchasing power parity poverty line 
for calculating the rate of poverty incidence.62 Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the results of the 
microeconometric decomposition of all countries for which we have enough information.63 In 
Table 6.1, poverty incidence calculated from observed household per capita income is shown 
in columns (i) and (ii), while poverty from simulated household per capita income for non-
whites is shown in columns (iii) to (viii). 
According to Table 6.2, for example, the observed poverty incidence for white people in 
Guatemala is almost 30 percentage points lower than that of the indigenous people. The 
returns-to-education effect in column (ii) is -3.2. This is the difference between the poverty 
incidence that results from applying whites’ vector of educational dummies to the indigenous 
distribution and the actual poverty incidence for indigenous people. A negative number in 
columns (ii) to (viii) indicates a poverty reducing effect. A large number compared to the 
other figures in the column suggests a significant effect. For instance, the returns-to-education 
effect in Mexico is -21.4. This roughly means that the poverty incidence would decrease by 
21.4 percentage points if the returns to education (i.e. the coefficients of the educational 
dummies in the wage equation) of the indigenous group were those of the white group. The -
21.4 gives us two pieces of information: i) since it is a negative number, it implies that the 
returns to education effect is poverty-decreasing for the non-whites; and ii) since it is large 
compared to the other number in the same row, it indicates that the difference in the returns to 
education is a very significant factor explaining differences in the poverty incidence between 
whites and indigenous peoples in Mexico.  
                                                 
62 The results do not change much, as regards the relative importance of each factor in explaining poverty 
differences, if we use the others poverty lines and income measures considered in Chapter 2. 
63 We are not considering Nicaragua, Haiti and Suriname because there are not enough observations for both 
groups. 
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- Insert Table 6.1 - 
- Insert Table 6.2 - 
The rest of this section is devoted to study the effects on poverty incidence of several 
potential income determinants. 
Returns to education. Differences in the returns to education imply a wage gap between 
whites and non-whites, which, in turn, would imply differences in poverty. In fact, the 
differences in the returns to education seem to have been one of the most important factors in 
explaining differences in poverty incidence by ethnicity. In eight out of twelve countries, the 
returns-to-education effect is poverty-decreasing. In countries like Bolivia, Mexico, and 
Ecuador, if the returns to education of indigenous people were equal to those of  whites, the 
poverty incidence for indigenous would be more than 10 percentage points lower. In Brazil, 
Colombia, Peru, Guatemala, and Honduras, the difference in the returns to education also has 
a negative impact of about 5 percentage points in the indigenous and afro-descendent poverty 
incidence. For the remaining countries, on the other hand, the sign of the returns-to-education 
effect is positive, meaning that non-white workers show higher returns to education than their 
white counterparts.64
Gender wage gap. If the gender wage gap is higher for whites than for non-whites65, we 
expect a poverty decreasing effect, as the simulated income for male indigenous and afro-
descendants will be higher while everything else will be kept constant at the observed values. 
This is the case in countries such as Costa Rica, Honduras, Paraguay and Panama. On the 
other hand, in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Guatemala the male dummy in the wage 
equations is higher for non-whites than for whites, meaning that the gender wage gap has a 
poverty-increasing effect. 
Experience (age). Age is used as a proxy for experience in the labor market. The coefficient 
of age and age squared in the log hourly equations show an inverted U shaped wage-age 
profile both for whites and non-whites. If the returns to experience are higher for white 
workers than for the indigenous and afro-descendant population, we expect a poverty-
reducing effect of importing white’s coefficients into non-whites’ hourly earnings. The 
comparison of the regression coefficients for age and age squared show the largest difference 
by ethnicity (in favor of white workers) in Panama, Ecuador, Paraguay, Brazil, Chile and 
Colombia. It is for these same countries that the returns-to-experience effect is poverty-
reducing. On the other hand, the returns-to-experience effect is poverty-increasing in 
Honduras and Bolivia. 
                                                 
64 At least for some relevant educational levels. 
65 As shown in Chapter 4, the coefficients of the male dummy in the wage equations are positive for whites and 
non-whites in all countries except Honduras. 
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Unobservables. The error term in the earnings equations is usually interpreted as capturing 
the joint effect of the endowment of non-observable factors (like natural school quality, 
ability and labor market connections) and its market value on earnings. In general terms, we 
assume that the variance of this error term captures the contribution of dispersion in 
unobservable factors to poverty incidence. Importing whites’ variance of residuals from the 
wage equation into that of non-whites translates into a poverty-increasing effect in all 
countries. This may indicate that there is greater heterogeneity amongst white workers along 
unobserved dimensions such as ability than among their indigenous and afro-descendant 
counterparts.  
Hours of work. In those countries where whites tend to work more hours than non-whites, 
the hours of the work effect will be poverty-decreasing. Importing whites’ coefficients for the 
hours of work equation lowers poverty incidence for non-whites in Colombia, Honduras and 
Mexico. On the other hand, the hours of work effect is poverty increasing for Bolivia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala and Peru.66  
Education. The differences in the education structure of the active population are important 
factors in the twelve countries of our sample. The indigenous and afro-descendant active 
populations tend to be less educated than their white counterparts. These differences have a 
negative effect on non-whites’ poverty incidence in eleven countries. The largest effects are 
observed in Mexico and Panama, where the education effect explains 15 and 13 percentage 
points of the difference in poverty incidence between whites and non-whites. In Honduras, 
Paraguay and Ecuador the education effect explains more than 5 percentage points of the 
difference in poverty incidence by ethnicity. 
Other factors and interactions. Differences in the factors considered explain some, but not 
all of the differences in poverty incidence by ethnicity. The last column in Table 6.2 is 
calculated as a residual- it encompasses the effects of interactions terms and of many factors 
not considered in the analysis. According to Table 6.2, these terms are large for some 
countries, implying that those other factors are important. This question deserves further 
investigation. 
Summarizing, the two most important factors that seem to be poverty-increasing for non-
whites are related to education: the returns-to-education effect, and the education effect. 
However, in some countries we were able to identify some other relevant factors (e.g. returns 
to experience in Panama and Ecuador). In Graph 6.1 we compare the observed and simulated 
                                                 
66 To assess the relevance of differences in hours of work on poverty, the distribution of the base group is 
simulated using the parameters of the hours of work equations. Some people do not work with the base group 
parameters but do work in the simulation. For those individuals, we simulate the base group hours of work and 
wages using the base year parameters and adding an error term obtained following the procedure described in 
Gasparini et al. (2004). This error term is used to simulate hours of work. 
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distributions of (log) household per capita income for these two effects in Bolivia and 
Mexico. 
 
- Insert Graph 6.1 - 
 
The graph clearly shows the poverty-reducing impact of both the returns-to-education and 
education effects. We see that the four simulated income distributions are everywhere at the 
right of the observed income distributions. In Graph 6.2 we replicate the analysis for the rest 
of the countries in our sample.  
2. Explaining Differences in School Attendance 
In this section we implement the methodology proposed in Gasparini (2000) for the 
microeconometric decomposition of differences in the rates of school attendance by ethnicity 
for three education levels: primary; secondary; and tertiary. The method quantifies the 
fraction of the school attendance differential that can be attributed to a difference in 
characteristics between two groups, and the proportion that is due to differences in the way 
those characteristics are linked to the schooling decision (i.e. the difference in coefficients 
associated with those characteristics in a regression framework). 
Methodology 
We combine micro data from the last available household surveys with an econometric 
modeling of the probability of being at school. As the first step, we estimate a probit model 
for each ethnic group within each education level. This is a binary choice model where the 
dependent variable equals 1 if the individual attends school and 0 otherwise. We consider the 
following age-groups in each education level: (i) primary, between 6 and 12; (ii) secondary, 
between 13 and 17; and (iii) tertiary, between 18 and 30. The independent variables are: 
household per capita income, household head’s educational level and age, gender, age and age 
squared, household size, and a urban/rural dummy. For the tertiary educational level we add a 
marital status dummy. 
The differences in school attendance rates by ethnicity can be explained due to differences in 
the observable characteristics of the groups and to differences in their parameters: (i) the 
characteristics effect answers the question regarding what the school attendance rate for 
indigenous and afro-descendent individuals would be if their characteristics were those of the 
white individuals; and (ii) the parameters effect captures differences in enrollment rates as a 
consequence of differences in parameters keeping everything else fixed.  
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The characteristic effect would be larger if the difference in school enrollment between white 
and non-white children is mainly driven by differences in some of the “characteristics” of 
these groups, including household income, parental education, household size, and location. 
Instead, differences might mainly be driven by other factors (e.g. preferences) that imply 
different schooling decisions by ethnicity, even in the case of similar “characteristics”. In this 
case, the parameter effect would be larger in our decomposition.    
Alternatively, both of the effects can be captured using each of the groups as the base group. 
It can be shown that the observed differences in school attendance equal the sum of the 
averages (changing the base group) of the characteristics and parameters effect plus a residual 
that is likely to be insignificant. See Appendix B for a more formal explanation.  
Results 
To implement the decomposition we need observed and simulated rates of school attendance 
for each group. These are shown in Table 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 for primary, secondary, and 
superior education levels, respectively. 
 
- Insert Table 6.3 - 
- Insert Table 6.4 - 
- Insert Table 6.5 - 
 
The rate of school attendance in the primary level for afro-descendants in Panama was 85% in 
2002. That rate would have been 91% if the parameters that link individual characteristics to 
the school attendance decision had been equal those of whites. With fixed parameters at afro-
descendents’ values and the whites’ characteristics, that rate would have been 90%.  
Comparing columns (ii) and (iii) allows a first evaluation of the characteristics effect, keeping 
the parameters fixed in a given group. The differences in the individual characteristics of 
children who are of age for attending primary school explains a large part of the difference 
between rates of school attendance for whites and non-whites in all countries. This conclusion 
applies to the three educational levels. Comparing columns (iii) and (iv) gives an idea of the 
parameters effect. The simulated rates of school attendance to primary school for non-whites 
are higher in only three (i.e. Brazil, Guatemala and Panama) out of thirteen countries. The 
results of the decompositions are shown in Table 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8 for primary, secondary, and 
tertiary levels, respectively. 
- Insert Table 6.6 - 
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- Insert Table 6.7 - 
- Insert Table 6.8 - 
In columns (i) and (ii) the non-white group is taken as the base group; in columns (iii) and (iv) 
the white group is the base group; and in columns (v) and (vi) the average of the two 
simulations is reported. Column (vii) shows the actual difference in the rate of school 
attendance between groups. For instance, the rate of school attendance in the secondary level 
in Brazil is 14.6 percentage points lower for afro-descendants than for whites. The average of 
computing the characteristics effects while changing the base group gives a value of 8.5% and 
the value of computing the parameters effect while changing the base group is 6.1%. 
From Table 6.6 to 6.8 it can be seen that the characteristics effects is always negative and, in 
most cases, they are larger than the parameters effects.67 This implies that differences in 
characteristics such as household per capita income, parental education, household size, and 
location are the most important factors behind the differences in enrollment rates between 
whites and non-whites. Differences in the way people make schooling decisions based on 
their characteristics (driven, for instance, by preferences) seem a less important source of 
differences in enrollment rates between ethnic groups. 
                                                 
67 The differences between rates of school attendance are larger for the secondary level. It is for this education 
level that the parameters effect is larger. 
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Methodological Appendix A 
In this Appendix we provide more details on the implementation of the microeconometric 
decomposition technique.68  
Let Yig be the labor income of individual’s i in group g, which can be written as a function F 
of the vector Xig of individual observable characteristics affecting wages and employment, the 
vector εig of unobservable characteristics, the vector βg of parameters that determine market 
hourly wages and the vector λg of parameters that affect employment outcomes (participation 
and hours of work). Then, 
( ) ggigigig XFY λβε ,,,=  (6.1) 
  gNi ,...,1=
where Ng is total population in group g. The distribution of individual labor income can be 
represented as 
{ } Nggg YYD ,...,1=  (6.2) 
We can simulate individual labor incomes by changing one or some arguments in equation 
(6.1). For instance, the following expression represents labor income that individual i in group 
g would have earned if the parameters determining wages had been those of group g’, keeping 
everything else constant. 
( ) ( ) ggigiggig XFY λβεβ ,,, '' =  (6.3) 
  gNi ,...,1=
( )More generally, we can define 'gig kY  where k is any set of arguments in (6.1). Hence, the 
simulated distribution will be 
( ) ( ) ( ){ } ''1' ,..., gNggggg kYkYkD =  (6.4) 
The contribution to the overall change in the distribution of a change in k between groups g 
and g’, holding all else constant, can be obtained by comparing (6.2) and (6.4).  
The previous discussion refers to the distribution of earnings. However, it is more relevant 
from a social point of view to study the distribution of household income, since a person’s 
utility usually depends not on her earnings but on her household income and the demographic 
                                                 
68 The following explanation is based on Gasparini et al. (2004).  
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composition of her family. Equivalent household income for each individual in household h in 
group g is defined as 
 
( )∑ ∑∈
∈hgj
  
+=
hgj jg
jgjgq
hg a
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Y
0
 (6.5) 
gHh ,...,1=
where Yq stands for equivalent household income, h indexes households, Y0 is income from 
other sources, and a stands for the equivalent adult of each individual. The distribution of 
equivalent household income for the population of Ng individuals in group g can be expressed 
as  
{ }qqq
( )( )
Nggg YYD ,...,1=  (6.6)  
Changing argument k to its value for group g’ yields the following simulated equivalent 
household income for group g: 
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  gHh ,...,1=
Hence, the simulated distribution is 
( ) ( ){ }''1 ,..., gNgggg kYkYD = qqq  (6.8)  
Although we can make the comparisons in terms of the whole distributions, in order to study 
differences in poverty between groups, we compare poverty indices 
( )zD ,Π q   
where Π is a poverty indicator that depends on the distribution of equivalent household 
income Dq, and the poverty line z. Therefore, the effect of a change in argument k on poverty, 
holding all else constant, is given by 
( )( ) ( )zDzkD ggg ,,' Π−Π qq  (6.9)  
As mentioned above, this section is devoted to discussing the following effects:  
( )ed(i) Returns to education k β= : it measures the effect of changes in the parameters 
that relate education to hourly wages ( )edβ  on poverty. 
( )g(ii) Gender wage gap k β= : the same as (i) but with gender instead of education. 
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(iii) Returns to experience ( )exk β= : the same as (i) but with experience (age). 
( )w(iv) Endowment and returns to unobservable factors k ε= : measures the effect of 
changes in the unobservable factors and their remunerations affecting hourly wages ( )wε  on poverty. 
( )(v) Hours of work and employment λ=k : measures the effect of changes in the 
parameters that determine hours of work and labor market participation ( )λ  on 
poverty. 
( )ed(vi) Education Xk = : measures the effect of changes in the educational levels of the 
population ( )edX  on poverty. 
In order to compute expression (6.9) we need to have estimates of parameters β  and λ  and 
the residual term ε . Also, since we do not have panels, we need a mechanism to replicate the 
structure of observable and unobservable characteristics of one group into the population of 
another group. Our estimation strategy follows closely Gasparini et al. (2004)- the reader is 
referred to that paper for technical details. 
The estimation of wage and hours of work equations is a key step in the microeconometric 
decomposition technique. We split the sample of workers into four groups according to two 
criteria: ethnicity (whites and non-whites) and individual role in the household (household 
heads and other members of the family). Thus, we estimate two pairs of equation for whites 
and non-whites.69 We restrict the analysis to labor income for two reasons: i) the households 
surveys we are using have various deficiencies in capturing capital income; and ii) modeling 
capital income and retirement payment is not an easy task, especially considering the scarce 
information contained in the surveys. In the estimation we restrict our sample by ignoring 
those households whose heads are older than 65 or receive retirement payments.  
We estimate (using ordinary least squares70) the log of hourly earnings (log of wages) as a 
function of the typical human capital proxies as education and age (and its squared), and other 
controls such as gender, and a urban/rural dummy. As a measure of educational attainment we 
use six educational categories71: primary incomplete72 and complete, secondary complete and 
complete, and collage complete and incomplete.  
                                                 
69 The results of both sets of equations are available from the authors upon request. 
70 The choice of OLS instead of other methods that allow controlling for sample selection is based on the 
consideration that, in absence of a good model for the selection equation, controlling for sample selection is not a 
dominant practice. 
71 Due to lack of information, we were not able to correct for educational quality. 
72 This category includes those persons with no education. 
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It is assumed that labor market participation choices are made within the household in a 
sequential fashion. Other members of the family take the heads’ labor status into 
consideration to decide whether to enter the labor market or not. We estimate (using a 
standard censored regression tobit) hours of work as a function of education, age and age 
squared, gender, location (urban/rural), marital status, number of children, a dummy that 
indicates if the individual attends school, and a dummy that indicates if the household head is 
unemployed.  
Unobservable characteristics affecting wages are modeled as regression error terms of the 
wage equations. In order to simulate the effect of differences by ethnicity in those 
unobservables, the estimated residuals of the wage equation of non-whites are rescaled to 
reflect whites’ error term variance. 
Methodological Appendix B 
This section provides more details on the methodology applied in section 2 of this chapter. 
The methodology uses an econometric modeling of the individual decision of attending 
school (Yig) to characterize differences between whites and non-whites in their aggregate 
school enrollment rate (Yg). The method begins by modeling Yig, as a function H of a vector of 
observable individual characteristics Xig, a parameter vector βg and unobservable factors eig. 
Assuming that the form of function H is the same for both groups, Yig can be written as: 
( ) iggigig XHY εβ ,,=  (6.10) 
The function H(.), the parameters βg and the random terms are unobservable. The usual 
procedure of estimation implies assuming some functional form for H(.), estimating the 
parameters βg through some econometric technique and obtaining the unobservable factors 
(and their returns) as residual. Formally, the individual value of Yig can be expressed as: 
( ) iggigig XHY εβ ˆ, += ˆˆ  (6.11)  
where ^ stands for estimated (or simulated in the case of the function H). From the preceding 
definitions and assuming for simplicity Ng=Ng’=N, the difference in the value of Y between g 
and g’ is 
 ( )[ ] ( )[ ]NN ˆˆ1ˆˆ1 ∑∑
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+−+=∆
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Y
11
''' ˆ,ˆ, εβεβ  (6.12) 
The aggregate variable can differ basically due to differences in the observable characteristics 
of the populations and to differences in the β parameters. 
Characteristics effect. What would have been the difference in Y if only the observable 
characteristics of the g group were those of the g’ group? The “characteristics effect” 
measures this counterfactual difference. Taking g as the base group, this effect is computed as 
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the difference between the value that would have resulted if only the observable 
characteristics of the g group were those of the g’ group and the observed value of the 
aggregate variable for group g. Analytically, 
 ( )[ ] ( )NN ˆˆ1ˆˆ1 ∑∑
==
+−+=
i
iggig
i
iggig XHN
XH
N
CE
11
'1 ˆ,ˆ, εβεβ  (6.13) 
Equation (6.13) isolates the effect of assigning individual characteristics from group g to 
group g’, keeping the rest constant at group g values. The same exercise can be done taking g’ 
as the base group. In that case, the characteristics effect (denoted as CE2) is computed as the 
difference between the observed aggregate variable for group g’ minus the simulated value 
with group g characteristics and group g’ parameters and residuals. 
Parameters effect. This effect captures the change in Y as a consequence of changes in 
parameters β, keeping all the rest fixed. Taking g as the base group it can be written as 
 ( )[ ] ( )NN ˆˆ1ˆˆ1 ∑∑
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11
'1 ˆ,ˆ, εβεβ  (6.14) 
In a similar way, this effect can be computed by taking g’ as the base group (denoted as PE2). 
It is easy to show that the difference between groups in the aggregate variable equals the sum 
of the averages (changing the base group) of the characteristics and parameters effects plus a 
residual that is likely to be insignificant. 
 RY ++=∆
22
PEPECECE ++ 2121  (6.15) 
where ∑∑ == −= i igi ig NNR 11 ' ˆ1ˆ1 εε NN . In models where R could be different from zero (e.g. 
probit), in most practical cases it will be insignificant. 
The only inputs required by the decomposition are observed and simulated aggregate 
variables. These are shown in the rows of Tables 6.3 to 6.5. 
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Chapter 7*
Policies to Meet the MDGs 
The underlying causes of black and indigenous poverty are largely structural. Inequity often 
manifests itself in the structure of land tenure, with rural indigenous peoples living on plots 
that are too small to be economically viable or in the least productive marginal areas of the 
region. In addition, inequity manifests itself in terms of discrimination and inequality of 
opportunities for indigenous and afro-latins in access to basic services. Indigenous and afro-
descendent peoples are often disadvantaged in their access to market, credit, technology and 
basic services such as education, health care, water supply and other community 
infrastructure. Language, cultural differences and physical isolation can be important 
determinants of their situation, but “social exclusion” due to racial, ethnic and religious 
prejudice tends to worsen their situation. Moreover, these groups have traditionally been 
excluded from the political process, limiting their ability to lobby for resources. Only recently 
has this begun to change, especially since the transitions to democracy experienced by most 
Latin American countries. The presence of these groups in the political process has been 
increasing in Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala and Honduras. 
In this chapter we revise different policies to address the specific problems from which 
indigenous and afro-descendent populations suffer. The basic discussion regarding this issue 
is divided in two tendencies. Some people consider that both indigenous and afro-descendent 
individuals have to be treated as any other poor group of society and be included in programs 
targeted at the poor population as a whole. Others think that indigenous and afro-descendents 
in poverty have cultural specificities that can only be addressed by special programs tailored 
to them. This discussion is present in almost every policy topic presented in this chapter and, 
as we will see, implicitly affects a trade-off between efficacy and lower costs for the policies.  
In particular, we are going to focus on a small set of policies. We first review information 
policies that allow government agencies to identify ethnicity. Secondly, we will focus on 
educational and affirmative action policies that are important to alleviate indigenous and afro 
poverty in the long run. Then, we analyze three sets of policies related to indigenous and afro-
descendent individuals that were implemented in some countries: infrastructure policies, 
financial services, land titling and rural development. Finally, we briefly review the role of 
international organizations regarding indigenous and afro-descendent populations.  
                                                 
* This chapter was co-authored by Mariana Orloff. 
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1. Information Policies 
Any policy aiming to target indigenous and/or afro-descendent individuals has to 
acknowledge, from the outset, a difference in group location. Although indigenous peoples 
are increasingly living in urban areas, the origins of indigenous poverty are to be found in 
rural areas where the aboriginals constitute an easily identifiable sector of the population. On 
the contrary, individuals of afro-descent tend to be more concentrated in urban areas.  
To understand the profile of poor households and assess how government policies affect their 
welfare, it is necessary to have extensive, detailed and precise knowledge of the 
characteristics and behavior of the households in terms of income generation, consumption, 
location and access to social services. Recently, it has become clearer that it is necessary to 
improve the data-collecting tools in order to more accurately reflect the situation of ethnic 
minorities in Latin America.  
As we have mentioned, many countries do not include in their household surveys and 
censuses questions that aim to identify ethnicity. Moreover, countries that do include these 
types of questions use many different methods. As a consequence, comparisons between 
countries, and in many cases within countries, become, over time, a difficult task. 
In fact, if countries wish to address the challenges faced by indigenous and afro-descendent 
people, the need to develop a set of standardized questions for surveys is urgent. Ideally, 
household surveys and censuses should include three type of questions: 
• Self-identification questions should allow respondents to identify a specific ethnic group 
(for example, Quechua, Aymara, black, etc.) rather than merely selecting “indigenous” so 
that potential bias due to prejudice is minimized.  
• Language questions should ask the mother tongue and the most commonly used language 
by the individual. 
• Region questions, should allow to identify small geographic units such as counties 
(instead of departments or states). Note first that the place where an individual lives is not 
a subjective variable (as it is to some extent language and self-identification). Therefore, 
in those countries were indigenous/black people are known to be highly regionally 
concentrated, a geographic variable would allow to assess if self-identification and 
language are properly identifying individuals. Of course, this variable alone would be 
useless for ethnic identification.  
Besides identification of ethnicity in surveys and censuses, there are three other aspects of 
data-collection that are worth discussing.  
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First, some indigenous/afro areas are often under-surveyed due to civil conflict or geographic 
isolation. It is important, therefore, to solve this under-representation, particularly if changes 
in the size of the indigenous population would affect policy. 
Secondly, it is important to recognize the existence of cultural heterogeneity between white 
and non-white groups. Statistical agencies could include periodically (every five years, for 
instance) a special survey module for indigenous peoples that allows the study of traditional 
medicine practices, religious/community activities, land ownership, bilingual schooling and 
other topics that help to better understand each ethnic group behavior. Some countries have 
used separate surveys for indigenous peoples, such as Mexico’s employment survey and 
Venezuela’s indigenous census. From a research and policy perspective, supplements to 
national censuses and surveys73 tend to be more useful since they allow for comparison to a 
control group (non-indigenous, non-black individuals).  
Thirdly, even if in some countries there have been significant advances in the collection of 
data in household surveys and censuses that allow for the desegregation by ethnicity and race, 
it is still difficult in many cases to identify different ethnic groups within indigenous people. 
In this sense, the small size of some indigenous and afro populations in some countries will 
require special samples stratification that could also be done periodically (every given number 
of years).  
Finally, the regular collection of data has not always translated in its use and dissemination. 
Sometimes, the information is collected but it is not usually a part of the regular tabulations 
published by statistical agencies. 
2. Educational Policies 
The classical educational model, which was developed in the XIX century and assumed the 
existence of a monolingual and monocultural student, corresponded to the idea of 
homogeneity of beliefs, culture and language. According to the dominating perspective at the 
time, it was necessary, as part of the process of state formation, to homogenize the population 
under a unique language that could serve in the public administration and to communicate 
with workers.  
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the role of indigenous peoples and 
language heterogeneity, which was reflected in the creation of intercultural bilingual 
education programs. Bilingual education is defined as instruction to minority groups, through 
the use of their mother language and progressively a mainstream language, such as Spanish or 
                                                 
73 Such as Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples Survey, designed and implemented in partnership with national 
Aboriginal organizations, carried out in 1991 and 2001, and Venezuela’s 2001 Census. 
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Portuguese (in the case of Latin America). Indeed, different studies suggest that the 
implementation of this educational model can improve the performance of indigenous 
peoples, increasing enrollment rates, educational results and the level of persistence at school 
among girls, also reducing gender gaps in education, furthering comprehension of Spanish 
and increasing the participation of parents at school. 
For instance, in the case of Bolivia, language skills have an impact on labor market 
participation and on earnings. Spanish is more likely to be the only language used by those 
who are more active in the labor market (men and women with fewer children). Monolingual 
Spanish speakers earn 25% more than those who speak both Spanish and an indigenous 
language, while women who speak only an indigenous language earn about 25% less than the 
bilingual speakers. That is, bilingual speakers may be penalized in the labor market because 
of a poorer proficiency in Spanish. They suggest that there might be large benefits from 
programs designed to improve Spanish language proficiency through bilingual education 
among people of indigenous origins (Chiswick et al., 2000). 
Some studies have identified the following common characteristics in successful programs 
that aimed to provide students with multiple language proficiency and with access to 
academic content material: (i) development of the mother tongue is encouraged to promote 
cognitive development and is used as a basis for learning the second language; (ii) parental 
and community support and involvement are essential; (iii) teachers are able to understand, 
speak and use with a high level of proficiency the language of instruction, whether it is their 
first or second language; (iv) recurrent costs for innovative programs are approximately the 
same as they are for traditional programs, although there may be additional one-time, start-up 
costs; (v) cost-benefit calculations can be estimated in terms of the cost savings to the 
education system, improvements in years of schooling, and enhanced earning potential for 
students with multiple language proficiency (Dutcher, 1994). 
Finally, it should be noted that bilingual education implies in many countries that 
governments face difficult decisions with respect to choosing the second languages. For 
instance, in the case of Guatemala there are 21 Mayan ethnic groups. In order to be 
successful, bilingual education has to operate with students’ mother tongues as basic 
language. This means training for teachers, books and other pedagogical material for  all 
Mayan languages, elevating the cost of the program (even up to a point where the program 
might become unfeasible). Should the government just choose some of those languages? Is 
there a common language that it is shared by the indigenous groups (an “indigenous lengua 
franca”) that could be used instead? Will the use of a common language jeopardize the 
success of the program? Although these types of questions should be addressed on a case-by-
case basis, they nonetheless deserve to be highlighted.  
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3. Affirmative-Action Policies 
Affirmative action is a set of public policies designed to help eliminate past and present 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and has been used 
extensively in the United States of America during the last 30 years. In general, these policies 
can take many forms- the most known being the use of race to change the probability of 
entering a university or of receiving financial aid to study.  
The experience of affirmative action policies in Latin America is new. The main problem 
related with these types of policies is to identify the targeted population in a society that has 
more inter-racial marriages than the US. The question that remains to be answered before 
initiating this type of programs is ‘who is black?’ or ‘who is indigenous?’. The use of a self-
identification method can be a problem if the result of identifying oneself as black gives 
benefits with certainty (for instance, secures a position at a public university, see Box). 
 
Affirmative action in Brazil 
Universities in Brazil have begun introducing affirmative action programs to combat 
accusations that the national higher education system is elitist and discriminatory. The 
country has the world's fourth largest student population in the tertiary education and the 
number of university students has grown by approximately one fifth in the past five years to 3 
million. However, only 8% of 25 to 64-year-olds have attended university, and campaigners 
say bias in the system prevents black pupils and those educated in state schools from securing 
a place. 
According to the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA), the average black Brazilian 
possesses five years of education compared with the eight years accumulated by a white 
Brazilian, and is also two and a half times poorer than his white counterpart. Last year, 65% 
of university students were educated at private secondary schools and two out of three were 
drawn from the wealthiest 20% of the population. In an effort to widen participation, several 
public universities, where education is free, have decided to introduce the controversial quotas 
for admission. At the Federal University of Brasilia, 20% of places are reserved for black 
students, while at the state University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), the figure is 40%; half of all 
places must be given to applicants from state schools. 
The decision comes as the Brazilian Congress considers implementing a statute of racial 
equality, which proposes 20% quotas for Afro-Brazilians in government jobs and public 
universities, as well as the monitoring of black participation in television programs and 
political parties. 
The problem of defining race, and identifying racism is particularly complicated in a country 
where 40% of the population regard themselves as "pardo" (mixed race). In the 2001 census 
only 6% identified themselves as black, a figure that several non-governmental organizations 
believe to be distorted by the racial stigma attached to being black. However, it is not just race 
that appears to be a barrier to higher education. The poor funding of state schools might be 
leaving many students unable to successfully compete for state university places against 
contemporaries from private schools.  
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Source: Extracted from “Brazil takes affirmative action in HE”, The Guardian, 
8/4/2003.http://education.guardian.co.uk/higher/worldwide/story/. 
 
4. Infrastructure Policies 
Although not directed related to ethnicity or race an important issue, especially related with 
some infrastructure projects undertaken in many countries, is involuntary resettlement. In 
particular, some infrastructure projects pursued in the region aiming to solve issues unrelated 
to ethnicity/race social inclusion, can generate an externality on indigenous and afro-
descendant people that should be taken into account so that the cost for these groups are 
minimized. Note that although this is not specific of indigenous/afro-descendent people, in 
many cases these specific groups have been affected.  
Involuntary resettlement occurs when an infrastructure project (e.g. a dam) forces some 
people to resettle to other areas of the country and can have a dramatic impact on the lives of 
people living in the area of influence of large-scale development projects. The reason for this 
is that it represents a sudden break on social continuity and can result in impoverishment of 
the people who are relocated. The changes it provokes are different from those under normal 
development processes: it dismantles settlement patterns and modes of production, disrupts 
social networks and diminishes people’s sense of control over their lives. It can threaten their 
cultural identity and can create profound health problems. When resettlement is badly planned 
or inadequately implemented, it always represents an additional cost to the main project and 
can have long term consequences for the affected population and the surrounding region.  
Resettlement should be planned by trying to improve the living standards, physical security, 
productive capacity and income levels of the people affected or to restore them to former 
levels within a reasonable period of time. According to the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB) guidelines, the principles for resettlement that should be taken into account are 
the following: (i) avoid or minimize population displacement; (ii) ensure community 
participation; (iii) regard resettlement as an opportunity for sustainable development74; (iv) 
define criteria for compensation: the definitions should include basic concepts such as what 
constitutes a household, to avoid speculative behavior; (v) provide compensations at 
replacement cost: displaced people must not subsidize the main project through unfair 
compensation; (vi) compensate the loss of customary rights: resettlement plans should 
compensate existing legal provisions and address the needs of those who have no legal 
protection (indigenous peoples or small holders have informal customary rights to land, 
                                                 
74 Cash compensations are usually not a viable solution to the problems of resettlement and, where possible, the 
affected population should be offered a direct share of the benefits of the main project. In irrigation projects, for 
instance, they can receive irrigated lands as part of their compensation. 
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forest, fishing grounds and other natural resources); (vii) provide economic opportunities to 
the displaced population; (viii) address security issues; (ix) consider host population in the 
development plans; (x) include resettlement costs in overall costs; and (xi) establish 
independent monitoring and arbitration procedures (IDB, 1999). 
Indigenous peoples represent a special case for resettlement because of their deep attachment 
to land and place. To date, there have only been a few accounts of successful resettlement 
involving indigenous peoples. For instance, there have been some good results in the case of 
environmental projects, such as the creation of national parks or wildlife reserves. Panama has 
managed to protect the Bayano tropical forest without negatively affecting the communities 
that live there. Some indigenous have been trained as forest management experts and forest 
guards and continue to live in the forest protection zone created with the construction of a 
hydroelectric complex. 
Nevertheless, indigenous social organization, cultural values and attachment to the land 
reflect centuries of practice, adaptation and survival strategies and, as a general rule, 
resettlement should be avoided. 
5. Financial Services  
Neither micro-enterprise nor social investment funds were originally designed to address rural 
poverty. Micro-enterprise financing took off in urban areas providing small, short term loans 
at rates below those charged by the informal market and was channeled into service and 
commercial activities or small scale manufacturing. Likewise, the social investment funds 
were initially designed to mitigate the impacts of economical stabilization policies. Nearly all 
were conceived as temporary measures that would be suppressed once stabilization policies 
had restored economic growth.  
The popularity of the funds is largely due to their flexibility and their participatory approach. 
Typically, the rules for recruitment are simpler than they are in other government agencies 
and priorities are identified at a local level, by the beneficiary communities, municipal or 
regional government agencies. The main activity of the funds is the provision of financing for 
basic infrastructure: schools, health centers, water supply and access roads.  
A few countries have established specific funds for indigenous people. The IDB financed 
these kinds of projects in Guyana, Honduras and Argentina. Nevertheless, the funds are 
typically more focused on poverty, and it is assumed that indigenous peoples will have equal 
or greater access than the rest of the population, simply because they are poorer on average. 
This assumption is not always granted, as indigenous peoples are many times excluded from 
the decision making process, and as a consequence they do not receive the same benefits as do 
other groups with more resources to lobby or influence decisions. By not contemplating 
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specific programs for indigenous people, the funds lose the opportunity to accommodate the 
specifics of language, culture and social organizations (Renshaw, 2001). 
Which mechanism is more effective to include the indigenous/afro population as beneficiaries 
of social investment funds? It is possible to identify two different approaches as to how they 
should be included. The most common one, the inclusive approach, treats them as equal, not 
distinguishing indigenous/afro people from the rest of the population. It assumes that, other 
things being equal, indigenous people should have the same access to funds as any other 
population group. Most inclusive funds have mechanisms to target resources to the poorer 
regions that many times coincide with the areas of highest concentration of indigenous 
population. The alternative, targeted policies, has a separate component intended only for 
indigenous or ethnic populations.75
Social funds targeted to indigenous populations are distinguished by their approach and 
methodology. Typically, they have to address the features that differentiate the indigenous 
population from other sectors of the poor. There are four factors that are particularly 
important in this case: (i) geographic isolation; (ii) social exclusion, based on ethnic or racial 
prejudice; (iii) social and cultural differences, covering areas such as language, structures of 
authority and economic values; and (iv) the need to strengthen the capacity of indigenous 
organizations. For example, in Guyana the physical isolation of many communities is critical: 
few communities can be reached by road, and the main means of transport are canoe or light 
aircraft.  
A separate fund for indigenous peoples offers the opportunity to address the social and 
cultural differences between them and other groups within the society. Language is one of the 
most immediate obvious features that make it difficult for indigenous peoples to participate in 
standard national programs of poverty reduction. For instance, in regions such as highland 
Peru or Bolivia, where a large proportion of the population is either monolingual or bilingual 
in indigenous languages, it is possible for a mainstream program to work in the native 
language while programs in Spanish are less effective. The most obvious way to resolve this 
problem is to work through the indigenous organizations.  
Nevertheless, the issue of social and cultural differences goes beyond language. The values, 
attitudes and expectations of indigenous peoples are often different from those belonging to 
the rest of the society. The indigenous economy is typically founded on social relations and is 
characterized by notions of reciprocity rather than values of the market- this must be taken 
into account when designing the programs (See Box below).  
 
                                                 
75 As it the case in SIMAP (Amerindian Program) in Guyana and Nuestras Raices in Honduras. 
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SIMAP Amerindian Program in Guyana 
SIMAP is a social investment fund that includes a specific component for indigenous peoples. 
It has been able to develop a range of small projects in isolated communities, using a 
participatory methodology and flexible procedures for project preparation and 
implementation. The projects include training and productive activities, such as brick making, 
sewing and tailoring, transport projects and community infrastructure projects such as 
schools, community centers, health posts, access roads and bridges. While these projects are 
not developed as a comprehensive solution to the poverty found in most indigenous 
communities, they have often achieved significant improvements in the provision of basic 
services and the standard of living. 
The definition of the program’s beneficiaries is simple: “the population must be primarily 
Amerindians and no less that 250 persons”. 
In the SIMAP Amerindian Program, simple infrastructure projects offer a useful starting point 
for the development of local institutions, requiring the motivation and mobilization of 
beneficiaries to comply with the program’s demand for a counterpart in labor or materials. 
The organization can later be consolidated through more complex programs, such as training 
or transport programs. 
 
6. Land titling and rural development 
The evidence that indigenous and black people are disproportionately over-represented among 
the extremely poor individuals throughout Latin America serves as a foundation for targeting 
land distribution and the access programs to these populations. The claims over land that 
indigenous groups often have can be made using different justifications, such as ancient or 
historical titles, compensation for past injustices and discrimination. 
The period between 1950-1970 is considered the era of land reform in Latin America. Most of 
the countries were affected by a wave of land reforms that sought to expropriate unproductive 
lands (generally upon the payment of some compensation) and to modernize agriculture by 
eradicating servile tenure systems and labor arrangements. These reforms were important for 
indigenous communities, which could receive an adjudication of land, as was the case in 
Mexico, Bolivia and Peru, and to a lesser extent to Ecuador and Colombia. The reform rarely 
aimed to consolidate traditional indigenous forms of land tenure and resource management. 
Beneficiaries tended to receive land in individual lots (Plant and Hvalkof, 2001). 
Despite these reforms, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (1994) point out a significant rise in 
poverty and extreme poverty for indigenous peoples in the 1980s. This was particularly the 
case for indigenous peasants in non-tropical regions. Desegregated data on the extent to which 
indigenous peoples benefited from land reform is not available, yet it is fair to ask if they 
were by-passed by land reform; if they received lands of inferior quality rather than those of 
agricultural potential; whether they had access to financial services; and whether the land 
reform models was ultimately inadequate.  
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There are three main conceptual premises behind current approaches to indigenous land 
demands. One is the protective approach, which insists that indigenous peoples need special 
protections from outside elements and market forces. Another is the rights based approach, 
which claims that they have special rights to land and resources within the parameters of a 
multicultural and multi-ethnic state. A third is the environmentally or ecologically determined 
approach, which argues that indigenous peoples have the greatest capacity to manage natural 
resources in ecologically fragile areas. 
In the last years, demands for land, originated from NGOs representing indigenous peoples, 
began to grow. There is a widespread consciousness among the indigenous that land is the 
main resource to avoid poverty. In a study conducted in Ecuador, respondents of the survey 
were asked to compare their situation with that of the neighboring communities: land was the 
most common measure to use (Hentschel and Waters, 2001). In most of the indigenous 
communities in the highlands of Ecuador, the precise manner in which the household obtains 
its sustenance is closely related to size and productive quality of its holdings. When the 
holding is of sufficient size and productive quality, a surplus can be sold; when it is not, other 
sources of non-agricultural income are required. This has important implications for public 
policies. Policies geared toward improving land productivity and distribution might have 
important effects on poverty reduction. Accessible credit and proper titling become priorities, 
too. The study also suggests that there are many differences in infrastructure needs in the 
communities that must be taken into account when designing poverty reduction policies for 
indigenous peoples. 
7. International Organization’s Role 
7.1 World Bank 
The World Bank's policy towards indigenous peoples dates back to 1982 and was initially 
designed to consider the needs of relatively isolated tribal groups affected by development 
projects. The policy focused mainly on the protection of land rights and the provision of 
health services, particularly in relation to forest-dwelling indigenous peoples in lowland South 
America.  
In 1991, the World Bank issued a revised policy document76, which extended the definition of 
indigenous peoples to include a much wider array of peoples who maintain social and cultural 
identities distinct from those of the national societies in which they live, who have close 
attachments to their ancestral lands, and who are often susceptible to being disadvantaged in 
the development process. 
                                                 
76 OD 4.20 
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The World Bank’s approach to indigenous peoples in Latin America was oriented primarily to 
compensate any adverse effects caused by bank-financed development interventions. 
Particular efforts were directed at securing land tenure rights in projects that threaten 
indigenous territories, especially in large infrastructure projects. To a large extent, the World 
Bank operated under the assumption that its development poverty reduction projects would 
reach all in poverty, regardless of ethnic origin. Thus, the needs of indigenous peoples were 
addressed through the traditional approaches: integrated rural development, regional 
development or agriculture projects. Recent trends indicate, however, that these assumptions 
are being revised, as demonstrated by new efforts that target interventions on the basis of age, 
gender or ethnic origin.77 In 1993, several donors, including the World Bank and the IDB, 
gathered together to develop the Indigenous Peoples Initiative, which stressed the 
strengthening of social capital and capacity building for indigenous organizations.  
 
The World Bank in Ecuador: Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples Development 
Project (IAEPDP) 
IAEPDP was the first World Bank project focusing exclusively on ethnic minorities. The 
strong ethnicity-poverty relationship identified in Ecuador’s Poverty Assessment strengthened 
the case for targeting interventions on Ecuador’s indigenous and afro population. 
During the project preparation, the World Bank committed itself to three basic guiding 
principles: targeting resources at the poorest sectors of the population; promotion of 
participatory processes to ensure that design responds to grassroots demands and close 
coordination between governmental and non-governmental organizations.  
The IAEPDP invested in local capacity building, small-scale demand driven rural sub-
projects, land tenure regularization, cultural heritage activities and institutional strengthening 
of CODENPE (Consejo de Desarrollo de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecuador). 
The targeting mechanisms used in the project included a combination of quantitative methods 
and geographic location with self-identification and community affiliation with second-tier 
organizations. Census information on the indigenous and afro-Ecuadorian population was 
crossed with data on poverty (index of unsatisfied basic needs) to obtain figures on levels of 
poverty by ethnicity. Additional information was gathered in the field, particularly self-
identification of communities. This information was then represented in a poverty map, which 
served to select parroquias. Then, second-tier organizations were selected to form alliances 
and a membership eligibility criterion was the basis for targeting the intended population. 
 
                                                 
77 Uquillas J. and Van Nieuwkoop M. (2003) 
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7.2 Inter-American Development Bank78
The Inter-American Development Bank advances social inclusion in Latin America and the 
Caribbean through broad-based initiatives in research, policy, and loan and grant projects.  
Specific initiatives on indigenous peoples began in the early 1990s with the creation of the 
Indigenous Peoples and Community Development Unit and the adoption of specific 
guidelines on protecting indigenous rights and promoting indigenous development, further 
expanding its social inclusion efforts and programs to address not only indigenous peoples, 
but also afro-descendents, persons with disabilities, persons with HIVs/AIDs and poor 
women. The Bank’s Social Development Strategy provides an institutional framework for 
social inclusion as well as specific initiatives for indigenous peoples and afro-descendents. 
Beginning in 2001, the Bank management approved two sequential “Action Plans for 
Combating Social Exclusion based on Race and Ethnicity” containing, among the series of 
actions, commitments to increase the number of Bank loan and grant operations supporting 
indigenous peoples and afro-descendents; advance research on the nature of exclusion, 
poverty and inequality; incorporate more systematic analysis of indigenous peoples and afro-
descendents in Bank programming and strategy documents, and promote greater awareness 
and participation of indigenous peoples and afro-descendents in national policies.79 Among 
specific actions are the following: 
(i). Loan programs emphasizing culturally-appropriate development and inclusion for 
excluded populations, such as: Bocas del Toro Regional Development (Panama), 
Diversity in Education (Brazil), Environmental Management of the Bay Islands 
(Honduras), Integrated Management of  Indigenous Ecosystems (Central America) 
,Indigenous Community-Based Development (Chile), Program for socio-culturally 
appropriate infrastructure in indigenous  Communities (Honduras). 
(ii). Creation of a multi-donor Social Inclusion Trust Fund to finance small projects and 
support larger bank operations targeting the five excluded populations of indigenous 
peoples,.  Support has included the Colombian COMPES affirmative action policy for 
afro-descendents and participation of indigenous peoples and afro-descendents in the 
Nicaraguan Census. 
(iii). Support to improved data collection on afro-descendents, indigenous peoples and 
persons with disabilities, including under the MECOVI program with the World 
Bank. 
                                                 
78 This section relies heavily on information provided by http://www.iadb.org/sds/SOC/index_soc_e.htm (IDB’s 
Sustainable Development Department).  
79 IDB Action Plan for Combating Social Exclusion due to Race or Ethnic Background: Progress Report, 2005. 
 88
(iv). Emphasis on strengthening local capacity, increasing participation, improving access 
to and quality of financial services, environmental management, and promoting rights 
and judicial security. 
(v). Development of socio-cultural guidelines for Bank operations and quality review of 
new operations. 
(vi). Establishment of a comprehensive comparative database on indigenous legislation at 
the national and international level.  
Currently under preparation is a new Operational Policy on Indigenous Peoples and a Strategy 
on Indigenous Development, based on a series of technical studies, a review of Bank 
experience and a series of consultations with indigenous peoples within the region.   
Recent research and publications include: Social Inclusion and Economic Development in 
Latin America (2004) a compilation of key research supported by the IDB including: the 
economic costs of the exclusion of indigenous peoples and afro-descendents; the link between 
education, exclusion and race in Brazil; rights of indigenous peoples; and, anti-discrimination 
legislation. Included in the IDB approach to social inclusion, indigenous peoples and afro-
descendents are: improving staff training on social inclusion, supporting efforts to raise 
awareness on discrimination and exclusion, supporting country policy dialogues, and 
expanding best practice research to improve future operations. 
As part of the institution’s support to national governments in achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals, focus is also provided on the role played by race and ethnicity in both the 
specific goals and in social development and poverty reduction, overall. This includes 
country-level analysis of race, ethnicity and the MDGs (e.g. Honduras, Peru), and support to 
improved data collection and disaggregation of the MDGs, where possible.  
 
7.3. United Nations Development Programme80
The lessons learned from country and regional engagement together with global consultations 
held with indigenous peoples’ organizations (IPOs) in 1999 and 2000 fed into and informed 
the UNDP policy entitled, UNDP and Indigenous Peoples: A Policy of Engagement endorsed 
in 2001. Underpinned by the international human rights framework, the policy recognizes 
indigenous peoples’ rights and their vital role and contribution to development.  
                                                 
80 This section has been draws heavily on the input received by UNDP. 
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Rooted in the goals reached at the Millennium Summit, the objective of the policy is to 
provide UNDP staff with a framework to guide their work in building sustainable partnerships 
with indigenous peoples. These partnerships are aimed at fostering an enabling environment 
that: promotes indigenous peoples’ participation in all decision-making levels; ensures the co-
existence of their economic, cultural, and socio-political systems with others; and develops 
the capacity of governments to build more inclusive policies and programmes. The policy 
establishes priority areas of engagement ranging from poverty reduction and conflict 
prevention and peace-building to issues related to ownership and use of land and natural 
resources and the protection of cultural and intellectual property. It also provides practical 
mechanisms for operational and policy engagement at the global, regional and country levels.  
The rationale for UNDP engagement with indigenous peoples and their organizations is 
grounded in the UNDP mandated areas of work; processes and agreements of development 
cooperation; and the aspirations of indigenous peoples. The UNDP role at the country level, 
its human development paradigm, advocacy of democratic governance, and policy of 
mainstreaming human rights positions makes it a partner for pursuing a more holistic 
approach to development. This mandate can serve as an entry point and foundation for 
supporting more inclusive development policies and programmes; brokering dialogues with 
all actors; facilitating participatory approaches; and creating the political space for alternative 
views to be shared. 
Guatemala: creating an enabling environment 
CSOs and indigenous peoples and their organizations played an active role in negotiating 
peace by promoting informal linkages among the opposing parties, by helping to define the 
major issues and build consensus. UNDP supported the establishment of the Civil Society 
Assembly charged with discussion of the substantial issues, formulation of specific proposals 
based on consensus, and review of the peace agreements. UNDP ensured that space was 
created so that the perspectives of indigenous peoples and their organizations were brought to 
national attention. The Assembly helped to overcome distrust, promote broad participation 
and move the country away from confrontation.   
UNDP work over the past two years has marked a shift from policy making to programme 
development and promoting action on the ground. HURIST, the Human Right Strengthening 
Programme, is a joint programme with UNDP and the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) aimed at integrating human rights in development by building the 
capacity of UN country offices, preparing methodologies and toolkits on human rights and 
documenting and disseminating good practices in the application of these rights in 
development. In 2002 Hurist incorporated an indigenous peoples’ component to its overall 
programme. The principal objectives of the component are: 1) to contribute to the 
implementation of the UNDP policy of engagement with indigenous peoples; and 2) to create 
a mechanism for dialogue at the national level to ensure the participation of indigenous 
peoples in UNDP activities at both the policy and programmatic levels. The key underlying 
 90
principle is to promote the full participation of indigenous peoples in the planning, 
implementation and evaluation of the projects that (may) affect them.   
 In 2003-2004 the Civil Society Organizations (CSO) Division in partnership with the 
Regional Programme of Latin America and the Caribbean undertook a mapping of the region’s 
country office activities involving indigenous peoples. Among the main recommendations is 
the establishment of a network of advisors on indigenous peoples’ issues for the region to 
provide ongoing advice to country offices.  
The global HDR for 2004 “Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World” focuses on exploring 
issues related to building inclusive societies and managing diversity. The report benefited from 
close consultation with indigenous peoples and members of the Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues. The 2004 HDR has provided a key platform for debate on indigenous 
peoples’ concerns. In June 2004, the Guatemala country office, organized a workshop to 
discuss issues raised in the HDR related to multiculturalism, indigenous peoples and 
governance. 
In addition, some regional and national HDRs have included data disaggregated by ethnic 
groupings, language groupings, gender, geographic, and age, for example.  
Much of UNDP support at the country level to indigenous peoples is channelled through 
small grant programmes.  In Latin America, a small grants programme in Guatemala supports 
indigenous peoples’ rights. Activities include: raising awareness and strengthening legislation 
on the rights of indigenous peoples; establishing institutions for the promotion and protection 
of indigenous women’s rights; and awareness on human rights treaties and norms.  
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Chapter 1 
Table 1.1: The Millennium Development Goals 
Goals Targets Indicators
1a. Proportion of population below $1 a day
1b. National poverty headcount ratio
2.  Poverty gap ratio at $1 a day (incidence x depth of poverty) 
3.  Share of poorest quintile in national consumption
4.  Prevalence of underweight in children (under five years of age) 
5.  Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption
6.  Net enrollment ratio in primary education 
7a. Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5 
7b. Primary completion rate
8.  Literacy rate of 15 to 24-year-olds
9.  Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary, and tertiary education 
10. Ratio of literate females to males among 15- to 24-year-olds 
11. Share of women in wage employment in the nonagricultural sector 
12. Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament
13. Under-five mortality rate 
14. Infant mortality rate 
15. Proportion of one-year-old children immunized against measles
16. Maternal mortality ratio 
17. Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel
18. HIV prevalence among 15- to 24-year-old pregnant women 
19. Condom use rate of the contraceptive prevalence rate 
19a.Condom use at last high-risk sex
19b.Percentage of population aged 15-24 with comprehensive correct knowledge of 
HIV/AIDS 
19c.Contraceptive prevalence rate
20. Ratio of school attendance of orphans to school attendance on non-orphans aged 10-14
21. Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria 
22. Proportion of population in malaria-risk areas using effective malaria prevention and 
23. Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis 
24. Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under directly observed treatment 
short course (DOTS)
25. Proportion of land area covered by forest 
26. Ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area 
27. Energy use per unit of GDP 
28. Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita) and consumption of ozone-depleting 
chlorofluorocarbons 
29. Proportion of population using solid fuels
30. Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source, urban 
and rural 
31. Proportion of population with access to improved sanitation
Target 11: Have achieved, by 2020, a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 
million slum dwellers
32. Proportion of households with access to secure tenure
Target 12: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, nondiscriminatory trading and 
financial system (includes a commitment to good governance, development, and poverty 
reduction—both nationally and internationally)
33. Net ODA  total and to least developed countries, as a percentage of OECD/DAC 
donors' gross  income  
34. Proportion of bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors for basic social 
services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water, and sanitation) 
35. Proportion of bilateral ODA of OECD/DAC donors  that is untied 
36. ODA received in landlocked countries as proportion of their GNI 
37. ODA received in small island developing states as proportion of their GNI
38. Proportion of total developed country imports (excluding arms) from developing 
countries and least developed countries admitted free of duties 
39. Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on agricultural products and clothing 
from developing countries 
40. Agricultural support estimate for OECD countries as a percentage of their GDP 
41. Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity
42. Total number of countries that have reached their HIPC decision points and completion 
points (cumulative) 
43. Debt relief committed under HIPC initiative, US$ 
44. Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services
45. Unemployment rate of 15- to 24-year-olds, male and female and total
47. Telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 100 population 
Target 17: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, 
essential drugs in developing countries
46. Proportion of population with access to affordable, essential drugs on a sustainable basis
48a. Personal computers in use per 100 population  
48b. Internet users per 100 population
Source: United Nations
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for 
development
Target 13: Address the special needs of the least developed countries (includes tariff-and 
quota-free access for exports enhanced program of debt relief for HIPC and cancellation of 
official bilateral debt, and more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty 
reduction)
Target 14: Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small island developing 
states (through the Program of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island 
Developing States and 22nd General Assembly provisions)
Target 15: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through 
national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term
Target 16: In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for 
decent and productive work for youth
Target 18: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new 
technologies, especially information and communications
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other 
diseases
Target 7: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS
Target 8: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other 
major diseases
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and 
program and reverse the loss of environmental resources
Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe 
drinking water and basic sanitation
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality Target 5: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate
Goal 5: Improve maternal health Target 6: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to 
complete a full course of primary schooling
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower 
women
Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 
2005 and in all levels of education no later than 2015
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less 
than $1 a day
Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger
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Table 1.2: Population Structure 
Percentage of Indigenous People in 
Total Population
Percentage of Afro-Descendent People in Total 
Population Population 
Approximate non-
white population In Sample
Country / Source World Bank ECLAC IDB World Bank ECLAC CIAT Author's Calculations
Blacks Mestizos Total
Latin America
Argentina 1.0 1.1 37,917,864 379,179
Bolivia 71.0 59 50.51 2.0 8,016,694 5,852,187 5,852,187
Brazil 0.4 1 0.16 44.7 4.9 40.1 45 169,368,031 76,384,982 76,384,982
Chile 8.0 10.3 7.06 14,875,102 1,190,008 1,190,008
Colombia 1.8 2.2 1.74 25.0 5 71 76 37,772,827 10,123,118 10,123,118
Costa Rica 0.8 0.75 2.0 3,620,703 101,380 101,380
Ecuador 38.0 35.3 24.85 10.0 12,116,444 5,815,893 5,815,893
El Salvador 7.0 1.69 5,867,402 410,718
Guatemala 66.0 42.8 48.01 12,359,079 8,156,992 8,156,992
Honduras 15.0 1.3 11.88 5.0 6,869,483 1,373,897 1,373,897
Mexico 14.0 7.4 9.47 0.5 98,991,045 14,353,702 14,353,702
Nicaragua 5.0 1.8 7.59 13.0 4,623,632 832,254 832,254
Panama 10.0 8.3 7.78 73.5 2,956,920 2,469,028 2,469,028
Paraguay 1.5 0.7 1.96 3.5 5,532,985 276,649 276,649
Peru 47.0 40.2 38.39 9.7 27,041,112 15,332,311 15,332,311
Uruguay 0.4 5.9 3,103,122 195,497
Venezuela 0.9 0.9 1.48 10.0 10 65 75 22,835,540 2,489,074
Caribbean
Antigua y Barbuda 97.9 81.4 8.6 90 66,460 65,064
Bahamas 85.0 n.a. n.a.
Barbados 95.8 91.9 2.6 94.5 271,622 260,214
Belize 19.0 13.65 57.0 6.6 43.7 50.3 241,004 183,163
Bermuda 61.3 n.a. n.a.
Cuba 62.0 12 21.8 33.8 11,373,758 7,051,730
Dominican Republic 84.0 11 73 84 8,035,515 6,749,833
French Guiana 4.0 3.94 42.6 177,330 82,636
Grenada 84.0 82.2 13.3 95.5 93,557 78,588
Guadeloupe 87.0 n.a. n.a.
Guyana 6.0 5.64 42.6 30.5 11 41.5 828,730 402,763
Haiti 100.0 95 95 7,787,756 7,787,756 7,787,756
Jamaica 2.0 91.4 90.9 5.8 96.7 2,464,440 2,301,787
St. Lucia 90.3 86.8 9.3 96.1 154,755 139,744
St. Vincent and Grenadines 95.0 82 13.9 95.9 n.a. n.a.
Suriname 6.0 3.34 41.0 15 466,227 219,127 219,127
Trinidad and Tobago 43.0 40.8 16.3 57.1 1,265,580 544,199 544,199
North America
Canada 1.0 2.2
United States 0.9 12.3
TOTAL 507,094,719 171,603,470 150,813,481
Sources: 
Hopenhayn, M. and A. Bello (2001) "Discriminación étnico-racial y xenofobia en América Latina y el Caribe", ECLAC Serie Politicas Sociales 47
IDB (1997) "The Role of the Inter-American Development Bank", Forum of the Americas, mimeo
World Bank (2004) "Inequality in Latin America. Breaking with history?", Chapter 3
CIAT (2003) "Latin America and Caribbean PopulationDatabase Documentation "  
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Table 1.3: Household surveys in LAC 
Coverage and main characteristics 
Name of Survey
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Bolivia
1997 Encuesta Nacional de Empleo (ENE III) INE National 36,752 45.5
2002 Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (MECOVI) INE National 24,933 54.4
Brazil
1995 Pesquisa Nacional Por Amostra de Domicílios IBGE National 333,898 45.1
2002 Pesquisa Nacional Por Amostra de Domicílios IBGE National 384,593 46.2
Chile
2000 Caracterizacion Socieconomica Nacional (CASEN)  MIDEPLAN National 252748 1.5
Colombia
1999 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares DANE National 152,298 11.3
Costa Rica
1992 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EHPM) INEC National 37,251 8.3
2001 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EHPM) INEC National 41,841 9.6
Ecuador
1998 Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida INEC National 26,129 3.9
Guatemala
2002 Encuesta Nacional de Empleo e Ingresos (ENEI) MECOVI National 10,615 42.7
Haiti
2001 Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida en Haiti IHSI National 33,007 99.0
Honduras
2003 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propositos Multiples INE National 40,984 9.2
Mexico
1992 Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH) INEGI National 50,862 4.9
2002 Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH) INEGI National 72,602 5.6
Nicaragua
1998 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Nivel de Vida (EMNV) INEC National 22,423 2.2
2001 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Nivel de Vida (EMNV) INEC National 22,810 3.8
Panama
2002 Encuesta de Hogares INEC National 54,500 6.9
Paraguay
1995 Encuesta de Hogares-Mano de Obra DGEEC National 21,910 48.1
2001 Encuesta Integrada de Hogares DGEEC National 37,437 51.5
Peru
2001 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO) INEI National 75,470 39.0
Suriname
1999 Household Budget Survey Suriname UNDP Urban 1,694 6.3
Country Year
Sample size 
(Individuals)
Non-White (as % of 
total poulation)Source Coverage
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Table 1.4: Definitions of Ethnicity by Country 
Country Years Non-White Definition
Identification 
Criterion
Question used to identify ethnicity in 
Household Survey Possible answers
Who is considered non-white (i.e. 
Indigenous or Afro-Descendent)?
1997 Language What language do you regularly speak?
Spanish, Quechua, Aymará, Guaraní, other 
indigenous language, or foreign language. 
Combinations between the previous 
categories were also allowed.
Individuals who speak at least one 
indigenous language (Quechua, 
Aymará, Guaraní or other).
2002 Self-Identification Do you consider that yourself as belonging to any of the following indigenous groups?
Quechua, Aymara, Guarani, Chiquitano, 
Mojeño, other, or none. 
Individuals who consider themselves 
belonging to some indigenous group.
Brazil 1995 and 2002 Afro-Descendent Self-Identification  What's your color or race?
White, black, pardo (i.e. a mix between 
white and black), yellow or indigenous.
Individual who answered they were 
black or pardo.
Chile 2000 Indigenous Language Is there a family member who speaks or understand any of the following languages? 
Aymará, Rapa-nui, Quechua, Mapuche, 
Atacameño, Coya, Kawaskar, Yagán
Individuals who live in ahousehold 
where at least one member speaks or 
understand any indigenous language.
Colombia 1999 Afro-Descendent Region (Counties) Counties and State (entered by interviewer) n.a.
Individuals who live in counties 
defined as "Predominantely Black" by 
the statistical agency of Colombia 
(DANE).
Costa Rica 1992 and 2001 Afro-Descendent Region (States) State (entered by interviewer) n.a.
Individuals who live in Huetar Atlantica 
State.
Ecuador 1998 Indigenous Language What languages do you speak? Spanish, Quichua, Shuar, others, and every possible combination between them. 
Individuals that speak at least one 
indigenous language.
Guatemala 2002 Indigenous Self-Identification “Specification of Ethnic Group”. 
Kiché, Qeqchí, Kaqchikel, Mam, Garifuna, 
Ladino, Extranjero, Achi, Acateco, 
Awacateco, Qanjobal, Ixil, Chorti, Chuj, 
Jacalteco, Pocomchi, Pocomam, Tzutujil, 
Xinca, Popti, Other Indigenous Group, 
Other.
Individuals who consider themselves 
to belong to any indigenous group.
Haiti 2001 Afro-Descendent Language What language do you usually speak at home? Créole, French, Spanish, English or Others Individuals who answered "Créole".
Honduras 2003 Indigenous Region (counties) Counties and State (entered by interviewer) n.a
Individuals who live in counties with 
more than 50% of indigenous 
population that are in the states of 
Gracias a Dios , Intibuca, Islas de la 
Bahia, La paz, Lempira, and 
Ocotepeque.
México 1992 and 2002 Indigenous Region (Counties) Counties and State (entered by interviewer) n.a
Individuals who live in counties with 
more than 50% of indigenous 
population that are in the states of 
Campeche, Chiapas, Chihuahua, 
Durango, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Nayarit, 
Oaxaca, Puebla, Quintana Roo, San 
Luis Potosi, Veracruz, and Yucatan.
1998 Language What is the language that you speak at home since your childhood? Spanish, Miskito, Sumu, English or Other.
Individuals who speak Miskito or 
Sumu.
2001 Self-Perception Which ethnic group do you belong to? 
Mestizo (from the pacific ocean or from the 
coast), white, criollo, Creole/black, miskito, 
mayagna (sumu), rama, other
Individuals who declared to be 
creole/black; miskito; mayagna 
(sumu); rama.
Panama 2002 Indigenous Self-Identification Are you Indigenous? Yes-No Individuals who answered "yes".
Paraguay 1995 and 2001 Indigenous Language
What language do you usually speak at 
home?
Guarani, Guarani and Spanish, Spanish, 
Other. Individuals who speak only guarani.
Peru 2001 Indigenous and Afro-Descendent Self-Identification
Because of your heritage or because of your 
culture do you consider your-self to be part of 
some ethnic group?
Indigenous from the Amazonia, Quechua, 
Aymara, Black/Mulato/Zambo, Mestizo, 
White, other.
Individuals who answered being 
Indigenous from the Amazonia, 
Quechua, Aymara or 
Black/Mulato/Zambo.
Suriname 1999 Afro-Descendent Self-Identification Ethnicity of respondent?
Creole, Hindustani, Javanese, Chinese, 
Bushnegro, Indigenous (Amerindian), Mixed, 
Other.
Individuals who answered 
"Bushnegro".
Source: Author's definitions
Bolivia
Nicaragua
Indigenous
Indigenous and Afro-
Descendent
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Table 1.5: Gender and Urban Structure by Ethnic Group 
% of Group Population 
that are Female
% of  Group Population 
Living in Rural Areas
White Non-White White Non-White
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Bolivia
1997 50.1 50.9 20.4 60.3
2002 50.5 50.2 23.3 49.7
Brazil
1995 51.9 50.0 16.8 26.1
2002 52.3 50.0 12.9 19.3
Chile
2000 51.0 47.3 13.6 49.6
Colombia
1999 51.4 51.0 51.4 54.3
Costa Rica
1992 50.6 49.2 54.1 72.3
2001 50.7 48.4 38.5 64.3
Ecuador
1998 50.1 50.2 40.2 88.8
Guatemala
2002 51.8 51.5 51.2 74.5
Haiti
2001 50.7 51.7 52.4 70.1
Honduras
2003 51.3 49.8 51.6 82.8
Mexico
1992 51.1 47.5 24.8 78.1
2002 51.2 51.8 21.9 72.3
Nicaragua
1998 51.1 51.5 45.3 62.9
2001 50.8 51.3 40.7 72.0
Panama
2002 49.7 49.5 33.0 100.0
Paraguay
1995 51.7 48.1 24.0 75.7
2001 54.3 46.9 22.6 68.1
Peru
2001 51.0 50.3 28.2 45.2
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Country Year
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Table 1.6: Age Structure by Ethnic Group 
(as percentage of reference population) 
White Non-White Total
[0-14] [15-24] [25-54] [55 - (+)] [0-14] [15-24] [25-54] [55 - (+)] [0-14] [15-24] [25-54] [55 - (+)]
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii)
Bolivia
1997 43 22 28 7 34 14 37 14 39 19 32 10
2002 38 24 31 7 41 15 33 10 40 19 32 9
Brazil
1995 30 18 39 13 35 20 35 10 32 19 37 12
2002 26 18 41 14 30 21 38 11 28 19 40 13
Chile
2000 28 17 41 15 14 14 51 22 27 17 41 15
Colombia
1999 31 19 38 12 35 19 34 11 # 31 19 38 12
Costa Rica
1992 34 19 36 11 41 18 33 8 35 19 36 11
2001 30 20 38 12 36 19 36 9 31 20 38 11
Ecuador
1998 36 20 34 10 42 15 33 11 36 20 34 10
Guatemala
2002 26 27 37 10 30 25 35 10 28 26 36 10
Haiti
2001 40 21 31 8 39 20 29 12 39 20 29 12
Honduras
2003 40 21 29 10 46 19 26 9 40 21 29 9
Mexico
1992 37 21 33 9 45 15 31 8 38 21 33 9
2002 32 19 37 12 41 17 31 12 32 19 37 12
Nicaragua
1998 42 21 29 8 51 20 25 4 42 21 29 8
2001 39 22 30 9 50 21 24 5 39 22 30 9
Panama
2002 30 19 38 13 49 17 27 7 32 18 38 12
Paraguay
1995 39 18 35 8 46 15 29 11 42 17 32 9
2001 36 22 35 8 40 18 29 13 38 20 32 10
Peru
2001 31 19 37 13 39 19 31 11 34 19 35 12
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Country Year
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Table 1.7: Average Family Size 
(number of individuals) 
White Non-white White Non-white White Non-white
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Bolivia
1997 4.61 3.89 2.44 1.93 1.37 1.20
2002 4.44 4.30 2.29 2.23 1.25 1.39
Brazil
1995 3.65 4.21 1.60 2.06 0.81 1.09
2002 3.18 3.50 1.32 1.62 0.65 0.85
Chile
2000 3.83 3.74 1.61 1.47 0.69 0.58
Colombia
1999 4.13 4.53 1.82 2.00 0.83 0.99
Costa Rica
1992 4.33 4.32 2.16 2.16 1.11 1.39
2001 3.97 3.91 1.89 1.90 0.87 1.07
Ecuador
1998 4.50 4.53 2.13 2.27 1.11 1.61
Guatemala
2002 3.59 4.26 1.54 2.04 0.59 0.93
Haiti
2001 4.75 4.30 2.17 1.89 1.27 1.03
Honduras
2003 4.93 5.59 2.33 3.02 1.23 1.81
Mexico
1992 4.74 4.90 2.44 2.50 1.34 1.74
2002 4.10 4.69 1.90 2.41 0.89 1.39
Nicaragua
1998 5.37 6.98 3.03 4.73 1.96 3.26
2001 5.23 6.90 2.56 4.03 1.26 2.57
Panama
2002 3.94 7.09 1.68 3.26 0.78 1.88
Paraguay
1995 4.37 4.82 2.03 2.49 1.23 1.59
2001 4.38 4.84 2.08 2.49 1.11 1.40
Peru
2001 4.51 4.50 2.13 2.21 0.98 1.14
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
ChildsPersons Childs under 12
Country Year
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Table 1.8: Marital Status 
(of individuals between 25 and 45 years old) 
White Non-white
(i) (ii)
Bolivia
1997 0.76 0.84
2002 0.76 0.83
Brazil
1995 n.a n.a
2002 n.a n.a
Chile
2000 0.70 0.72
Colombia
1999 0.66 0.69
Costa Rica
1992 0.71 0.79
2001 0.70 0.76
Ecuador
1998 0.74 0.92
Guatemala
2002 0.75 0.83
Haiti
2001 0.67 0.63
Honduras
2003 0.72 0.74
Mexico
1992 n.a n.a
2002 0.75 0.82
Nicaragua
1998 0.72 0.82
2001 0.69 0.78
Panama
2002 0.68 0.86
Paraguay
1995 0.79 0.78
2001 0.76 0.75
Peru
2001 0.69 0.73
Suriname
1999 n.a n.a
Percentage married
Country Year
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Table 1.9: Type of Family 
Monoparental Families 
(as a % of reference population) 
White Non-white
(i) (ii)
Bolivia
1997 0.20 0.18
2002 0.21 0.18
Brazil
1995 0.18 0.21
2002 0.26 0.30
Chile
2000 0.21 0.19
Colombia
1999 0.26 0.26
Costa Rica
1992 0.20 0.17
2001 0.25 0.23
Ecuador
1998 0.20 0.10
Guatemala
2002 0.26 0.22
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a.
Honduras
2003 0.26 0.20
Mexico
1992 0.14 0.07
2002 0.22 0.20
Nicaragua
1998 0.29 0.21
2001 0.28 0.22
Panama
2002 0.27 0.15
Paraguay
1995 0.19 0.17
2001 0.23 0.22
Peru
2001 0.21 0.22
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a.
Percentage monoparental
YearCountry
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Table 1.10: Labor Status by Gender 
(individuals between 25 and 50 years old) 
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii)
Bolivia
1997 62.8 94.2 75.6 97.9 2.1 1.7 0.4 1.2 61.4 92.7 75.3 96.7
2002 69.6 95.5 75.9 96.5 6.4 4.4 4.2 1.7 65.2 91.3 72.7 94.9
Brazil
1995 64.5 95.6 64.2 95.0 5.2 3.4 5.9 4.3 61.2 92.3 60.4 91.0
2002 68.8 94.4 67.5 93.5 7.8 4.4 10.4 6.0 63.5 90.2 60.5 87.9
Chile
2000 53.4 94.1 44.0 94.9 10.1 8.0 9.7 7.4 47.9 86.6 39.7 87.9
Colombia
1999 66.3 97.2 60.7 96.6 15.7 8.7 13.3 8.7 55.9 88.8 52.6 88.3
Costa Rica
1992 40.5 95.4 38.5 97.4 3.7 2.2 8.4  3.9 39.0 93.3 35.2 93.6
2001 54.7 96.3 42.5 96.3  5.1  3.1  6.8  3.8 51.9 93.3 39.6 92.6
Ecuador
1998 64.2 96.7 89.3 100.0 2.9 2.7 0.0 1.9 62.4 94.1 89.3 98.1
Guatemala
2002 87.2 96.7 79.9 96.9 56.2 6.4 59.0 4.8 38.2 90.5 32.8 92.3
Haiti
2001 79.9 81.2 70.5 86.2 23.0 19.2 26.8 17.7 61.5 65.6 51.6 70.9
Honduras
2003 51.7 94.9 37.7 94.5 5.4 4.6 0.5 1.1 48.9 90.6 37.5 93.5
Mexico
1992 36.9 89.9 25.5 88.8 1.4 2.6 1.1 0.0 36.3 87.6 25.3 88.8
2002 53.4 94.6 45.9 94.8 1.5 2.3 0.5 0.2 52.6 92.4 45.7 94.6
Nicaragua
1998 49.1 87.8 35.5 92.3 10.8 8.7 0.0 7.1 43.8 80.2 35.5 85.8
2001 57.9 96.0 58.0 98.5 9.1 7.6 0.0 6.4 52.6 88.8 58.0 92.3
Panama
2002 58.5 96.3 35.2 97.5 11.0 7.8 0.9 0.6 52.1 88.8 34.9 96.9
Paraguay
1995 71.5 98.2 73.0 97.6 3.9 2.3 1.1 1.5 68.8 96.0 72.2 96.2
2001 68.2 96.2 58.8 96.3 8.3 5.2 5.3 4.1 62.5 91.2 55.6 92.4
Peru
2001 69.4 91.6 78.8 94.4 5.5 3.8 3.9 3.1 65.6 88.1 75.7 91.5
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Non-white
Country Year
Unemployment rate (%) Employment rate (%)Participacion rate (%)
White Non-whiteWhite Non-white White
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Table 1.11: Employment Sectoral Structure by Gender 
(individuals between 25 and 50 years old as a percentage of reference population) 
White Non-white
Female Male Female Male
Primary Lab mnf Cap mnf Services Primary Lab mnf Cap mnf Services Primary Lab mnf Cap mnf Services Primary Lab mnf Cap mnf Services
Bolivia
1997 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2002 14.0 12.9 n.a 73.1 26.3 15.8 n.a 57.9 41.8 11.4 n.a 46.8 41.8 13.8 n.a 44.4
Brazil
1995 14.6 6.2 3.4 75.8 17.7 6.4 12.7 63.3 21.9 4.8 1.9 71.4 28.0 5.0 8.3 58.8
2002 10.1 9.6 3.9 76.4 14.5 6.2 11.4 68.0 16.4 8.1 2.1 73.5 23.2 4.9 8.5 63.4
Chile
2000 6.0 7.4 3.5 83.1 19.6 6.4 10.0 64.0 10.6 4.5 3.3 81.5 38.1 5.1 5.2 51.6
Colombia
1999 6.2 12.9 3.6 77.3 28.2 5.4 7.5 59.0 9.0 10.1 1.5 79.4 40.8 4.6 5.0 49.6
Costa Rica
1992 3.3 16.6 5.0 75.2 24.9 6.3 10.8 58.0 21.5 8.9 1.4 68.2 52.3 1.1 5.6 41.0
2001 3.6 13.9 3.9 78.6 16.0 7.6 8.5 67.9 18.2 9.1 1.6 71.1 46.6 2.6 3.8 47.0
Ecuador
1998 16.8 9.0 3.0 71.3 28.7 4.2 7.6 59.5 67.4 9.6 2.4 20.6 50.2 1.4 1.8 46.6
Guatemala
2002 14.8 22.2 2.1 61.0 36.5 7.8 7.1 48.6 27.2 36.7 1.8 34.3 58.2 6.3 2.6 32.9
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 21.7 4.6 0.7 73.1 53.2 5.9 3.6 37.4
Honduras
2003 6.8 23.5 1.9 67.8 40.3 8.9 4.8 46.0 29.1 20.7 4.0 46.3 79.2 0.4 2.4 18.1
Mexico
1992 7.3 10.3 5.2 77.1 19.6 9.1 9.8 61.6 34.2 26.7 0.3 38.9 73.1 5.0 0.6 21.2
2002 6.6 15.5 2.3 75.7 14.6 15.2 2.8 67.5 35.3 19.1 0.0 45.6 51.2 4.1 1.4 43.4
Nicaragua
1998 7.8 9.7 1.5 81.0 38.7 5.6 4.8 50.9 31.9 5.5 n.a 62.6 60.9 1.7 n.a 37.5
2001 6.8 12.6 0.9 79.7 39.0 5.3 5.9 49.8 59.9 n.a n.a 40.1 64.9 n.a 3.7 31.4
Panama
2002 2.9 7.9 3.4 85.7 23.6 5.5 7.5 63.4 70.4 14.8 9.3 5.6 91.2 0.7 1.6 6.5
Paraguay
1995 0.5 11.6 2.4 85.5 4.3 6.9 12.9 76.0 6.4 12.3 4.0 77.3 26.0 7.3 14.8 51.9
2001 6.5 9.5 2.0 82.0 10.5 6.6 11.8 71.1 36.6 8.8 0.6 54.0 51.2 4.4 7.3 37.2
Peru
2001 16.6 8.1 3.2 72.2 29.0 4.6 7.0 59.4 36.6 6.1 2.1 55.3 39.6 3.8 6.0 50.6
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Country Year
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Table 1.12: Type of Work by Gender 
(individuals between 25 and 50 years old as a percentage of reference population) 
White Non-white
Female Male Female Male
Entrepre
neur
Wage 
earner
Self-
employed
Zero 
income
Entrepre
neur
Wage 
earner
Self-
employed
Zero 
income
Entrepr
eneur
Wage 
earner
Self-
employed
Zero 
income
Entrepre
neur
Wage 
earner
Self-
employed
Zero 
income
Bolivia
1997 3.8 45.0 38.2 13.0 12.4 52.1 32.6 2.9 1.4 11.7 38.5 48.4 7.4 29.2 59.9 3.5
2002 2.2 42.0 40.7 15.2 8.3 53.3 33.4 5.0 2.2 20.0 40.2 37.7 7.8 34.9 53.9 3.3
Brazil
1995 3.6 52.8 27.6 16.0 8.7 61.3 28.3 1.8 1.0 44.9 35.4 18.7 3.7 62.0 31.9 2.5
2002 4.5 58.9 25.7 10.9 8.3 62.9 27.2 1.6 1.5 49.7 34.4 14.4 3.9 64.0 29.6 2.5
Chile
2000 2.3 79.8 16.1 1.9 4.6 75.8 19.2 0.5 2.2 70.2 18.8 8.8 3.3 60.3 33.0 3.4
Colombia
1999 2.7 59.2 35.1 3.0 4.8 55.7 38.4 1.1 2.0 46.2 48.2 3.6 3.7 50.7 44.6 1.0
Costa Rica
1992 2.0 76.9 17.7 3.4 6.8 70.0 22.2 1.0 3.2 70.4 20.5 6.0 2.7 79.1 17.6 0.6
2001 5.7 70.8 20.8 2.7 10.7 68.2 20.5 0.6 5.1 62.2 26.8 5.9 9.0 70.5 20.3 0.2
Ecuador
1998 4.1 42.1 33.5 20.3 10.1 56.4 28.9 4.6 1.4 9.1 35.5 54.1 3.3 39.1 53.0 4.6
Guatemala
2002 5.0 59.2 30.2 5.7 9.2 61.4 27.7 1.7 6.1 20.6 52.7 20.5 12.4 39.7 43.1 4.8
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.3 14.0 83.6 2.1 0.7 24.4 72.7 2.3
Honduras
2003 4.8 45.7 44.0 5.5 15.9 51.7 29.6 2.8 6.3 19.0 64.2 10.5 17.7 33.4 46.5 2.4
Mexico
1992 3.1 64.8 25.6 6.5 7.5 72.8 17.8 2.0 1.2 12.2 74.8 11.8 10.3 41.9 42.9 4.9
2002 2.2 64.2 25.2 8.5 6.1 72.6 19.4 1.9 1.2 29.9 58.9 10.0 2.5 59.3 34.8 3.4
Nicaragua
1998 1.5 57.1 35.4 6.0 6.4 56.8 31.9 4.9 4.2 49.8 28.7 17.3 2.0 42.2 52.0 3.8
2001 2.4 51.2 38.8 7.6 9.1 58.4 28.4 4.2 0.0 28.7 30.4 40.9 8.2 42.8 43.0 6.0
Panama
2002 1.8 77.9 17.7 2.6 3.7 64.8 30.1 1.5 0.0 8.5 39.9 51.7 1.0 17.2 75.1 6.7
Paraguay
1995 5.1 45.5 44.4 5.0 10.8 57.3 31.4 0.4 0.7 14.7 81.5 3.2 2.5 33.1 64.0 0.5
2001 5.3 55.8 33.8 5.1 13.9 59.1 25.5 1.5 1.6 26.4 62.4 9.6 6.4 38.8 48.6 6.2
Peru
2001 2.5 40.9 38.8 17.9 8.2 53.2 35.7 2.9 1.8 25.1 38.3 34.8 7.5 43.2 45.2 4.1
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Country Year
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Table 1.13: Firm Size by Gender 
(individuals between 25 and 50 years old as a percentage of reference population) 
Large Small Public Large Small Public Large Small Public Large Small Public
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii)
Bolivia
1997 18.7 62.2 19.2 32.9 55.6 11.5 8.5 86.1 5.5 18.9 72.3 8.9
2002 18.4 66.3 15.4 36.2 53.3 10.5 16.9 74.6 8.5 26.7 64.0 9.3
Brazil
1995 41.9 19.4 38.7 60.7 20.7 18.6 37.1 20.8 42.1 57.6 21.4 21.0
2002 46.1 23.4 30.5 61.8 21.6 16.7 40.0 26.6 33.5 59.6 23.2 17.2
Chile
2000 38.9 44.5 16.6 54.7 33.6 11.7 23.6 65.1 11.2 41.9 49.9 8.2
Colombia
1999 n.a 87.84* 12.2 n.a 93.11* 6.9 n.a 85.48* 14.5 n.a 93.03* 7.0
Costa Rica
1992 28.4 42.4 29.2 37.2 43.2 19.6 29.5 48.3 22.2 54.1 32.6 13.4
2001 27.9 48.1 24.0 41.4 43.8 14.8 17.1 62.0 20.8 44.8 45.7 9.5
Ecuador
1998 22.5 66.8 10.8 35.8 54.8 9.5 8.1 89.7 2.2 17.8 74.1 8.1
Guatemala
2002 34.7 53.6 11.7 42.5 51.4 6.1 11.9 83.2 4.9 20.3 75.2 4.6
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras
2003 66.6 21.6 11.8 69.5 24.7 5.8 85.4 4.7 9.9 91.5 4.7 3.8
Mexico
1992 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2002 28.4 54.8 16.9 39.0 48.4 12.7 6.8 82.6 10.6 13.4 74.2 12.4
Nicaragua
1998 33.1 67.0 n.a. 40.3 59.7 n.a. 38.5 61.5 n.a. 26.8 73.2 n.a.
2001 20.6 66.4 13.1 33.4 59.5 7.1 13.0 78.2 8.8 19.5 70.7 9.9
Panama
2002 32.3 41.2 26.6 37.6 46.5 15.9 1.7 94.9 3.4 7.3 86.9 5.8
Paraguay
1995 40.7 15.3 44.0 50.5 24.5 25.0 32.0 43.8 24.2 39.4 53.8 6.8
2001 20.3 58.5 21.2 31.6 54.6 13.9 5.4 89.0 5.7 17.4 79.1 3.5
Peru
2001 13.7 73.1 13.2 25.9 61.7 12.4 9.0 83.6 7.4 19.2 71.3 9.4
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Country Year
White Non-white
Female Male Female Male
 
 105
Chapter 2 
Table 2.1: Poverty Incidence (MDG 1) 
by Household Per Capita Income 
1 U$S per Day 2 U$S per Day 50 % of Median IPCF Official Povery Line Oficial Extreme Poverty Line
White Non-White Total White Non-White Total White Non-White Total White Non-White Total White Non-White Total
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (x) (xi) (xii)
Bolivia
1997 14.8 45.3 28.7 32.5 64.0 46.8 16.7 48.7 31.2 53.7 76.1 63.9 27.8 57.5 41.3
2002 16.6 37.1 27.7 34.0 57.9 47.0 18.0 39.1 29.5 54.3 72.6 64.3 25.5 45.8 36.6
Brazil
1995 4.7 12.7 8.3 12.8 32.0 21.4 14.8 36.7 24.7 39.9 69.7 53.3 17.7 40.9 28.2
2002 5.1 10.6 7.6 11.2 25.7 17.9 17.2 36.8 26.2 39.2 66.6 51.8 17.7 38.0 27.0
Chile
2000 3.4 9.4 3.5 7.5 20.5 7.7 12.9 29.0 13.1 20.4 28.5 20.5 4.5 3.1 4.5
Colombia
1999 15.2 24.1 16.2 26.6 38.5 27.9 25.6 37.1 26.9 53.8 66.9 55.3 20.5 31.0 21.7
Costa Rica
1992 8.2 7.8 8.1 21.0 16.8 20.7 21.4 17.2 21.1 48.4 45.9 48.2 17.4 13.3 17.1
2001 5.0 4.9 5.0 11.6 12.8 11.8 21.2 29.7 22.1 32.3 41.7 33.4 12.0 13.1 12.1
Ecuador
1998 29.0 61.0 30.3 55.7 82.1 56.7 24.8 53.7 25.9 45.4 75.8 46.6 16.0 38.9 16.9
Guatemala
2002 11.4 31.5 20.0 20.9 50.4 33.5 16.4 43.2 27.9 34.6 64.4 47.3 14.3 39.1 24.9
Haiti
2001 51.7 50.9 50.9 64.3 73.7 73.6 40.2 30.5 30.6 60.6 67.0 67.0 53.2 57.9 57.8
Honduras
2003 14.7 26.1 15.8 34.2 60.4 36.6 22.6 41.4 24.4 66.3 81.2 67.7 46.9 69.6 49.0
Mexico
1992 10.7 53.3 12.8 26.7 79.0 29.3 20.9 74.0 23.5
2002 12.3 40.9 13.9 24.4 72.2 27.1 22.9 70.2 25.5 20.1 60.4 22.4 14.5 47.9 16.4
Nicaragua
1998 24.5 46.0 24.9 44.3 61.4 44.6 28.2 47.3 28.6 47.6 62.3 48.0 17.0 37.7 17.5
2001 15.0 35.0 15.8 37.5 68.4 38.6 21.3 51.8 22.5 45.2 74.5 46.3 14.5 33.9 15.2
Panama
2002 9.3 54.7 12.4 23.8 80.9 27.8 23.1 80.7 27.1 37.0 89.2 40.6 19.2 74.4 23.0
Paraguay
1995 2.7 24.3 11.8 7.2 43.3 22.3 11.6 57.6 33.7 17.8 47.9 30.4 4.8 24.5 13.1
2001 2.2 17.3 9.9 5.4 33.5 19.8 10.7 40.9 27.8 21.3 47.4 34.7 5.0 24.9 15.2
Peru
2001 14.6 26.9 19.5 31.6 46.6 37.5 21.5 34.6 26.7 51.1 64.9 56.6 18.7 33.5 24.6
Suriname
1999 20.9 35.5 21.8 36.8 52.3 37.8 31.3 41.1 31.9 67.6 73.8 68.0 38.4 52.3 39.3
Country Year
 
Table 2.2: Poverty Gap (MDG 1) 
by Household Per Capita Income 
1 U$S per Day 2 U$S per Day 50 % of Median IPCF Official Povery Line Oficial Extreme Poverty Line
White Non-White Total White Non-White Total White Non-White Total White Non-White Total White Non-White Total
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (x) (xi) (xii)
Bolivia
1997 8.1 33.1 19.4 15.7 44.3 28.7 8.7 34.2 20.3 26.3 51.9 37.9 13.4 39.1 25.1
2002 8.5 23.8 16.8 16.8 35.9 27.2 9.2 25.0 17.8 23.6 37.3 31.0 9.5 18.3 14.3
Brazil
1995 2.5 5.6 3.9 5.5 14.0 9.4 6.8 17.1 11.5 18.1 37.7 26.9 7.2 18.2 12.2
2002 3.5 6.1 4.7 5.8 12.0 8.6 8.0 17.1 12.2 18.8 36.2 26.8 8.3 17.8 12.7
Chile
2000 2.3 5.2 2.4 3.8 10.0 3.9 5.6 14.1 5.7 7.0 10.6 7.1 1.7 1.0 1.7
Colombia
1999 11.1 16.4 11.7 15.9 23.8 16.8 15.5 23.3 16.4 29.6 40.6 30.8 13.3 20.1 14.0
Costa Rica
1992 4.1 4.5 4.2 9.0 8.1 9.0 9.2 8.2 9.1 22.0 20.4 21.9 7.7 6.9 7.6
2001 3.0 2.7 2.9 5.5 5.6 5.5 9.5 11.1 9.6 13.9 16.5 14.2 5.6 5.6 5.6
Ecuador
1998 15.4 36.7 16.3 29.3 55.4 30.3 13.4 33.0 14.2 23.2 47.5 24.1 9.1 24.0 9.7
Guatemala
2002 6.0 17.0 10.7 11.2 29.6 19.1 8.7 23.9 15.2 16.0 38.2 25.5 7.7 21.6 13.7
Haiti
2001 34.7 29.7 29.7 46.7 47.0 46.9 22.9 17.4 17.4 41.9 40.9 40.9 37.3 33.6 33.7
Honduras
2003 5.4 9.4 5.7 15.1 27.2 16.2 9.0 16.4 9.7 34.9 47.0 36.0 21.1 35.0 22.4
Mexico
1992 5.1 24.0 6.0 11.6 46.7 13.3 9.3 40.8 10.8
2002 8.9 18.8 9.5 13.5 38.7 14.9 12.9 36.8 14.2 11.7 30.4 12.8 9.7 22.0 10.4
Nicaragua
1998 15.0 29.6 15.3 24.7 40.8 25.1 16.6 32.0 17.0 26.9 43.0 27.2 11.5 22.4 11.8
2001 6.7 16.8 7.0 16.4 36.1 17.1 9.1 22.5 9.6 20.3 43.0 21.2 6.7 15.6 7.0
Panama
2002 3.9 25.2 5.3 10.3 47.7 12.9 10.0 46.8 12.5 17.1 60.4 20.1 8.2 41.7 10.5
Paraguay
1995 1.2 11.3 5.5 3.0 22.3 11.1 7.6 42.0 24.2 6.0 24.3 13.7 1.8 10.9 5.7
2001 1.3 7.6 4.5 2.6 16.8 9.9 4.9 20.3 13.6 6.2 20.2 13.4 1.6 9.8 5.8
Peru
2001 7.2 12.5 9.3 15.3 24.8 19.1 10.2 17.6 13.2 24.7 34.8 28.7 9.1 17.0 12.2
Suriname
1999 15.3 15.7 15.3 22.7 29.4 23.1 18.7 23.6 19.0 38.2 46.9 38.7 23.3 30.3 23.7
Country Year
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Table 2.3: Severity of Poverty (MDG 1) 
by Household Per Capita Income 
1 U$S per Day 2 U$S per Day 50 % of Median IPCF Official Povery Line Oficial Extreme Poverty Line
White Non-White Total White Non-White Total White Non-White Total White Non-White Total White Non-White Total
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (x) (xi) (xii)
Bolivia
1997 6.1 28.1 16.1 10.7 36.7 22.5 6.4 29.0 16.7 17.1 42.0 28.4 9.0 32.3 19.6
2002 6.0 18.8 13.0 11.3 27.7 20.2 6.5 19.7 13.7 13.6 23.1 18.8 5.1 10.0 7.8
Brazil
1995 2.0 3.8 2.8 3.6 8.5 5.8 4.3 10.5 7.1 11.1 25.2 17.4 4.5 11.1 7.4
2002 3.1 4.8 3.9 4.3 8.1 6.0 5.5 11.1 8.1 12.1 24.4 17.8 5.6 11.5 8.4
Chile
2000 2.0 4.0 2.0 2.8 6.8 2.9 3.7 9.4 3.8 3.7 5.6 3.7 1.0 0.5 1.0
Colombia
1999 9.8 13.8 10.3 12.7 18.9 13.4 12.5 18.6 13.2 21.4 30.6 22.4 11.2 16.3 11.7
Costa Rica
1992 3.1 3.7 3.1 5.8 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.8 5.9 13.6 12.5 13.6 5.0 5.1 5.0
2001 2.5 2.2 2.4 3.9 3.7 3.8 6.1 6.4 6.1 8.5 9.4 8.6 3.9 3.7 3.9
Ecuador
1998 11.1 28.0 11.8 20.2 42.9 21.1 9.8 25.4 10.4 16.0 36.3 16.8 6.9 18.2 7.4
Guatemala
2002 4.2 12.1 7.6 7.7 21.3 13.5 6.0 17.0 10.7 10.7 27.9 18.1 5.4 15.3 9.6
Haiti
2001 26.7 21.7 21.7 38.2 35.4 35.4 15.6 12.7 12.7 33.9 30.2 30.2 29.4 24.6 24.6
Honduras
2003 2.8 4.7 3.0 8.8 15.7 9.4 5.0 8.7 5.3 22.2 31.5 23.0 12.6 21.4 13.4
Mexico
1992 3.6 14.0 4.1 7.3 31.8 8.5 6.0 26.7 7.0
2002 7.9 12.2 8.1 10.5 25.8 11.3 10.1 24.3 10.9 9.4 19.7 10.0 8.3 14.2 8.6
Nicaragua
1998 12.0 23.0 12.2 18.3 32.8 18.6 13.0 25.1 13.3 19.9 34.8 20.2 9.9 17.2 10.0
2001 4.3 10.6 4.5 10.0 23.6 10.5 5.7 14.2 6.0 12.5 29.3 13.2 4.3 9.9 4.5
Panama
2002 2.2 14.4 3.1 6.1 32.7 7.9 5.9 31.9 7.7 10.5 45.1 12.9 4.7 27.5 6.3
Paraguay
1995 0.7 6.7 3.3 1.8 14.9 7.3 6.5 36.5 20.9 3.2 15.9 8.5 1.0 6.4 3.3
2001 1.0 4.5 2.8 1.8 10.8 6.4 3.4 13.2 8.9 3.1 11.6 7.4 0.7 5.1 3.0
Peru
2001 4.8 7.7 6.0 9.9 16.6 12.6 6.7 11.3 8.5 15.8 23.6 18.9 6.0 10.8 7.9
Suriname
1999 13.5 12.2 13.4 17.9 21.2 18.1 15.4 16.6 15.4 28.2 35.1 28.6 18.3 21.8 18.5
Country Year
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Table 2.4: Poverty Incidence (MDG 1) 
by Household Equivalent Income 
1 U$S per Day 2 U$S per Day 50 % of Median IPCF
White Non-White Total White Non-White Total White Non-White Total
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
Bolivia
1997 10.2 39.4 23.5 21.7 54.7 36.7 15.4 47.1 29.8
2002 11.0 30.4 21.5 23.6 47.2 36.4 17.1 38.6 28.8
Brazil
1995 2.9 7.1 4.8 8.1 21.0 13.9 15.1 36.2 24.6
2002 4.3 8.2 6.1 8.6 19.4 13.6 15.7 34.3 24.3
Chile
2000 2.9 6.7 2.9 5.2 15.2 5.3 11.9 29.1 12.2
Colombia
1999 12.8 19.7 13.6 20.3 30.9 21.5 24.9 36.1 26.1
Costa Rica
1992 5.6 5.7 5.6 12.9 10.5 12.7 20.1 15.5 19.7
2001 3.6 3.5 3.6 8.1 8.1 8.1 20.9 27.5 21.6
Ecuador
1998 21.1 47.1 22.1 42.4 72.8 43.6 24.9 52.0 26.0
Guatemala
2002 9.0 24.4 15.6 17.6 44.8 29.3 16.9 42.4 27.8
Haiti
2001 48.8 41.2 41.3 58.0 65.1 65.1 38.8 30.3 30.4
Honduras
2003 8.0 13.6 8.5 23.4 42.9 25.2 22.3 40.4 24.0
Mexico
1992 6.5 38.2 8.0 16.5 69.6 19.1 20.1 73.6 22.7
2002 10.3 26.4 11.2 17.6 58.9 19.9 21.9 69.0 24.5
Nicaragua
1998 18.4 37.7 18.8 32.4 49.4 32.8 28.0 47.3 28.5
2001 8.7 23.6 9.3 24.3 54.0 25.4 21.2 48.3 22.2
Panama
2002 6.0 37.4 8.2 16.4 66.8 19.9 22.3 77.0 26.0
Paraguay
1995 2.0 17.8 8.6 4.0 31.4 15.5 11.6 56.4 33.1
2001 1.5 10.7 6.2 3.7 24.7 14.5 10.2 39.8 26.9
Peru
2001 10.4 19.8 14.1 23.1 36.6 28.5 21.2 34.3 26.4
Suriname
1999 17.8 21.5 18.1 31.8 41.1 32.4 29.5 41.1 30.2
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Country Year
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Table 2.5: Poverty Gap (MDG 1) 
by Household Equivalent Income 
1 U$S per Day 2 U$S per Day 50 % of Median IPCF
White Non-White Total White Non-White Total White Non-White Total
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
Bolivia
1997 6.2 29.4 16.8 11.0 38.4 23.4 8.4 34.1 20.1
2002 6.3 20.0 13.8 12.0 29.5 21.5 9.0 24.8 17.6
Brazil
1995 2.0 3.7 2.8 3.6 8.7 5.9 6.3 15.6 10.5
2002 3.2 5.2 4.1 4.7 9.2 6.8 7.4 15.6 11.2
Chile
2000 2.1 4.3 2.1 3.0 7.6 3.1 5.2 13.7 5.4
Colombia
1999 10.0 14.2 10.5 13.2 19.8 13.9 15.2 22.7 16.1
Costa Rica
1992 3.2 3.7 3.3 6.0 5.8 6.0 8.7 7.5 8.6
2001 2.5 2.3 2.5 4.1 3.8 4.1 9.1 10.0 9.2
Ecuador
1998 11.8 29.6 12.5 21.8 45.2 22.7 13.5 32.6 14.2
Guatemala
2002 4.9 13.9 8.8 9.1 24.6 15.8 8.8 23.8 15.2
Haiti
2001 29.6 23.6 23.7 41.2 39.0 39.1 21.9 17.1 17.2
Honduras
2003 2.7 4.4 2.9 9.3 16.4 9.9 8.7 15.4 9.3
Mexico
1992 3.5 14.7 4.1 7.5 35.6 8.8 8.8 40.0 10.3
2002 8.1 12.5 8.3 10.9 28.1 11.8 12.5 34.7 13.8
Nicaragua
1998 12.2 23.1 12.4 18.8 34.0 19.2 16.6 31.1 16.9
2001 4.3 10.0 4.5 10.3 23.6 10.8 8.9 20.5 9.3
Panama
2002 2.4 14.2 3.2 6.7 34.3 8.6 9.5 42.7 11.7
Paraguay
1995 0.8 7.2 3.5 1.8 15.9 7.8 7.5 41.6 23.9
2001 1.1 4.6 2.9 1.8 11.1 6.6 4.8 19.5 13.1
Peru
2001 5.2 8.3 6.4 10.9 18.6 13.9 9.8 17.0 12.7
Suriname
1999 13.9 13.0 13.8 19.0 22.8 19.2 18.2 21.6 18.4
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Country Year
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Table 2.6: Severity of Poverty (MDG 1) 
by Household Equivalent Income 
1 U$S per Day 2 U$S per Day 50 % of Median IPCF
White Non-White Total White Non-White Total White Non-White Total
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
Bolivia
1997 4.9 25.2 14.1 7.8 32.2 18.9 6.3 29.0 16.6
2002 4.7 15.8 10.7 8.2 23.0 16.3 6.3 19.6 13.5
Brazil
1995 1.8 2.8 2.2 2.5 5.4 3.8 3.9 9.3 6.3
2002 3.0 4.4 3.6 3.7 6.5 5.0 5.1 10.1 7.4
Chile
2000 1.8 3.4 1.8 2.4 5.4 2.4 3.5 9.1 3.6
Colombia
1999 9.2 12.3 9.6 11.1 16.0 11.7 12.3 18.1 13.0
Costa Rica
1992 2.5 3.3 2.6 4.1 4.4 4.2 5.6 5.4 5.6
2001 2.2 2.0 2.2 3.1 2.8 3.0 5.9 5.9 5.9
Ecuador
1998 8.7 22.8 9.3 15.1 34.7 15.9 9.8 25.1 10.4
Guatemala
2002 3.4 10.0 6.2 6.3 17.5 11.1 6.1 16.9 10.7
Haiti
2001 21.3 17.2 17.2 32.9 28.7 28.8 14.5 12.4 12.5
Honduras
2003 1.5 2.1 1.6 5.0 8.6 5.4 4.7 8.1 5.0
Mexico
1992 2.8 8.1 3.0 4.9 22.2 5.7 5.6 25.8 6.6
2002 7.4 8.7 7.5 9.0 18.1 9.5 9.9 22.6 10.6
Nicaragua
1998 10.2 17.8 10.4 14.4 26.7 14.7 13.0 24.1 13.2
2001 3.0 6.6 3.1 6.3 14.7 6.7 5.5 12.8 5.8
Panama
2002 1.4 7.3 1.8 3.8 21.3 5.0 5.5 28.1 7.1
Paraguay
1995 0.4 3.9 1.9 1.1 10.2 4.9 6.5 36.2 20.8
2001 0.9 2.8 1.9 1.3 6.8 4.1 3.2 12.4 8.4
Peru
2001 3.5 5.0 4.1 7.1 11.9 9.0 6.4 10.8 8.2
Suriname
1999 12.7 10.1 12.5 15.6 16.0 15.6 15.2 15.1 15.1
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
YearCountry
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Table 2.7: Poverty rankings – Headcount ratio 
Country Year 1 U$S per Day 50 % of Median IPCF 2 U$S per Day Oficial Povery Line Oficial Extreme Poverty Line
Headcount 
Ratio Rank
Headcount 
Ratio Rank
Headcount 
Ratio Rank
Headcount 
Ratio Rank
Headcount 
Ratio Rank
Chile 2000 3.5 (1) 13.1 (1) 7.7 (1) 20.5 (1) 4.5 (1)
Costa Rica 2001 5.0 (2) 22.1 (2) 11.8 (2) 33.4 (3) 12.1 (2)
Brazil 2002 7.6 (3) 26.2 (7) 17.9 (3) 51.8 (9) 27.0 (11)
Paraguay 2001 9.9 (4) 27.8 (11) 19.8 (4) 34.7 (4) 15.2 (3)
Panama 2002 12.4 (5) 27.1 (10) 27.8 (6) 40.6 (5) 23.0 (8)
Mexico 2002 13.9 (6) 25.5 (5) 27.1 (5) 22.4 (2) 16.4 (5)
Honduras 2003 15.8 (7) 24.4 (4) 36.6 (9) 67.7 (14) 49.0 (14)
Nicaragua 2001 15.8 (8) 22.5 (3) 38.6 (12) 46.3 (6) 15.2 (4)
Colombia 1999 16.2 (9) 26.9 (9) 27.9 (7) 55.3 (10) 21.7 (7)
Peru 2001 19.5 (10) 26.7 (8) 37.5 (10) 56.6 (11) 24.6 (9)
Guatemala 2002 20.0 (11) 27.9 (12) 33.5 (8) 47.3 (8) 24.9 (10)
Suriname 1999 21.8 (12) 31.9 (15) 37.8 (11) 68.0 (15) 39.3 (13)
Bolivia 2002 27.7 (13) 29.5 (13) 47.0 (13) 64.3 (12) 36.6 (12)
Ecuador 1998 30.3 (14) 25.9 (6) 56.7 (14) 46.6 (7) 16.9 (6)
Haiti 2001 50.9 (15) 30.6 (14) 73.6 (15) 67.0 (13) 57.8 (15)  
Figure 2.8: Poverty rankings – Poverty gap 
Country Year 1 U$S per Day 50 % of Median IPCF 2 U$S per Day Oficial Povery Line Oficial Extreme Poverty Line
Poverty Gap Rank Poverty Gap Rank Poverty Gap Rank Poverty Gap Rank Poverty Gap Rank
Chile 2000 2.4 (1) 5.7 (1) 3.9 (1) 7.1 (1) 1.7 (1)
Costa Rica 2001 2.9 (2) 9.6 (2) 5.5 (2) 14.2 (4) 5.6 (2)
Paraguay 2001 4.5 (3) 13.6 (8) 9.9 (4) 13.4 (3) 5.8 (3)
Brazil 2002 4.7 (4) 12.2 (5) 8.6 (3) 26.8 (9) 12.7 (9)
Panama 2002 5.3 (5) 12.5 (6) 12.9 (5) 20.1 (5) 10.5 (7)
Honduras 2003 5.7 (6) 9.7 (4) 16.2 (7) 36.0 (13) 22.4 (13)
Nicaragua 2001 7.0 (7) 9.6 (3) 17.1 (9) 21.2 (6) 7.0 (4)
Peru 2001 9.3 (8) 13.2 (7) 19.1 (11) 28.7 (10) 12.2 (8)
Mexico 2002 9.5 (9) 14.2 (10) 14.9 (6) 12.8 (2) 10.4 (6)
Guatemala 2002 10.7 (10) 15.2 (11) 19.1 (10) 25.5 (8) 13.7 (10)
Colombia 1999 11.7 (11) 16.4 (12) 16.8 (8) 30.8 (11) 14.0 (11)
Suriname 1999 15.3 (12) 19.0 (15) 23.1 (12) 38.7 (14) 23.7 (14)
Ecuador 1998 16.3 (13) 14.2 (9) 30.3 (14) 24.1 (7) 9.7 (5)
Bolivia 2002 16.8 (14) 17.8 (14) 27.2 (13) 31.0 (12) 14.3 (12)
Haiti 2001 29.7 (15) 17.4 (13) 46.9 (15) 40.9 (15) 33.7 (15)  
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Figure 2.9: Poverty rankings – Severity of poverty 
Country Year 1 U$S per Day 50 % of Median IPCF 2 U$S per Day Oficial Povery Line Oficial Extreme Poverty Line
Severity of 
Poverty Rank
Severity of 
Poverty Rank
Severity of 
Poverty Rank
Severity of 
Poverty Rank
Severity of 
Poverty Rank
Chile 2000 2.0 (1) 3.8 (1) 2.9 (1) 3.7 (1) 1.0 (1)
Costa Rica 2001 2.4 (2) 6.1 (4) 3.8 (2) 8.6 (3) 3.9 (3)
Paraguay 2001 2.8 (3) 8.9 (8) 6.4 (4) 7.4 (2) 3.0 (2)
Honduras 2003 3.0 (4) 5.3 (2) 9.4 (6) 23.0 (13) 13.4 (13)
Panama 2002 3.1 (5) 7.7 (5) 7.9 (5) 12.9 (5) 6.3 (5)
Brazil 2002 3.9 (6) 8.1 (6) 6.0 (3) 17.8 (8) 8.4 (9)
Nicaragua 2001 4.5 (7) 6.0 (3) 10.5 (7) 13.2 (6) 4.5 (4)
Peru 2001 6.0 (8) 8.5 (7) 12.6 (9) 18.9 (11) 7.9 (8)
Guatemala 2002 7.6 (9) 10.7 (10) 13.5 (11) 18.1 (9) 9.6 (11)
Mexico 2002 8.1 (10) 10.9 (11) 11.3 (8) 10.0 (4) 8.6 (10)
Colombia 1999 10.3 (11) 13.2 (13) 13.4 (10) 22.4 (12) 11.7 (12)
Ecuador 1998 11.8 (12) 10.4 (9) 21.1 (14) 16.8 (7) 7.4 (6)
Bolivia 2002 13.0 (13) 13.7 (14) 20.2 (13) 18.8 (10) 7.8 (7)
Suriname 1999 13.4 (14) 15.4 (15) 18.1 (12) 28.6 (14) 18.5 (14)
Haiti 2001 21.7 (15) 12.7 (12) 35.4 (15) 30.2 (15) 24.6 (15)  
 
Table 2.10: Ratio of non-white poverty to white poverty 
Average
Pop. Weighted
1 U$S per Day 2.19 2.76 2.46
2 U$S per Day 1.80 2.27 2.30
50 % of Median IPCF 2.17 2.23 2.28
Official Povery Line 1.52 1.67 1.92
Oficial Extreme Poverty Line 1.97 2.23 2.32
Poverty Lines Median Average
 
 
Table 2.11: Bootstrap Poverty Incidence 95% Confidence Intervals 
by Household Per Capita Income 
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2 U$S per Day 50 % of Median IPCF
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Bolivia
1997 31.9 33.3 63.2 64.9 16.1 17.1 47.2 49.3
2002 32.7 34.9 56.8 58.9 17.3 18.7 38.3 40.1
Brazil
1995 12.7 13.0 31.7 32.2 14.6 15.0 36.5 37.0
2002 11.0 11.3 25.5 25.9 17.0 17.4 36.6 37.1
Chile
2000 7.4 7.7 19.3 21.7 20.9 21.3 37.9 41.7
Colombia
1999 26.2 27.0 37.9 39.5 25.3 26.0 36.0 37.9
Costa Rica
1992 20.5 21.6 15.7 18.0 20.9 22.1 16.1 18.5
2001 11.3 12.1 11.8 13.9 20.7 21.7 28.5 31.0
Ecuador
1998 55.0 56.5 79.3 84.4 24.2 25.8 51.2 57.2
Guatemala
2002 19.7 22.4 48.0 52.7 15.3 19.1 41.3 45.5
Haiti
2001 57.3 69.6 73.2 74.2 33.7 45.3 30.0 31.3
Honduras
2003 33.8 34.9 58.7 62.4 22.2 23.0 39.6 43.1
Mexico
1992 26.2 27.3 76.6 80.8 20.4 21.4 71.4 76.2
2002 23.9 24.9 70.1 73.6 22.4 23.5 68.3 71.9
Nicaragua
1998 41.9 43.9 56.3 64.0 27.4 28.8 42.7 51.8
2001 35.2 36.8 63.8 70.7 20.8 21.9 48.8 57.1
Panama
2002 23.3 24.1 79.7 82.0 22.4 23.4 79.1 82.1
Paraguay
1995 6.8 7.9 42.2 44.4 10.2 11.3 48.9 51.2
2001 4.9 5.9 32.5 34.5 7.7 9.9 41.8 44.5
Peru
2001 31.0 32.1 46.1 47.3 21.0 21.9 33.9 35.3
Suriname
1999 34.6 39.6 42.1 60.8 29.1 33.8 34.6 53.3
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
White Non-WhiteCountry Year White Non-White
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Table 2.12: Bootstrap Poverty Gap 95% Confidence Intervals 
by Household Per Capita Income 
2 U$S per Day 50 % of Median IPCF
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Bolivia
1997 15.4 16.1 43.4 44.9 8.4 9.0 33.3 35.1
2002 16.2 17.3 34.8 36.5 8.7 9.7 24.3 26.1
Brazil
1995 5.5 5.7 13.9 14.2 6.7 6.9 17.0 17.3
2002 5.7 5.9 11.9 12.1 7.9 8.1 17.0 17.3
Chile
2000 3.7 3.9 9.3 11.0 8.3 8.6 18.5 20.1
Colombia
1999 15.6 16.1 23.0 24.3 15.4 15.8 22.5 24.0
Costa Rica
1992 8.8 9.3 7.5 8.6 9.0 9.4 7.5 8.9
2001 5.3 5.8 5.1 6.1 9.2 9.7 10.5 11.8
Ecuador
1998 28.8 29.8 53.7 58.3 13.0 13.8 30.5 36.4
Guatemala
2002 9.6 11.9 28.3 30.9 7.8 9.5 22.6 25.8
Haiti
2001 42.5 53.1 46.5 47.5 19.6 26.9 17.1 17.9
Honduras
2003 14.8 15.3 26.4 28.2 8.7 9.2 15.7 17.3
Mexico
1992 11.2 11.8 44.8 47.6 9.0 9.6 39.5 42.1
2002 13.2 14.0 37.9 39.8 12.6 13.4 35.4 37.8
Nicaragua
1998 23.5 24.8 36.7 44.5 16.1 17.1 28.4 35.9
2001 15.3 16.1 32.7 37.7 8.8 9.4 20.1 24.6
Panama
2002 10.1 10.6 46.7 49.0 9.7 10.2 45.4 47.8
Paraguay
1995 2.7 3.2 21.6 23.2 3.9 4.5 26.4 28.0
2001 2.3 2.9 16.2 17.5 3.3 4.1 20.9 22.0
Peru
2001 14.9 15.6 24.4 25.4 9.9 10.5 17.2 18.1
Suriname
1999 20.7 24.8 23.5 35.7 16.8 20.1 18.2 30.1
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
White Non-WhiteCountry Year White Non-White
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 Table 2.13: Living Conditions (MDG 7) 
% of Household With Access to Water % of Household With Access to Sewage % of Household With Hygienic Restroom
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
White Non-White White Non-White White Non-White White Non-White White Non-White White Non-White
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Bolivia
1997 0.37 0.26 0.90 0.84 0.05 0.05 0.52 0.68 0.06 0.01 0.46 0.22
2002 0.56 0.52 0.93 0.86 0.04 0.05 0.48 0.59 0.50 0.32 0.91 0.75
Brazil
1995 0.88 0.69 0.99 0.94 0.04 0.03 0.55 0.33 0.20 0.08 0.79 0.55
2002 0.88 0.73 0.99 0.97 0.05 0.03 0.59 0.42 0.25 0.09 0.83 0.65
Chile
2000 0.60 0.31 0.99 0.98 0.04 0.01 0.89 0.87 0.33 0.08 0.94 0.91
Colombia
1999 0.62 0.61 0.99 0.95 0.32 0.26 0.94 0.74 0.32 0.26 0.94 0.74
Costa Rica
1992 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
2001 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Ecuador
1998 0.49 0.82 0.85 0.90 0.16 0.06 0.74 0.82 0.32 0.12 0.80 0.84
Guatemala
2002 0.64 0.72 0.94 0.85 n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.33 0.27 0.91 0.76
Haiti
2001 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Honduras
2003 0.66 0.58 0.92 0.92 0.05 0.00 0.57 0.34 0.17 0.02 0.68 0.36
Mexico
1992 0.68 0.36 0.93 0.80 0.04 0.00 0.71 0.26 0.24 0.10 0.81 0.40
2002 0.69 0.72 0.96 0.86 0.09 0.01 0.65 0.16 0.19 0.04 0.69 0.27
Nicaragua
1998 0.30 0.03 0.84 0.49 n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.02 n.a 0.37 0.04
2001 0.27 0.00 0.84 0.37 n.a n.a 0.26 0.03 0.02 n.a 0.35 0.11
Panama
2002 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Paraguay
1995 0.60 0.63 0.84 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.02 0.43 0.11 0.85 0.37
2001 0.89 0.80 0.99 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.05 0.53 0.14 0.89 0.58
Peru
2001 0.34 0.37 0.81 0.74 0.06 0.03 0.75 0.64 0.16 0.15 0.80 0.72
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
YearCountry
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Table 2.14: Ethnic Discrimination 
(Difference in the Conditional Expectation of Log Hourly Wages between White and 
Non-White Individuals) 
Coefficients Robust White t-statistics
Bolivia
1997 -0.408 -0.225 -0.345 [14.93]** [7.37]** [16.66]**
2002 -0.401 -0.229 -0.331 [11.40]** [6.21]** [12.86]**
Brazil
1995 -0.283 -0.256 -0.273 [38.32]** [39.56]** [55.48]**
2002 -0.256 -0.223 -0.241 [42.75]** [39.56]** [58.10]**
Chile
2000 -0.204 -0.145 -0.174 [9.76]** [5.52]** [10.58]**
Colombia
1999 0.002 0.024 0.015 [0.09] [1.02] [0.96]
Costa Rica
1992 0.274 0.195 0.249 [12.19]** [7.19]** [14.39]**
2001 -0.079 -0.088 -0.078 [3.63]** [3.19]** [4.53]**
Ecuador
1998 -0.462 -0.271 -0.391 [5.07]** [2.62]** [5.63]**
Guatemala
2002 -0.316 -0.176 -0.239 [6.75]** [3.92]** [7.30]**
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras
2003 0.410 0.493 0.448 [9.11]** [9.55]** [13.19]**
Mexico
1992 -0.597 -0.673 -0.614 [11.51]** [10.20]** [15.01]**
2002 -0.649 -0.595 -0.622 [19.23]** [16.85]** [25.40]**
Nicaragua
1998 -0.289 0.226 -0.067 [2.82]** [2.28]* [0.88]
2001 -0.240 0.268 -0.028 [2.15]* [2.36]* [0.33]
Panama
2002 -0.583 -0.548 -0.566 [9.29]** [8.16]** [12.33]**
Paraguay
1995 -0.403 -0.254 -0.333 [10.07]** [6.70]** [12.09]**
2001 -0.480 -0.246 -0.358 [16.50]** [10.16]** [19.10]**
Peru
2001 -0.119 -0.091 -0.112 [6.24]** [4.77]** [8.30]**
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Household 
Heads
Household Non-
Heads All
Country Year AllHousehold Heads
Household Non-
Heads
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Chapter 3 
Table 3.1: Literacy Rates (MDG 2) 
White Non-White Total White Non-White Total
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Bolivia
1997 0.96 0.82 0.89 0.99 0.95 0.97
2002 0.96 0.87 0.92 0.99 0.97 0.98
Brazil
1995 0.93 0.80 0.87 0.96 0.89 0.93
2002 0.95 0.87 0.91 0.98 0.95 0.96
Chile
2000 0.85 0.83 0.85 0.99 0.99 0.99
Colombia
1999 0.94 0.89 0.94 0.98 0.95 0.97
Costa Rica
1992 0.94 0.90 0.94 0.98 0.97 0.98
2001 0.95 0.92 0.95 0.98 0.96 0.98
Ecuador
1998 0.76 0.49 0.74 0.71 0.75 0.72
Guatemala
2002 0.85 0.65 0.77 0.92 0.77 0.86
Haiti
2001 0.64 0.56 0.57 n.a. n.a. 0.77
Honduras
2003 0.87 0.76 0.86 0.91 0.86 0.91
Mexico
1992 0.93 0.68 0.92 0.97 0.80 0.97
2002 0.94 0.79 0.93 0.98 0.93 0.98
Nicaragua
1998 0.81 0.84 0.81 0.85 0.91 0.86
2001 0.82 0.72 0.81 0.87 0.79 0.86
Panama
2002 0.96 0.66 0.94 0.98 0.78 0.97
Paraguay
1995 0.92 0.79 0.86 0.95 0.92 0.94
2001 0.97 0.89 0.93 0.98 0.93 0.96
Peru
2001 0.73 0.64 0.69 0.72 0.71 0.72
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
[10-65] [15-24]
YearCountry
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Table 3.2: Enrollment Rates (MDG 2) 
[4-5] [6-12] [13-15] [16-18] [19-24] [25-30]
Country Year White Non-White Total White Non-White Total White Non-White Total White Non-White Total White Non-White Total White Non-White Total
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii) (xiv) (xv) (xvi) (xvii) (xviii)
Bolivia
1997 0.51 0.34 0.47 0.95 0.90 0.93 0.90 0.77 0.85 0.76 0.50 0.67 0.47 0.18 0.36 0.06 0.02 0.04
2002 0.59 0.48 0.53 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.90 0.84 0.87 0.73 0.66 0.70 0.44 0.33 0.39 0.09 0.05 0.07
Brazil
1995 0.56 0.50 0.53 0.93 0.86 0.90 0.85 0.79 0.82 0.62 0.53 0.57 0.26 0.21 0.23 0.03 0.03 0.03
2002 0.70 0.64 0.67 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.74 0.68 0.71 0.33 0.27 0.30 0.06 0.06 0.06
Chile
2000 0.72 0.57 0.72 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.77 0.68 0.77 0.31 0.19 0.31 0.02 0.01 0.02
Colombia
1999 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.56 0.47 0.55 0.24 0.16 0.23 0.03 0.03 0.03
Costa Rica
1992 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.90 0.85 0.89 0.73 0.58 0.71 0.47 0.33 0.46 0.24 0.11 0.23 0.04 0.02 0.04
2001 0.45 0.31 0.44 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.79 0.70 0.78 0.59 0.51 0.58 0.35 0.18 0.33 0.06 0.03 0.06
Ecuador
1998 0.63 0.39 0.61 0.93 0.87 0.92 0.71 0.53 0.71 0.52 0.19 0.51 0.23 0.10 0.22 0.03 0.02 0.03
Guatemala
2002 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.88 0.77 0.83 0.70 0.55 0.63 0.45 0.24 0.36 0.21 0.12 0.17 0.04 0.02 0.03
Haiti
2001 n.a. 0.04 0.04 n.a. 0.78 0.78 n.a. 0.79 0.79 n.a. 0.69 0.69 n.a. 0.34 0.34 n.a. 0.02 0.02
Honduras
2003 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.88 0.84 0.88 0.67 0.55 0.66 0.43 0.28 0.41 0.22 0.13 0.21 0.04 0.03 0.04
Mexico
1992 0.63 0.43 0.62 0.94 0.82 0.93 0.73 0.59 0.72 0.42 0.24 0.42 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.02 0.01 0.02
2002 0.85 0.78 0.84 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.81 0.79 0.81 0.51 0.40 0.50 0.25 0.11 0.24 0.02 0.01 0.02
Nicaragua
1998 0.56 0.31 0.55 0.84 0.82 0.84 0.69 0.73 0.69 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.04 0.03 0.04
2001 0.60 0.27 0.58 0.87 0.76 0.86 0.77 0.82 0.77 0.48 0.52 0.48 0.25 0.16 0.25 0.03 0.05 0.03
Panama
2002 0.63 0.40 0.61 0.98 0.85 0.96 0.88 0.58 0.86 0.68 0.22 0.65 0.32 0.03 0.30 0.06 0.02 0.06
Paraguay
1995 0.47 0.13 0.29 0.92 0.86 0.89 0.79 0.59 0.69 0.58 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.06 0.16 0.05 0.01 0.03
2001 0.56 0.50 0.53 0.96 0.92 0.94 0.89 0.71 0.80 0.69 0.41 0.56 0.32 0.15 0.24 0.09 0.02 0.06
Peru
2001 0.79 0.71 0.76 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.87 0.91 0.89 0.58 0.65 0.61 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.02 0.02 0.02
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys  
Table 3.3: Net Enrollment Rates in Each Education Level (MDG 2) 
Secondary
White Non-White Total White Non-White Total White Non-White Total White Non-White Total White Non-White Total
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii) (xiv) (xv)
Bolivia
1997 0.95 0.90 0.93 0.94 0.89 0.93 0.48 0.26 0.40 0.53 0.39 0.50 0.23 0.07 0.17
2002 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.49 0.41 0.46 0.54 0.51 0.53 0.24 0.14 0.19
Brazil
1995 0.93 0.87 0.90 0.92 0.88 0.91 0.20 0.07 0.14 0.29 0.14 0.25 0.06 0.02 0.04
2002 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.33 0.18 0.26 0.33 0.17 0.27 0.12 0.04 0.08
Chile
2000 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.93 0.89 0.93 0.53 0.44 0.53 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.14 0.07 0.14
Colombia
1999 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.80 0.77 0.80 0.66 0.55 0.65 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.11 0.05 0.11
Costa Rica
1992 0.90 0.85 0.89 0.67 0.52 0.66 0.52 0.33 0.51 0.43 0.26 0.42 0.12 0.04 0.11
2001 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.76 0.67 0.76 0.61 0.47 0.60 0.54 0.41 0.53 0.14 0.05 0.13
Ecuador
1998 0.92 0.87 0.92 0.69 0.39 0.68 0.58 0.28 0.57 0.33 0.42 0.33 0.09 0.02 0.09
Guatemala
2002 0.88 0.77 0.83 0.73 0.66 0.71 0.43 0.18 0.32 0.41 0.53 0.44 0.10 0.05 0.08
Haiti
2001 n.a. 0.74 0.74 n.a. 0.89 0.89 n.a. 0.22 0.22 n.a. 0.21 0.20 n.a. 0.01 0.01
Honduras
2003 0.88 0.84 0.87 0.61 0.41 0.60 0.37 0.17 0.35 0.50 0.31 0.49 0.07 0.01 0.06
Mexico
1992 0.94 0.81 0.93 0.67 0.47 0.66 0.54 0.22 0.53 0.48 0.10 0.47 0.07 0.00 0.07
2002 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.68 0.62 0.67 0.69 0.62 0.69 0.08 0.01 0.08
Nicaragua
1998 0.84 0.82 0.84 0.78 0.65 0.78 0.39 0.24 0.38 0.48 0.61 0.48 0.07 0.06 0.07
2001 0.89 0.81 0.89 0.79 0.82 0.79 0.44 0.21 0.43 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.1 0.03 0.1
Panama
2002 0.98 0.85 0.96 0.85 0.44 0.83 0.76 0.21 0.72 0.43 0.26 0.43 0.18 0.01 0.17
Paraguay
1995 0.92 0.86 0.89 0.78 0.49 0.66 0.57 0.25 0.41 0.32 0.17 0.30 0.09 0.01 0.06
2001 0.95 0.91 0.93 0.89 0.70 0.81 0.74 0.45 0.59 0.41 0.34 0.40 0.16 0.04 0.11
Peru
2001 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.85 0.91 0.87 0.66 0.69 0.67 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.13 0.12 0.12
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Primary Tertiary
Country Year
Tertiary
(Conditional on having finished Primary) (Conditional on having finished Primary)Secondary
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Table 3.4: Mean of School Gap 
White Non-White White Non-White Females Males Females Males
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Bolivia
1997 2.00 3.17 5.25 7.59 2.33 2.38 5.93 5.96
2002 1.82 2.10 5.23 6.09 1.96 1.92 5.33 5.85
Brazil
1995 3.60 5.17 7.71 9.70 3.89 4.87 7.87 9.29
2002 2.62 3.78 6.00 8.07 2.77 3.66 5.84 7.78
Chile
2000 1.52 2.18 5.40 7.04 1.39 1.69 5.02 5.80
Colombia
1999 2.56 3.62 7.00 8.46 2.32 2.96 6.58 7.56
Costa Rica
1992 3.10 3.57 8.03 8.84 2.90 3.41 7.70 8.40
2001 2.97 3.26 7.13 8.25 2.73 3.24 6.65 7.68
Ecuador
1998 2.26 3.23 6.19 7.62 1.96 2.59 5.79 6.55
Guatemala
2002 2.97 5.05 6.12 9.63 3.64 3.75 7.06 7.41
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras
2003 3.72 4.77 8.60 10.91     3.52 4.29 8.14 9.65
Mexico
1992 2.57 4.93 7.24 10.89 2.50 2.85 7.25 7.48
2002 1.76 2.60 6.03 8.60 1.69 1.99 5.96 6.44
Nicaragua
1998 4.72 4.69 8.30 6.89 4.22 5.18 7.68 8.72
2001 4.44 5.15 9.12 9.12 3.72 5.06 8.23 9.80
Panama
2002 1.83 4.95 5.81 11.65 1.64 2.24 5.28 6.60
Paraguay
1995 2.12 3.82 6.12 9.66 2.65 3.06 6.80 7.92
2001 1.79 3.05 4.75 8.45 2.18 2.74 5.89 7.25
Peru
2001 2.03 2.14 5.72 5.63 2.03 2.13 5.60 5.76
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Country Year
Mean of school gap for
[13-19] [20-25] [13-19] [20-25]
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Table 3.5: Ethnic Discrimination 
(Difference in the conditional probability of enrollment between white and non-white 
average individual) 
Coefficients  z-statistics Coefficients  z-statistics Coefficients  z-statistics
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Bolivia
1997 0.007 1.40 0.000 0.00 -0.009 -0.88
2002 0.019 3.14 0.052 2.48 0.005 0.42
Brazil
1995 -0.012 -5.45 -0.025 -15.78 -0.008 -10.25
2002 -0.004 -2.98 -0.052 -15.78 -0.019 -13.72
Chile
2000 0.002 1.19 -0.006 -0.25 0.002 0.22
Colombia
1999 0.008 1.44 -0.042 -3.08 -0.012 -1.91
Costa Rica
1992 -0.031 -3.50 -0.084 -3.17 -0.015 -1.76
2001 0.008 1.63 -0.030 -1.22 -0.035 -3.34
Ecuador
1998 0.021 1.43 -0.056 -1.05 -0.038 -1.65
Guatemala
2002 -0.053 -3.00 -0.109 -3.36 -0.012 -0.75
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras
2003 0.033 4.77 -0.115 -5.62 -0.013 -3.26
Mexico
1992 -0.049 -5.24 -0.141 -4.03 -0.015 -1.04
2002 0.006 1.83 0.060 3.40 -0.005 -0.76
Nicaragua
1998 0.059 1.94 0.002 0.03 0.000 0.03
2001 0.032 1.73 -0.093 -1.78 -0.032 -2.05
Panama
2002 -0.023 -4.44 -0.226 -6.53 -0.065 -2.06
Paraguay
1995 -0.001 -0.12 -0.128 -4.25 -0.021 -2.72
2001 -0.003 -0.36 -0.111 -3.89 -0.032 -2.33
Peru
2001 0.009 3.70 0.059 5.48 0.021 3.51
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Country
Primary Secondary Tertiary
Year
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Table 3.6: Social Mobility 
White Non-White White Non-White Females Males Females Males
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Bolivia
1997 0.827 0.836 0.733 0.777 0.776 0.835 0.710 0.739
2002 0.864 0.790 0.741 0.771 0.803 0.860 0.709 0.789
Brazil
1995 0.757 0.785 0.680 0.768 0.742 0.733 0.680 0.687
2002 0.824 0.824 0.730 0.790 0.818 0.785 0.749 0.709
Chile
2000 0.911 0.958 0.815 0.875 0.922 0.897 0.812 0.813
Colombia
1999 0.777 0.751 0.779 0.808 0.776 0.761 0.784 0.771
Costa Rica
1992 0.813 0.824 0.815 0.727 0.824 0.803 0.712 0.748
2001 0.792 0.874 0.885 0.684 0.803 0.800 0.730 0.671
Ecuador
1998 0.787 0.805 0.701 0.615 0.803 0.771 0.661 0.737
Guatemala
2002 0.806 0.841 0.802 0.785 0.776 0.763 0.741 0.750
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras
2003 0.779 0.897 0.662 0.906 0.813 0.780 0.699 0.676
Mexico
1992 0.858 0.871 0.762 0.909 0.851 0.849 0.763 0.757
2002 0.859 0.886 0.723 0.778 0.861 0.845 0.721 0.703
Nicaragua
1998 0.788 0.931 0.712 0.955 0.786 0.791 0.708 0.710
2001 0.768 0.865 0.720 0.872 0.752 0.778 0.688 0.750
Panama
2002 0.833 0.876 0.730 0.890 0.822 0.813 0.707 0.720
Paraguay
1995 0.780 0.899 0.712 0.849 0.796 0.759 0.713 0.658
2001 0.834 0.849 0.784 0.847 0.800 0.796 0.744 0.723
Peru
2001 0.835 0.816 0.749 0.815 0.819 0.839 0.757 0.804
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Country Year
Social Mobility Index for
[13-19] [20-25] [13-19] [20-25]
 
Table 3.7: Incentives to Educate by Ethnicity 
dF/dx z P>|z| dF/dx z P>|z|
lincome 0.075 21.33 0.000 0.020 21.99 0.000
edu_head 0.015 27.29 0.000 0.004 25.83 0.000
age_head 0.004 19.01 0.000 0.001 19.37 0.000
male* -0.037 -7.46 0.000 -0.011 -9.39 0.000
age 0.358 22.36 0.000 0.060 21.28 0.000
age_sq -0.008 -22.35 0.000 -0.001 -20.11 0.000
family_size -0.001 -0.33 0.738 0.001 1.38 0.167
urban* 0.050 3.98 0.000 0.007 2.15 0.032
ret_edu 0.979 2.18 0.029 0.205 1.85 0.064
reg_unemp -0.527 -2.57 0.010 -0.041 -1.28 0.201
obs. P 0.165 0.052
pred. P 0.086 (at x-avg) 0.015 (at x-avg)
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0
BRAZIL
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dF/dx z P>|z| dF/dx z P>|z|
lincome 0.037 3.17 0.002 0.024 3.10 0.002
edu_head 0.019 8.66 0.000 0.014 9.05 0.000
age_head 0.004 4.64 0.000 0.002 2.49 0.013
male* -0.036 -1.83 0.067 0.017 2.26 0.024
age 0.602 6.54 0.000 0.303 4.03 0.000
age_sq -0.014 -6.45 0.000 -0.007 -3.94 0.000
family_size -0.010 -2.40 0.017 -0.006 -1.49 0.137
married* -0.214 -6.52 0.000 -0.118 -4.70 0.000
urban* 0.142 3.13 0.002 0.130 7.43 0.000
ret_edu 2.984 4.67 0.000 1.411 2.14 0.033
reg_unemp 0.859 1.63 0.104 -1.843 -2.58 0.010
obs. P 0.251 0.178
pred. P 0.169 (at x-avg) 0.102 (at x-avg)
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0
BOLIVIA
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Table 4.1: Literacy Rates by Gender (MDG 3) 
(individuals between 15 and 24 years old) 
White Non-White
Female Male Female Male
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Bolivia
1997 0.98 0.99 0.92 0.98
2002 0.99 0.99 0.95 1.00
Brasil
1995 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.85
2002 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.93
Chile
2000 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Colombia
1999 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.94
Costa Rica
1992 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97
2001 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.94
Ecuador
1998 0.68 0.75 0.69 0.76
Guatemala
2002 0.89 0.95 0.70 0.82
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. 0.75 0.80
Honduras
2003 0.92 0.89 0.84 0.87
Mexico
1992 0.97 0.97 0.69 0.90
2002 0.97 0.98 0.91 0.96
Nicaragua
1998 0.87 0.83 0.92 0.94
2001 0.89 0.84 0.78 0.81
Panama
2002 0.98 0.98 0.68 0.87
Paraguay
1995 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.94
2001 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.93
Peru
2001 0.70 0.76 0.64 0.83
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Country Year
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Table 4.2: Enrollment Rates by Gender (MDG 3) 
[4-5] [6-12] [13-15] [16-18] [19-24] [25-30]
White Non-White White Non-White White Non-White White Non-White White Non-White White Non-White
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii) (xiv) (xv) (xvi) (xvii) (xviii) (xix) (xx) (xxi) (xxii) (xxiii) (xxiv)
Bolivia
1997 0.53 0.49 0.35 0.34 0.95 0.95 0.88 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.70 0.84 0.75 0.77 0.46 0.55 0.46 0.47 0.15 0.21 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02
2002 0.58 0.60 0.49 0.47 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.88 0.91 0.82 0.86 0.73 0.73 0.62 0.68 0.43 0.46 0.31 0.34 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.05
Brasil
1995 0.55 0.56 0.51 0.48 0.94 0.92 0.87 0.85 0.86 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.64 0.60 0.56 0.49 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.19 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
2002 0.72 0.69 0.66 0.63 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.74 0.73 0.69 0.68 0.33 0.32 0.28 0.26 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05
Chile
2000 0.71 0.73 0.31 0.67 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.97 0.77 0.77 0.66 0.70 0.29 0.33 0.17 0.21 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01
Colombia
1999 0.67 0.69 0.68 0.66 0.92 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.82 0.79 0.81 0.79 0.57 0.54 0.47 0.46 0.24 0.24 0.14 0.19 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
Costa Rica
1992 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.85 0.72 0.74 0.61 0.56 0.47 0.47 0.35 0.31 0.23 0.24 0.10 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02
2001 0.45 0.45 0.30 0.32 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.78 0.80 0.73 0.67 0.61 0.57 0.56 0.47 0.37 0.33 0.18 0.18 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.03
Ecuador
1998 0.67 0.59 0.47 0.31 0.95 0.91 0.88 0.87 0.70 0.73 0.46 0.59 0.53 0.51 0.10 0.28 0.23 0.22 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02
Guatemala
2002 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.86 0.90 0.72 0.81 0.67 0.73 0.50 0.61 0.43 0.48 0.19 0.30 0.21 0.22 0.08 0.15 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.04
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. 0.04 0.05 n.a. n.a. 0.79 0.77 n.a. n.a. 0.79 0.80 n.a. n.a. 0.66 0.71 n.a. n.a. 0.28 0.40 n.a. n.a. 0.02 0.03
Honduras
2003 0.38 0.33 0.41 0.32 0.89 0.87 0.81 0.86 0.68 0.67 0.57 0.53 0.46 0.39 0.30 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.10 0.16 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02
Mexico
1992 0.63 0.64 0.50 0.37 0.94 0.94 0.75 0.86 0.71 0.75 0.47 0.73 0.43 0.42 0.22 0.26 0.17 0.22 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00
2002 0.86 0.84 0.77 0.80 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.81 0.81 0.72 0.86 0.49 0.52 0.41 0.39 0.24 0.26 0.06 0.17 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01
Nicaragua
1998 0.58 0.54 0.37 0.25 0.87 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.73 0.64 0.76 0.70 0.45 0.44 0.31 0.50 0.25 0.19 0.17 0.31 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.00
2001 0.61 0.59 0.47 0.20 0.87 0.86 0.76 0.75 0.81 0.74 0.87 0.77 0.55 0.41 0.39 0.66 0.26 0.24 0.11 0.23 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.03
Panama
2002 0.63 0.63 0.56 0.26 0.98 0.98 0.81 0.88 0.91 0.86 0.55 0.61 0.70 0.67 0.11 0.33 0.36 0.28 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.02
Paraguay
1995 0.46 0.47 0.12 0.14 0.92 0.92 0.86 0.85 0.77 0.81 0.54 0.64 0.57 0.59 0.21 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01
2001 0.61 0.52 0.51 0.48 0.97 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.88 0.90 0.74 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.42 0.41 0.32 0.31 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.03 0.02
Peru
2001 0.78 0.80 0.75 0.68 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.85 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.56 0.60 0.59 0.70 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Country Year
 
 124
Table 4.3: Education Levels by Gender (MDG 3) 
(individuals between 25 and 65 years old) 
Skilled
White Non-White
Female Male Female Male
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Bolivia
1997 0.27 0.32 0.06 0.10
2002 0.23 0.26 0.09 0.13
Brasil
1995 0.16 0.17 0.04 0.04
2002 0.20 0.19 0.06 0.05
Chile
2000 0.18 0.21 0.07 0.13
Colombia
1999 0.13 0.16 0.08 0.09
Costa Rica
1992 0.12 0.13 0.05 0.04
2001 0.19 0.20 0.09 0.05
Ecuador
1998 0.16 0.19 0.02 0.05
Guatemala
2002 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.03
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. 0.03 0.06
Honduras
2003 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.01
Mexico
1992 0.07 0.14 0.00 0.01
2002 0.11 0.17 0.02 0.04
Nicaragua
1998 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.06
2001 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.04
Panama
2002 0.24 0.18 0.01 0.01
Paraguay
1995 0.13 0.15 0.01 0.01
2001 0.18 0.20 0.02 0.02
Peru
2001 0.23 0.28 0.12 0.18
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Country Year
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Table 4.4: Gender Discrimination by Ethnicity 
(Difference in the conditional probability of enrollment between male and female 
average individual) 
Coef.  z-statistics Coef.  z-statistics Coef.  z-statistics Coef.  z-statistics Coef.  z-statistics Coef.  z-statistics
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii)
Bolivia
1997 0.001 0.26 0.008 0.71 0.032 1.54 0.078 2.80 0.002 0.19 0.004 0.56
2002 0.007 0.75 0.005 0.72 -0.049 -1.86 0.088 2.89 -0.032 -1.89 0.016 1.09
Brazil
1995 -0.008 -3.73 -0.015 -4.23 -0.035 -9.81 -0.011 -8.19 -0.007 -4.01 -0.002 -4.03
2002 -0.003 -2.27 -0.011 -5.34 -0.077 -11.95 -0.043 -13.43 -0.036 -11.53 -0.011 -10.31
Chile
2000 -0.001 -1.16 -0.005 -0.99 -0.059 -7.26 0.012 0.33 -0.015 -7.04 -0.004 -0.95
Colombia
1999 -0.016 -3.92 -0.010 -0.84 -0.042 -4.89 -0.037 -1.35 -0.026 -7.47 -0.005 -1.22
Costa Rica
1992 0.001 0.15 -0.007 -0.41 -0.012 -0.61 -0.084 -1.89 -0.023 -3.54 -0.022 -2.81
2001 0.000 0.06 -0.005 -0.62 -0.037 -2.17 -0.102 -2.21 -0.029 -3.99 -0.014 -2.12
Ecuador
1998 -0.024 -3.14 0.000 0.01 -0.029 -1.48 0.155 1.44 -0.021 -2.87 0.000
Guatemala
2002 0.011 0.60 0.100 3.36 -0.001 -0.02 0.021 0.53 -0.011 -0.64 0.033 2.59
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras
2003 -0.020 -3.00 0.013 1.07 -0.071 -4.33 -0.055 -2.47 -0.002 -0.52 -0.000 -0.57
Mexico
1992 0.002 0.38 0.054 1.78 0.010 0.67 0.025 0.56 0.017 4.31 0.001 0.54
2002 -0.000 -0.01 -0.013 -1.56 -0.009 -0.74 -0.009 -0.26 -0.001 -0.16 0.003 1.41
Nicaragua
1998 -0.043 -3.67 -0.026 -0.42 -0.112 -5.76 0.070 0.60 -0.015 -2.86 -0.007 -0.29
2001 -0.011 -1.29 -0.021 -0.50 -0.089 -4.38 -0.105 -1.31 -0.024 -3.79 0.005 0.59
Panama
2002 0.001 0.48 0.088 3.00 -0.070 -5.59 0.079 1.64 -0.099 -13.03 0.000 0.22
Paraguay
1995 0.001 0.32 0.009 1.12 0.004 0.14 0.014 0.44 0.007 0.67 -0.014 -2.87
2001 -0.014 -2.66 0.005 0.53 0.019 0.62 -0.039 -1.35 -0.008 -0.34 -0.034 -3.12
Peru
2001 -0.001 -0.38 0.003 0.81 0.029 2.01 0.060 3.83 -0.040 -5.07 -0.013 -1.49
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Non-Whites
Tertiary
Whites
Primary
Non-Whites
Secondary
Whites Non-Whites
Country Year
Whites
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Table 4.5: Percentage of People Working in Agricultural Jobs by Gender (MDG 3) 
Rural Urban
White Non-White White Non-White
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Bolivia
1997 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2002 0.77 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.10
Brasil
1995 0.71 0.75 0.71 0.79 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.14
2002 0.67 0.74 0.71 0.80 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.12
Chile
2000 0.35 0.72 0.50 0.81 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.09
Colombia
1999 0.23 0.69 0.21 0.64 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.13
Costa Rica
1992 0.08 0.46 0.37 0.68 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.18
2001 0.10 0.39 0.29 0.64 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.20
Ecuador
1998 0.47 0.65 0.80 0.62 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.01
Guatemala
2002 0.30 0.63 0.38 0.76 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.25
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. 0.38 0.79 n.a. n.a. 0.02 0.14
Honduras
2003 0.20 0.73 0.40 0.89 0.01 0.12 0.06 0.40
Mexico
1992 0.38 0.66 0.38 0.82 0.02 0.09 0.22 0.61
2002 0.36 0.58 0.49 0.70 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.33
Nicaragua
1998 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2001 0.21 0.75 0.83 0.80 0.02 0.18 0.04 0.32
Panama
2002 0.14 0.62 0.72 0.93 0.00 0.05
Paraguay
1995 0.02 0.19 0.08 0.43 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.06
2001 0.33 0.42 0.53 0.76 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.10
Peru
2001 0.60 0.80 0.76 0.80 0.05 0.12 0.10 0.14
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Country Year
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 Table 4.6: Gender Discrimination by Ethnicity 
(Difference in the Conditional Expectation of Log Hourly Wages between men and 
women) 
Coefficient t-statistic (*) Coefficient t-statistic (*)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Bolivia
1997 0.237 9.68 0.219 6.56
2002 0.185 5.18 0.206 5.15
Brasil
1995 0.338 47.74 0.288 36.68
2002 0.321 56.77 0.293 49.78
Chile
2000 0.208 36.38 0.131 3.53
Colombia
1999 0.149 18.10 0.230 6.84
Costa Rica
1992 0.165 9.87 0.335 8.86
2001 0.135 9.76 0.116 2.65
Ecuador
1998 0.366 16.97 0.512 3.25
Guatemala
2002 0.067 2.05 0.266 3.99
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras
2003 0.070 3.44 -0.346 -4.88
Mexico
1992 0.218 13.37 0.606 6.84
2002 0.191 17.43 0.177 3.66
Nicaragua
1998 0.150 6.01 0.255 1.10
2001 0.065 2.75 0.039 0.23
Panama
2002 0.200 14.85 0.174 1.38
Paraguay
1995 0.199 7.63 0.183 3.99
2001 0.237 6.78 -0.095 -2.54
Peru
2001 0.261 15.41 0.249 10.81
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
(*) Robust White t-statistics
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Whites Non-Whites
YearCountry
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Table 5.1: National Effects of Halving Poverty for Non-Whites 
Poverty Incidence 
Whites Non-whites National Whites Non-whites National Whites Non-whites National Whites Non-whites National
Bolivia
2002 16.6 37.1 27.7 16.6 18.5 17.6 18.0 39.1 29.5 18.0 19.4 18.8
Brazil
2002 5.1 10.6 7.6 5.1 5.2 5.1 17.2 36.8 26.2 17.2 18.2 17.7
Chile
2000 3.4 9.4 3.5 3.4 4.5 3.5 21.1 39.6 21.4 21.1 19.3 21.1
Colombia
1999 11.3 19.6 12.3 11.3 9.7 11.2 23.7 36.1 25.0 23.7 17.5 23.0
Costa Rica
2001 5.0 4.9 5.0 5.0 2.4 4.7 21.2 29.7 22.1 21.2 14.6 20.5
Ecuador
1998 29.0 61.0 30.3 29.0 30.5 29.1 24.8 53.7 25.9 24.8 26.8 24.8
Guatemala
2002 11.4 31.5 20.0 11.4 15.7 13.2 16.4 43.2 27.9 16.4 21.4 18.6
Haiti
2001 51.7 50.9 50.9 51.7 24.0 24.3 40.2 30.5 30.6 40.2 14.3 14.6
Honduras
2003 14.7 26.1 15.8 14.7 13.0 14.6 22.6 41.4 24.4 22.6 20.6 22.5
Mexico
2002 12.3 40.9 13.9 12.3 20.3 12.8 22.9 70.2 25.5 22.9 34.9 23.5
Nicaragua
2001 14.3 32.1 15.0 14.3 16.2 14.4 21.3 51.8 22.5 21.3 25.7 21.5
Panama
2002 9.3 54.7 12.4 9.3 27.2 10.5 23.1 80.7 27.1 23.1 40.1 24.2
Paraguay
2001 4.2 18.9 12.5 4.2 9.4 7.1 10.7 40.9 27.8 10.7 20.4 16.2
Peru
2001 14.6 26.9 19.5 14.6 13.4 14.1 21.5 34.6 26.7 21.5 17.2 19.8
Suriname
1999 20.9 35.5 21.8 20.9 17.8 20.7 31.3 41.1 31.9 31.3 20.6 30.6
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Observed After achieving MDG for non-whites
Poverty line 1 U$S PPP Poverty line 50% median income
Observed After achieving MDG for non-whitesCountry Year
 
Table 5.2: National Effects of Halving Poverty for Non-Whites 
Poverty Gap 
Whites Non-whites National Whites Non-whites National Whites Non-whites National Whites Non-whites National
Bolivia
2002 8.5 23.8 16.8 8.5 11.8 10.3 9.2 25.0 17.8 9.2 12.4 11.0
Brazil
2002 3.5 6.1 4.7 3.5 2.9 3.3 8.0 17.1 12.2 8.0 8.4 8.2
Chile
2000 2.3 5.2 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.3 8.5 19.2 8.6 8.5 9.3 8.5
Colombia
1999 7.2 12.0 7.8 7.2 5.8 7.1 12.5 20.1 13.3 12.5 9.7 12.2
Costa Rica
2001 3.0 2.7 2.9 3.0 1.2 2.8 9.5 11.1 9.6 9.5 5.4 9.0
Ecuador
1998 15.4 36.7 16.3 15.4 18.3 15.6 13.4 33.0 14.2 13.4 16.5 13.5
Guatemala
2002 6.0 17.0 10.7 6.0 8.4 7.0 8.7 23.9 15.2 8.7 11.9 10.0
Haiti
2001 34.7 29.7 29.7 34.7 14.0 14.1 22.9 17.4 17.4 22.9 8.1 8.3
Honduras
2003 5.4 9.3 5.7 5.4 4.6 5.3 9.0 16.4 9.7 9.0 8.1 8.9
Mexico
2002 8.9 18.8 9.5 8.9 9.3 9.0 12.9 36.8 14.2 12.9 18.2 13.2
Nicaragua
2001 6.4 16.2 6.8 6.4 7.9 6.5 9.1 22.5 9.6 9.1 11.2 9.2
Panama
2002 3.9 25.2 5.3 3.9 12.5 4.4 10.0 46.8 12.5 10.0 23.3 10.9
Paraguay
2001 2.4 8.3 5.7 2.4 4.0 3.3 4.9 20.3 13.6 4.9 10.1 7.8
Peru
2001 7.2 12.5 9.3 7.2 6.2 6.8 10.2 17.6 13.1 10.2 8.7 9.6
Suriname
1999 15.3 15.6 15.3 15.3 7.9 14.8 18.7 23.6 19.0 18.7 12.1 18.3
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Poverty line 1 U$S PPP Poverty line 50% median income
Observed After achieving MDG for non-whites Observed After achieving MDG for non-whitesCountry Year
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Table 5.3: National Effects of Halving Poverty for Non-Whites 
Severity of Poverty 
Whites Non-whites National Whites Non-whites National Whites Non-whites National Whites Non-whites National
Bolivia
2002 6.0 18.8 13.0 6.0 9.3 7.8 6.5 19.7 13.7 6.5 9.8 8.3
Brazil
2002 3.1 4.8 3.9 3.1 2.3 2.8 5.5 11.1 8.1 5.5 5.4 5.4
Chile
2000 2.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.0 5.2 12.7 5.3 5.2 6.1 5.2
Colombia
1999 6.0 9.4 6.4 6.0 4.5 5.8 9.1 14.8 9.7 9.1 7.1 8.9
Costa Rica
2001 2.5 2.2 2.4 2.5 1.0 2.3 6.1 6.4 6.1 6.1 3.1 5.7
Ecuador
1998 11.1 28.0 11.8 11.1 13.9 11.2 9.8 25.4 10.4 9.8 12.6 9.9
Guatemala
2002 4.2 12.1 7.6 4.2 6.0 4.9 6.0 17.0 10.7 6.0 8.4 7.0
Haiti
2001 26.7 21.7 21.7 26.7 10.2 10.3 15.6 12.7 12.7 15.6 5.9 6.0
Honduras
2003 2.8 4.7 3.0 2.8 2.2 2.8 5.0 8.7 5.3 5.0 4.2 4.9
Mexico
2002 7.9 12.2 8.1 7.9 6.0 7.8 10.1 24.3 10.9 10.1 12.0 10.2
Nicaragua
2001 4.2 10.3 4.4 4.2 5.0 4.2 5.7 14.2 6.0 5.7 6.9 5.7
Panama
2002 2.2 14.4 3.1 2.2 7.1 2.6 5.9 31.9 7.7 5.9 15.8 6.6
Paraguay
2001 1.9 5.2 3.8 1.9 2.5 2.2 3.4 13.2 8.9 3.4 6.5 5.1
Peru
2001 4.8 7.7 6.0 4.8 3.7 4.4 6.7 11.3 8.5 6.7 5.5 6.2
Suriname
1999 13.5 12.2 13.4 13.5 6.2 13.1 15.4 16.5 15.4 15.4 8.4 14.9
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Poverty line 1 U$S PPP Poverty line 50% median income
Observed After achieving MDG for non-whites Observed After achieving MDG for non-whitesCountry Year
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Table 5.4: Isopovery Curves: Axis Intercepts, Tranfer Cost and Gini Coefficients 
Targeted Transfer 
X axis Y axis Cost (*) Observed Gini (*)
Simulated 
Gini (*) X axis Y axis Cost (*)
Observed 
Gini (*)
Simulated 
Gini (*)
(alpha=0) (g=0) (% national 
income)
(alpha=0) (g=0) (% national 
income)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (iv) (v) (vi) (iv) (v)
Bolivia
2002 10.76 0.92 0.90 0.624 0.613 10.13 1.07 1.04 0.624 0.611
Brazil
2002 7.18 0.07 0.07 0.595 0.594 4.38 0.52 0.50 0.595 0.589
Chile
2000 11.86 0.00 0.00 0.579 0.579 4.70 0.02 0.02 0.579 0.578
Colombia
1999 6.42 0.05 0.05 0.595 0.594 5.47 0.15 0.15 0.595 0.593
Costa Rica
2001 n.a. n.a. 0.01 0.517 0.517 3.01 0.09 0.08 0.517 0.516
Ecuador
1998 6.01 0.13 0.12 0.606 0.604 7.45 0.10 0.10 0.606 0.604
Guatemala
2002 6.68 0.34 0.34 0.592 0.588 6.76 0.77 0.75 0.592 0.583
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras
2003 3.56 0.04 0.04 0.563 0.563 4.13 0.11 0.10 0.563 0.562
Mexico
2002 4.29 0.04 0.04 0.548 0.547 6.15 0.19 0.19 0.548 0.546
Nicaragua
2001 4.49 0.04 0.04 0.568 0.567 4.46 0.06 0.05 0.568 0.567
Panama
2002 5.07 0.06 0.06 0.624 0.623 8.24 0.26 0.26 0.624 0.621
Paraguay
2001 3.28 0.11 0.11 0.621 0.620 5.32 0.75 0.73 0.621 0.612
Peru
2001 4.56 0.29 0.28 0.552 0.548 5.50 0.63 0.60 0.552 0.545
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
(*) The cost is calculated assuming no economic growth (g=0)
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Poverty line 1 U$S PPP a day Poverty line 50% median income
Country Year
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Table 5.5: Isopovery Curves: Axis Intercepts, Tranfer Cost and Gini Coefficients 
Egalitarian Transfer 
X axis Y axis Cost (*) Observed Gini (*)
Simulated 
Gini (*) X axis Y axis Cost (*)
Observed 
Gini (*)
Simulated 
Gini (*)
(alpha=0) (g=0) (% national 
income)
(alpha=0) (g=0) (% national 
income)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (iv) (v) (vi) (iv) (v)
Bolivia
2002 10.76 3.58 3.49 0.624 0.578 10.13 4.02 3.90 0.624 0.573
Brazil
2002 7.18 0.28 0.28 0.595 0.591 4.38 1.93 1.86 0.595 0.570
Chile
2000 11.86 0.01 0.01 0.579 0.579 4.70 0.08 0.08 0.579 0.578
Colombia
1999 6.42 0.18 0.17 0.595 0.592 5.47 0.63 0.61 0.595 0.587
Costa Rica
2001 n.a. n.a. 0.05 0.517 0.517 3.01 0.35 0.34 0.517 0.513
Ecuador
1998 6.01 0.48 0.46 0.606 0.600 7.45 0.39 0.38 0.606 0.601
Guatemala
2002 6.68 1.37 1.35 0.592 0.573 6.76 2.91 2.82 0.592 0.555
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras
2003 3.56 0.16 0.16 0.563 0.561 4.13 0.41 0.39 0.563 0.558
Mexico
2002 4.29 0.16 0.16 0.548 0.546 6.15 0.68 0.66 0.548 0.540
Nicaragua
2001 4.49 0.12 0.12 0.568 0.566 4.46 0.25 0.25 0.568 0.565
Panama
2002 5.07 0.22 0.22 0.624 0.621 8.24 0.88 0.85 0.624 0.613
Paraguay
2001 3.28 0.42 0.42 0.621 0.615 5.32 2.92 2.83 0.621 0.583
Peru
2001 4.56 1.11 1.08 0.552 0.537 5.50 2.27 2.18 0.552 0.524
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
(*) Calculated assuming no economic growth (g=0)
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Poverty line 50% median incomePoverty line 1 U$S PPP a day
Country Year
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Table 6.1: Decomposition of the Difference in Poverty Incidence Between Ethnic Groups 
Household per Capita Income - Poverty Line = 2 U$S PPP 
Effects as Levels 
Returns to 
education
Gender wage 
gap
Returns to 
experience Unobservables Hours of work Education
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Bolivia
2002 34.0 57.9 39.4 59.3 59.6 59.2 59.3 54.8
Brazil
2002 11.2 25.6 24.8 25.5 22.1 25.7 25.0 22.2
Chile
2000 7.5 20.3 24.5 19.7 17.9 20.6 19.8 19.2
Colombia
1999 22.7 34.7 32.7 36.2 32.4 35.4 33.3 31.1
Costa Rica
2001 11.6 12.8 14.3 12.3 11.6 13.4 14.6 11.5
Ecuador
1998 55.7 82.1 38.6 84.1 73.1 84.6 83.3 75.3
Guatemala
2002 20.7 50.3 47.1 54.8 50.7 50.3 56.4 48.1
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras
2003 34.2 60.4 60.3 50.5 72.7 61.3 57.1 51.3
Mexico
2002 24.4 72.0 50.6 72.6 70.7 74.8 70.7 57.5
Nicaragua
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Panama
2002 23.6 80.8 87.5 77.5 57.3 85.4 82.2 68.1
Paraguay
2001 8.8 36.7 39.1 31.2 30.7 38.1 38.2 28.8
Peru
2001 31.1 46.6 43.4 47.0 46.0 46.5 49.0 44.7
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
YearCountry
Non-whites simulated - Effects (levels)
Whites 
observed
Non-whites 
observed
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Table 6.2: Decomposition of the Difference in Poverty Incidence Between Ethnic Groups 
Household per Capita Income - Poverty Line = 2 U$S PPP 
Effects as Differences 
Returns to 
education
Gender wage 
gap
Returns to 
experience Unobservables Hours of work Education Rest
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Bolivia
2002 -23.9 -18.4 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.4 -3.1 -8.2
Brazil
2002 -14.4 -0.8 -0.1 -3.5 0.1 -0.6 -3.4 -6.2
Chile
2000 -12.8 4.2 -0.6 -2.4 0.3 -0.4 -1.0 -12.8
Colombia
1999 -12.0 -2.0 1.5 -2.4 0.7 -1.4 -3.6 -4.7
Costa Rica
2001 -1.2 1.5 -0.5 -1.2 0.6 1.8 -1.3 -2.1
Ecuador
1998 -26.5 -43.6 2.0 -9.1 2.5 1.1 -6.8 27.4
Guatemala
2002 -29.6 -3.2 4.5 0.4 0.0 6.1 -2.2 -35.1
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras
2003 -26.3 -0.2 -9.9 12.3 0.9 -3.3 -9.1 -17.0
Mexico
2002 -47.5 -21.4 0.7 -1.2 2.9 -1.2 -15 -12.7
Nicaragua
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Panama
2002 -57.2 6.6 -3.3 -23.5 4.6 1.4 -13 -30.2
Paraguay
2001 -27.8 2.4 -5.4 -6.0 1.4 1.5 -7.9 -13.8
Peru
2001 -15.5 -3.2 0.4 -0.5 -0.0 2.4 -1.8 -12.7
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Year
Actual 
differenceCountry
Non-whites simulated - Effects (differences)
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Table 6.3: Observed and Simulated Rates of School Attendance 
Primary 
Observed Using non-whites coef. Observed
Using whites 
coef.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Bolivia
2002 0.938 0.958 0.936 0.917
Brazil
2002 0.970 0.965 0.953 0.957
Chile
2000 0.988 0.979 0.975 0.973
Colombia
1999 0.903 0.906 0.892 0.883
Costa Rica
2001 0.962 0.963 0.958 0.947
Ecuador
1998 0.917 0.909 0.890 0.840
Guatemala
2002 0.873 0.828 0.775 0.835
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras
2003 0.878 0.913 0.895 0.842
Mexico
2002 0.973 0.971 0.965 0.954
Nicaragua
2001 0.884 0.878 0.897 0.835
Panama
2002 0.974 0.898 0.847 0.910
Paraguay
2001 0.973 0.960 0.946 0.902
Peru
2001 0.967 0.977 0.969 0.956
Suriname
2000 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Country Year
Primary
Whites Non-whites
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Table 6.4: Observed and Simulated Rates of School Attendance 
Secondary 
Observed Using non-whites coef. Observed
Using whites 
coef.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Bolivia
2002 0.482 0.516 0.451 0.402
Brazil
2002 0.327 0.268 0.181 0.245
Chile
2000 0.481 0.480 0.379 0.385
Colombia
1999 0.664 0.617 0.524 0.558
Costa Rica
2001 0.560 0.530 0.467 0.493
Ecuador
1998 0.580 0.433 0.362 0.392
Guatemala
2002 0.513 0.385 0.250 0.339
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras
2003 0.396 0.323 0.162 0.247
Mexico
2002 0.670 0.728 0.582 0.525
Nicaragua
2001 0.395 0.249 0.233 0.301
Panama
2002 0.730 0.310 0.209 0.399
Paraguay
2001 0.775 0.649 0.517 0.574
Peru
2001 0.675 0.724 0.680 0.625
Suriname
2000 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Country Year
Secondary
Whites Non-whites
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Table 6.5: Observed and Simulated Rates of School Attendance 
Tertiary 
Observed Using non-whites coef. Observed
Using whites 
coef.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Bolivia
2002 0.202 0.214 0.142 0.140
Brazil
2002 0.136 0.108 0.046 0.065
Chile
2000 0.082 0.092 0.034 0.033
Colombia
1999 0.114 0.104 0.057 0.058
Costa Rica
2001 0.110 0.077 0.041 0.062
Ecuador
1998 0.092 0.037 0.024 0.026
Guatemala
2002 0.141 0.151 0.071 0.067
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras
2003 0.078 0.043 0.007 0.019
Mexico
2002 0.066 0.066 0.018 0.022
Nicaragua
2001 0.093 0.180 0.115 0.150
Panama
2002 0.156 0.029 0.012 0.014
Paraguay
2001 0.208 0.143 0.059 0.082
Peru
2001 0.132 0.155 0.122 0.104
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys
Country Year
Whites Non-whites
Tertiary
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Table 6.6: Decomposition of the Rate of School Attendance 
Primary 
Country Year Parameters Characteristics Parameters Characteristics Parameters Characteristics
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Bolivia
2002 0.019 -0.022 0.019 -0.021 0.019 -0.022 -0.002
Brazil
2002 -0.004 -0.012 -0.005 -0.013 -0.005 -0.012 -0.017
Chile
2000 0.002 -0.004 -0.009 -0.014 -0.003 -0.009 -0.012
Colombia
1999 0.009 -0.014 0.002 -0.020 0.006 -0.017 -0.011
Costa Rica
2001 0.011 -0.005 0.001 -0.015 0.006 -0.010 -0.004
Ecuador
1998 0.050 -0.018 -0.009 -0.077 0.021 -0.048 -0.027
Guatemala
2002 -0.060 -0.053 -0.045 -0.038 -0.052 -0.046 -0.098
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras
2003 0.053 -0.018 0.034 -0.036 0.044 -0.027 0.017
Mexico
2002 0.011 -0.006 -0.002 -0.019 0.004 -0.013 -0.008
Nicaragua
2001 0.061 0.019 -0.006 -0.048 0.028 -0.015 0.013
Panama
2002 -0.063 -0.051 -0.076 -0.065 -0.070 -0.058 -0.128
Paraguay
2001 0.044 -0.013 -0.013 -0.070 0.015 -0.042 -0.027
Peru
2001 0.013 -0.008 0.010 -0.011 0.011 -0.009 0.002
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Primary
Base group non-whites Base group whites Average Actual 
difference (*)
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Table 6.7: Decomposition of the Rate of School Attendance 
Secondary 
Country Year Parameters Characteristics Parameters Characteristics Parameters Characteristics
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Bolivia
2002 0.049 -0.065 0.034 -0.080 0.041 -0.072 -0.031
Brazil
2002 -0.063 -0.087 -0.059 -0.082 -0.061 -0.085 -0.146
Chile
2000 -0.005 -0.101 -0.001 -0.096 -0.003 -0.098 -0.102
Colombia
1999 -0.034 -0.093 -0.047 -0.106 -0.041 -0.099 -0.140
Costa Rica
2001 -0.026 -0.063 -0.030 -0.067 -0.028 -0.065 -0.093
Ecuador
1998 -0.030 -0.071 -0.147 -0.188 -0.088 -0.129 -0.218
Guatemala
2002 -0.089 -0.135 -0.128 -0.174 -0.109 -0.154 -0.263
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras
2003 -0.085 -0.160 -0.073 -0.149 -0.079 -0.155 -0.234
Mexico
2002 0.057 -0.146 0.058 -0.145 0.057 -0.146 -0.088
Nicaragua
2001 -0.069 -0.017 -0.145 -0.094 -0.107 -0.055 -0.162
Panama
2002 -0.190 -0.102 -0.419 -0.331 -0.305 -0.216 -0.521
Paraguay
2001 -0.057 -0.132 -0.126 -0.201 -0.092 -0.166 -0.258
Peru
2001 0.055 -0.044 0.049 -0.050 0.052 -0.047 0.005
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Secondary
Base group non-whites Base group whites Average Actual 
difference (*)
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Table 6.8: Decomposition of the Rate of School Attendance 
Tertiary 
Country Year Parameters Characteristics Parameters Characteristics Parameters Characteristics
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Bolivia
2002 0.002 -0.072 0.011 -0.063 0.007 -0.067 -0.060
Brazil
2002 -0.019 -0.062 -0.028 -0.071 -0.024 -0.067 -0.090
Chile
2000 0.001 -0.057 0.010 -0.049 0.005 -0.053 -0.048
Colombia
1999 -0.001 -0.046 -0.010 -0.056 -0.006 -0.051 -0.057
Costa Rica
2001 -0.021 -0.036 -0.033 -0.048 -0.027 -0.042 -0.069
Ecuador
1998 -0.002 -0.013 -0.054 -0.066 -0.028 -0.040 -0.068
Guatemala
2002 0.004 -0.079 0.009 -0.074 0.007 -0.077 -0.070
Haiti
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras
2003 -0.012 -0.036 -0.035 -0.059 -0.024 -0.048 -0.071
Mexico
2002 -0.004 -0.048 -0.000 -0.044 -0.002 -0.046 -0.048
Nicaragua
2001 -0.035 -0.065 0.087 0.057 0.026 -0.004 0.022
Panama
2002 -0.001 -0.016 -0.127 -0.142 -0.064 -0.079 -0.143
Paraguay
2001 -0.023 -0.084 -0.065 -0.126 -0.044 -0.105 -0.149
Peru
2001 0.018 -0.033 0.022 -0.029 0.020 -0.031 -0.011
Suriname
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tertiary
Base group non-whites Base group whites Average Actual 
difference (*)
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Graph 1.1: Regional comparisons Goal 1 
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Graph 1.2: Regional comparisons Goal 2 
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Graph 1.3: Percentage of people living in rural areas 
33.0
40.2
51.6
51.2
21.9
40.7
22.6
38.5
51.4
23.3
13.59
28.2
12.9
100.0
88.8
82.8
74.5
72.3
72.0
68.1
64.3
54.3
49.7
49.6
45.2
19.3
0 20 40 60 80 100
Panama
Ecuador
Honduras
Guatemala
M exico
Nicaragua
Paraguay
Costa Rica
Colombia
Bolivia
Chile
Peru
Brazil
White Non-White
 
 Graph 1.4: Family characteristics 
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Graph 1.5: Labor market characteristics - Male 
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Employment Rates
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Graph 1.6: Employment characteristics – Males  
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% of  males working as self -employed
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% of M ale working in Small Firms
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Graph 1.7: Labor market characteristics - Female 
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Unemployment Rates
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Figure 2.1: Poverty rankings – Headcount ratio 
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Figure 2.2: Poverty rankings – Poverty gap 
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Figure 2.3: Poverty rankings - Severity of poverty 
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Graph 2.4: Headcount ratio – 1 dollar-a-day PPP 
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Graph 2.5: Evolution of poverty  
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Graph 2.6.a: Rural areas characteristics 
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Graph 2.6.b: Urban areas characteristics 
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Graph 2.7: Poverty and mean income 
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Graph 2.8: Mean household per capita income and mean hourly real wage 
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Graph 2.9 : White’s and non-white’s mean incomes 
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Graph 2.10: Poverty and inequality 
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Graph 2.11: Poverty and discrimination in the labor market 
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Chapter 3 
Graph 3.1: Literacy Rates 
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Graph 3.2: Net Enrollment Rates in Each Education Level 
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Graph 3.3: Poverty and enrollment rates 
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Graph 3.4: Mean of School Gap 
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Graph 3.5: Ethnic Discrimination 
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Tert iary
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Graph 3.6: Social Mobility Index 
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Chapter 4 
Graph 4.1: Ratio of literate women to men ages 15-24 
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50
Brazil
Costa Rica
Colombia
Chile
Paraguay
Honduras
Nicaragua
Bolivia
M exico
Ecuador
Guatemala
Panama
Peru
Non-White White
 
Graph 4.2: Ratio of Enrolled Girls to Enrolled Boys 
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[19-24]
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Graph 4.3: Ratio of Women to Men with High Skill Level 
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Graph 4.4: Percentage of People Working in Agricultural Jobs by Gender 
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Graph 4.5: Gross Gender Wage Gap 
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Chapter 5 
Graph 5.1: National Effects of Halving Poverty for Non-Whites – Poverty Incidence 
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Graph 5.2: National Effects of Halving Poverty for Non-Whites – Poverty Gap 
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Graph 5.3: National Effects of Halving Poverty for Non-Whites – Severity of Poverty 
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Graph 5.4: Isopoverty curves 
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Graph 5.5: Isopoverty Curves 
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Graph 5.6: Income transfer as a percentage of the country’s total income 
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Graph 5.7: Gini coefficient before and after the transfer 
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Chapter 6 
Graph 6.1: Distribution of log household per capita income 
Observed and Simulated 
Kernel estimates of the density functions 
Note: The vertical line represents the poverty line 
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 Graph 6.2: Distribution of log household per capita income 
Observed and Simulated 
Kernel estimates of the density functions 
Note: The vertical line represents the poverty line 
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